Explanations I
If rewards and praise do not spur a man to effort, and punishments and blame do not make him afraid – if these four measures are applied to him and he still does not change – then he should be eliminated.
Duke Jing of Qi visited Jin and drank with Duke Ping, while Shi Kuang attended them. Duke Jing asked Shi Kuang about government, saying, “What will you teach me?” Shi Kuang replied, “You must simply benefit the people.” When the drinking was half over and they were about to leave, Duke Jing asked again, “What will you teach me?” Shi Kuang again said, “You must simply benefit the people.” When Duke Jing left for his lodging, Shi Kuang escorted him, and Duke Jing asked once more. Shi Kuang replied, “You must simply benefit the people.”
After returning, Duke Jing reflected while still not fully sober and understood whom Shi Kuang meant: Gongzi Wei and Gongzi Xia, the duke’s two younger brothers. They were greatly loved by the people of Qi; their households were rich and honored, and the people delighted in them, so that they rivaled the ducal house. This endangered Duke Jing’s position. “So when he tells me to benefit the people, is he telling me to compete with my two brothers for the people?” Duke Jing therefore returned to Qi, distributed grain from the granaries to the poor, scattered surplus treasury wealth to orphans and widows, left no old grain in the storehouses nor surplus wealth in the treasuries, married out palace women who had not been favored, and provided stipend grain to those aged seventy and above. In this way he dispensed virtue and favor to the people, competing with his two brothers for popular support. After two years, the two brothers fled: Gongzi Xia escaped to Chu, and Gongzi Wei to Jin.
Duke Jing and Yan Zi were touring near the Little Sea. They ascended the Baining Terrace and looked back over the state. Duke Jing said, “How magnificent! How vast and grand! Who will possess this in later generations?” Yan Zi replied, “Perhaps the Tian Cheng clan.” Duke Jing said, “I possess this state; why do you say the Tian Cheng clan will possess it?” Yan Zi answered, “The Tian clan has won over the people of Qi. Toward the people, they lobby the great ministers above for titles and emoluments, and below they privately lend grain using large measures and collect repayment using small ones. When they slaughter an ox, they take only a small portion of meat and use the rest to feed their retainers. Throughout the year they keep only a small share of cloth and silk and use the rest to clothe their men. Thus timber in the market is no dearer than in the mountains, and fish, salt, turtles, snails, and mussels from the marshes are no dearer than at the sea. The ruler imposes heavy exactions, while Tian Chengshi gives generously. Once, when Qi suffered great famine, the starving dead by the roadside were countless; yet fathers and sons, hand in hand, fled to Tian Chengshi, and none failed to survive. The people of Zhou and Qin even sang together: ‘Oh, will it cease? Oh, shall we go and take refuge with Master Tian?’ The Book of Poetry says, ‘Though no virtue is given to you, still you sing and dance.’ Now Tian Chengshi’s virtue makes the people sing and dance; their hearts have turned to him. Therefore I say: perhaps it will be the Tian Cheng clan.”
Duke Jing wept and said, “Is this not sorrowful? I hold the state, yet the Tian Cheng clan may come to possess it. What can I do now?” Yan Zi replied, “Why should you worry? If you wish to take it back, draw near the worthy and keep the unworthy at a distance, rectify disorder, relax punishments, relieve the poor, care for orphans and widows, dispense favor, and supply the needy. Then the people will return to you. Even if there were ten Tian Cheng clans, what could they do against you?”
Another view says: Duke Jing did not know how to use positional power, and Shi Kuang and Yan Zi did not understand how to remove threats. A hunter who relies on the comfort of a carriage, the speed of six horses, and the reinsmanship of Wang Lao will exert little effort and easily overtake swift beasts. But if he abandons the carriage, discards the horses, and runs on foot, even Lou Ji’s swift legs could never catch them. With good horses and a firm carriage, even a slave would have more than enough. The state is the ruler’s carriage; positional power is his horses. Not to occupy this power in order to restrain and punish ministers who act on private favor, but instead to compete with the world for the people by generous virtue, is to abandon the carriage and run on foot. Thus Duke Jing was a ruler who did not know how to use power, while Shi Kuang and Yan Zi were ministers who did not know how to remove threats.
Zi Xia said, “The Spring and Autumn Annals records ministers killing rulers and sons killing fathers in numerous cases. None occurred in a single day; they grew gradually. Treachery, practiced long enough, accumulates strength; accumulated strength enables killing. Therefore an enlightened ruler cuts it off early.” Now Tian Chang’s rebellion already showed gradual signs, yet the ruler did not punish him. Yan Zi did not induce his ruler to prohibit encroaching ministers, but urged him to dispense favor; hence Duke Jian suffered disaster. As Zi Xia said, “One who is skilled at maintaining power cuts off treachery at its sprout.”
