Han Feizi – Chapter 36.3

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When Guan Zhong fell ill, Duke Huan of Qi went to visit him and said, “Zhongfu, you are gravely ill. If you should unfortunately die, what advice would you leave me?” Guan Zhong replied, “Even if Your Lordship had not asked, I was about to speak. I wish you to dismiss Shu Diao, remove Yi Ya, and keep Prince Kaifang of Wei at a distance. Yi Ya was in charge of your food. Since you had never tasted human flesh, he steamed his own son’s head and offered it to you. Among human feelings, none is stronger than love for one’s child. If he does not love his own son, how could he love you? You are jealous and fond of women in your inner quarters. Shu Diao castrated himself so that he could manage them. Among human feelings, none is stronger than care for one’s own body. If he does not care for his own body, how could he love you? I have heard that Kaifang has served you for fifteen years. The distance between Qi and Wei is only a few days’ journey, yet he abandoned his mother and remained in office without returning. If he does not love his mother, how could he love you? I have heard: ‘Affected falsehood does not last long; covered-up falsity cannot endure.’ I hope you will keep these three men at a distance for a long time.” After Guan Zhong died, Duke Huan did not follow his advice. When Duke Huan died, worms crawled out of his corpse, and he was not buried.

Someone says: The advice Guan Zhong gave Duke Huan was not the speech of a man who understood proper institutions. He wanted Shu Diao and Yi Ya removed because they did not care for their own bodies in order to suit the ruler’s desires. He said, “If they do not care for their own bodies, how could they love the ruler?” But then, if ministers exhaust themselves and risk death for their lord, would Guan Zhong refuse to employ them? If he says, “Those who do not cherish their lives cannot love the ruler,” then the ruler would be dismissing loyal ministers. Moreover, to infer disloyalty to the ruler from a lack of care for oneself is like inferring that Guan Zhong would not serve Duke Huan because he did not die for Prince Jiu. By that standard, Guan Zhong himself would fall within the group to be dismissed.

The way of an enlightened ruler is not like this. He establishes what people desire – titles and emoluments – to encourage merit; he establishes what people dread – punishments – to prohibit wickedness. When rewards are certain and punishments inevitable, the ruler achieves merit through his ministers, and wickedness does not deceive him. Even if there were a Shu Diao, what could he do to the ruler? Ministers exhaust their strength in exchange with the ruler; the ruler dispenses titles and emoluments in exchange with ministers. The relationship between ruler and minister is not the intimacy of father and son; it arises from calculation. If the ruler has proper methods, ministers exert themselves and wickedness does not arise. If he lacks proper methods, ministers block the ruler’s clarity above and pursue private gain below.

Guan Zhong did not make these institutional principles clear to Duke Huan. He merely told him to dismiss Shu Diao; yet if one Shu Diao is removed, another will appear. This is not the way to cut off wickedness. The reason Duke Huan died with worms flowing from his corpse and remained unburied was that his ministers had become too powerful. The reality of such ministerial weight is that they usurped control over the ruler. When a minister usurps control, the ruler’s orders do not reach downward, and the ministers’ true conditions do not reach upward. The power of a single person can separate ruler from minister, so that good and bad outcomes are unheard, and fortune and disaster do not pass through. Hence the disaster of going unburied.

The way of an enlightened ruler is this: no one person holds multiple offices; no one office handles multiple responsibilities. Those of low rank need not wait for the noble to introduce them before being advanced and judged; great ministers do not depend on the ruler’s attendants to gain audience. All officials communicate properly; all ministers gather like spokes around a hub. When someone is to be rewarded, the ruler sees his merit; when someone is to be punished, the ruler knows his crime. When perception and knowledge are not contradicted beforehand, and rewards and punishments are not corrupted afterward, how could there be any danger of going unburied? Guan Zhong did not explain this to Duke Huan; he only told him to remove three men. Therefore it is said: Guan Zhong lacked proper institutional method.