When Ji Sun was chief minister of Lu, Zi Lu served as magistrate of Hou. In the fifth month, Lu raised a labor force to dig a long canal. Zi Lu used his own grain to prepare food and drink, and fed the laborers at the crossroads of Wufu. Confucius heard of this and sent Zigong to overturn the food and break the vessels, saying, “The ruler of Lu possesses these people; why do you feed them?” Zi Lu was angered, rolled up his sleeves, entered, and asked, “Master, do you object to my practicing benevolence and righteousness? What I have learned from you is benevolence and righteousness, which mean sharing what one has and benefiting others together with the world. I feed the people with my own grain; why should this be wrong?” Confucius said, “You are crude! I thought you understood, but you have not yet reached it. How ignorant you are of ritual! You feed them as if they were yours to give to. By ritual, the Son of Heaven cares for all under Heaven, a feudal lord for those within his borders, a great officer for his office, and a shi for his household. To go beyond what one is entitled to is encroachment. Now the ruler of Lu possesses these people, yet you arbitrarily bestow love upon them. This is encroachment; is it not false?”
Before he finished speaking, Ji Sun’s messenger arrived and reproached him, saying, “It is I, Fei, who roused the people and set them to work. You have sent your disciple to stop them and feed them; are you trying to take my people from me?” Confucius yoked his horses and left Lu. With all his worthiness, Confucius, though not the ruler, used the ruler’s technique to prohibit unauthorized private favor before harm arose. How much more could a true ruler do so? If Duke Jing had used his power to prohibit Tian Chang’s encroachment, he would surely have avoided the danger of being overpowered or killed.
When Taigong Wang was enfeoffed in Qi to the east, there lived by the eastern sea two recluses, brothers named Kuang Yu and Hua Shi. They declared, “We do not serve the Son of Heaven as ministers, nor associate with feudal lords as friends. We plow to eat, dig wells to drink, and depend on no one. We seek no name from superiors, no salary from rulers; we do not serve in office, but rely on our own labor.” When Taigong Wang arrived at Yingqiu, he had officials arrest and execute them as the first to be punished.
The Duke of Zhou, hearing of this from Lu, sent an urgent message to ask, “These two men are worthy. Why do you execute worthy men just as you have received your state?” Taigong Wang replied, “These brothers declare, ‘We do not serve the Son of Heaven, nor associate with feudal lords; we plow to eat, dig wells to drink, and depend on no one.’ Their refusal to serve the Son of Heaven means I cannot make them my ministers; their refusal to associate with feudal lords means I cannot employ them; their self-sufficiency means I cannot encourage or restrain them by reward and punishment. Without recognition from superiors, even a wise man is not useful to me; without reliance on a ruler’s salary, even a worthy man brings me no merit. If they do not serve, they cannot be governed; if they accept no office, they are not loyal. The former kings moved their ministers and people by means of rank and salary, or by punishment. If these four means cannot move them, for whom am I to be ruler? To become prominent without bearing arms, and to gain a name without personally plowing, is also unfit to serve as instruction to the state.
Suppose there is a horse that resembles a thoroughbred, the finest under Heaven. Yet when driven it will not advance, when pulled back it will not stop, when guided left it does not go left, and when guided right it does not go right. Even a lowly servant would not entrust his feet to such a carriage. Servants wish to entrust themselves to a thoroughbred because it can pursue advantage and avoid harm. If it cannot be used by people, even a servant will not rely on it. These men call themselves worthy scholars of the age, yet they are not employed by their ruler; though extremely virtuous, they are of no use to the ruler. This is not how an enlightened ruler obtains ministers. They are like a thoroughbred that cannot be directed; therefore I executed them.”
Another version says: When Taigong Wang was enfeoffed in Qi, there was a worthy man named Kuang Yu by the sea. Taigong Wang heard of him and went to invite him, turning his horses back three times at the gate, yet Kuang Yu did not respond or appear. Taigong Wang executed him. At that time the Duke of Zhou was in Lu and hastened to stop him, but by the time he arrived the execution had already been carried out. The Duke of Zhou said, “Kuang Yu is a worthy man of the world; why did you execute him?” Taigong Wang replied, “Kuang Yu holds that one should not serve the Son of Heaven nor associate with feudal lords. I feared he would disrupt the laws and alter instruction, so I executed him first. Suppose there is a horse whose appearance resembles a thoroughbred, yet when driven it will not go and when led it will not advance; even a servant would not place his foot upon its carriage. Therefore I executed him.”
Ru Er persuaded Duke Si of Wei, and the duke sighed with admiration. His attendants asked, “Why do you not make him chief minister?” The duke replied, “A horse that looks like a deer may be valued at a thousand gold, yet there are horses worth a hundred gold and no deer worth a thousand. Why? Because horses are useful to people, while deer are not. Ru Er has the talent of a chief minister for a state of ten thousand chariots, yet his heart is set on a great power abroad and not on Wei. Though eloquent and intelligent, he is not useful to me; therefore I do not appoint him.”