Note

This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 36.3 critiques Guan Zhong’s advice to Duke Huan. It argues merely dismissing treacherous favorites is insufficient; sound institutions and reliable reward‑punishment systems are needed to block ministerial usurpation.

Han Feizi and Legalism:

Han Fei was a major Legalist thinker of the late Warring States period. Legalism emphasized clear laws, rewards, punishments, and institutional control rather than reliance on personal virtue.

Duke Huan of Qi:

A famous ruler of the Spring and Autumn period and traditionally counted among the Five Hegemons. His early success is often attributed to Guan Zhong’s reforms.

Guan Zhong:

Duke Huan’s chief minister, remembered as an able administrator. Here he warns against three dangerous favorites but is criticized by Han Fei for not proposing institutional reform.

Shu Diao, Yi Ya, and Prince Kaifang of Wei:

Court favorites in Qi. Yi Ya is said to have cooked his own son for the ruler; Shu Diao castrated himself to serve in the inner palace; Kaifang abandoned his mother to remain at court. Han Fei uses them to discuss how ministers may manipulate rulers.

“Worms crawled out; he was not buried”:

A shocking image of political collapse. After Guan Zhong’s death, Duke Huan kept these favorites; after his own death, court disorder prevented his burial.

Ruler–minister relationship as exchange:

Han Fei treats politics as a realm of calculated interests, not familial affection. Ministers serve for reward; rulers control through law and position.

Institutional method versus personal judgment:

Han Fei argues that removing three men is not enough. A ruler must prevent any minister from monopolizing access to the throne by using clear offices, open channels, and reliable rewards and punishments.

Zhongfu:

An honorific title meaning “Second Father,” showing Duke Huan’s high respect for Guan Zhong.

三

  管仲有病,桓公往问之,曰:“仲父病,不幸卒于大命,将奚以告寡人?”管仲曰:“微君言,臣故将谒之。愿君去竖刁,除易牙,远卫公子开方。易牙为君主,惟人肉未尝,易牙烝其子首而进之。夫人唯情莫不爱其子,今弗爱其子,安能爱君?君妒而好内,竖刁自宫以治内。人情莫不爱其身,身且不爱,安能爱君?闻开方事君十五年,齐、卫之间不容数日行,弃其母,久宦不归。其母不爱,安能爱君?臣闻之:‘矜伪不长,盖虚不久。’愿君久去此三子者也。”管仲卒死,桓公弗行。及桓公死,虫出尸不葬。

  或曰:管仲所以见告桓公者,非有度者之言也。所以去竖刁、易牙者,以不爱其身,适君之欲也。曰:“不爱其身,安能爱君?”然则臣有尽死力以为其主者,管仲将弗用也。曰“不爱其死力,安能爱君?”是君去忠臣也。且以不爱其身度其不爱其君,是将以管仲之不能死公子纠度其不死桓公也,是管仲亦在所去之域矣。明主之道不然,设民所欲以求其功,故为爵禄以劝之;设民所恶以禁其奸,故为刑罚以威之。庆赏信而刑罚必,故君举功于臣而奸不用于上,虽有竖刁,其奈君何?且臣尽死力以与君市,君垂爵禄以与臣市。君臣之际,非父子之亲也,计数之所出也。君有道,则臣尽力而奸不生;无道,则臣上塞主明而下成私。管仲非明此度数于桓公也,使去竖刁,一竖刁又至,非绝奸之道也。且桓公所以身死虫流出尸不葬者,是臣重也。臣重之实,擅主也。有擅主之臣,则君令不下究,臣情不上通。一人之力能隔君臣之间,使善败不闻,祸福不通,故有不葬之患也。明主之道:一人不兼官,一官不兼事;卑贱不待尊贵而进论,大臣不因左右而见;百官修通,群臣辐凑;有赏者君见其功,有罚者君知其罪。见知不悖于前,赏罚不弊于后,安有不葬之患?管仲非明此言于桓公也,使去三子,故曰:管仲无度矣。

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