When Lord Xue served as chief minister to Duke Zhao of Wei, there were two men of the Luan clan, Yang Hu and Pan Qi, who were highly esteemed by the ruler but did not serve Lord Xue. Lord Xue was troubled by this, so he summoned them to gamble, giving each a hundred gold, and soon increasing it to two hundred. While they were gambling, a gatekeeper announced that the son of Zhang Ji was at the door. Lord Xue became angry, took up a weapon, and handed it to the gatekeeper, saying, “Kill him! I have heard that Zhang Ji does not serve me.”
After a moment, Zhang Ji’s brother, Zhang Jiyu, who was present, said, “That is not so. I have privately heard that Zhang Ji serves you well; only his activities have been hidden from others.” Lord Xue then stopped, did not kill the guest, and treated him with great honor, saying, “Earlier I heard that Zhang Ji did not serve me, so I wished to kill him. Now that he truly serves me, how could I forget him?” He ordered the granary to present a thousand shi of grain, the treasury five hundred gold, and the stables two fine carriages with good horses; he also commanded a eunuch to lead twenty beautiful concubines from the palace and send them all to Zhang Ji. The Luan men then said to one another, “Those who serve the lord will surely benefit; those who do not will surely suffer. Why should we hesitate to serve him?” They privately urged one another and henceforth served him.
Lord Xue, though a minister, used the techniques of a ruler and prevented harm from arising; how much more could a true ruler do so? A bird trainer cuts the lower feathers of a bird; then it must rely on humans for food, and how can it remain untamed? An enlightened ruler keeps his ministers in the same way: he makes them unable to benefit except through the ruler’s salary, and unable to avoid submitting to the ruler’s name. Benefiting from the ruler’s salary and submitting to the ruler’s name, how can they fail to obey?
Note
This Han Feizi‑Chapter 34.4 Legalist section collects multiple anecdotes. It stresses rulers must eliminate ungovernable threats early and control ministers via power and rewards‑punishments, rather than merely competing through private benevolence.
A late Warring States Legalist thinker who argued that rulers should rely on law, administrative technique, and positional power rather than moral persuasion alone.
A famous blind music master of Jin, often consulted as a wise adviser in early Chinese texts.
Duke Jing of Qi:
A Spring and Autumn ruler of Qi. Here he faces competition from powerful relatives and from the Tian clan.
Tian Cheng clan / Tian Chang:
The Tian family gradually won popular support in Qi and later displaced the ruling house. Tian Chang is associated with the overthrow of Duke Jian of Qi.
Zi Xia:
A disciple of Confucius. Han Fei cites him to argue that threats to rulers develop gradually and must be stopped early.
Ji Sun, Zi Lu, Confucius:
Ji Sun was a powerful ministerial family in Lu. Zi Lu, a disciple of Confucius, acts out of benevolence, but Confucius stops him because private charity to the ruler’s people can be seen as political encroachment.
Taigong Wang / Jiang Ziya:
The founding ruler of Qi under the Zhou dynasty. He executes recluses who refuse to serve the state.
Kuang Yu and Hua Shi:
Reclusive brothers who claim self-sufficiency and refuse political obligation. Han Fei uses them to argue that those beyond reward and punishment threaten legal order.
A foundational Zhou statesman, here representing a more respectful attitude toward reputed worthies.
Wang Lao:
A legendary expert charioteer, used as a symbol of skilled control.
Lou Ji:
A legendary swift runner, used to show that human effort cannot replace proper instruments of power.
Ru Er and Duke Si of Wei:
Ru Er is a talented persuader; Duke Si refuses to appoint him because his loyalty lies elsewhere.
说一
赏之誉不劝，罚之毁之不畏.四者加焉不变，则除之。
齐景公之晋，从平公饮，师旷侍坐。景公问政于师旷曰：“太师将奚以教寡人？”师旷曰：“君必惠民而已。”中坐，酒酣，将出，又复问政于师旷曰：“太师奚以教寡人？”。师旷曰：“君必惠民而已矣。”景公出之舍，师旷送之，又问政于师旷。师旷曰：“君必惠民而已矣。”景公归思，未醒，而得师旷之所谓公子尾、公子夏者，景公之二弟也，甚得齐民，家富贵而说之，拟于公室，此危吾位者也，今谓我惠民，使我与二弟争民邪？于是反国，发禀粟以赋众贫，散府馀财以赐孤寡，仓无陈粟，府无馀财，宫妇不御者出嫁之，七十受禄米，鬻德惠施于民也，已与二弟争民。居二年，二弟出走，公子夏逃楚，公子尾走晋。
景公与晏了子游于少海，登柏寝之台而还望其国曰：“美哉！泱泱乎，堂堂乎！后世将孰有此？”晏子对曰：“其田成氏乎！“景公曰：“寡人有此国也，而曰田成氏有之，何也？”晏子对曰：“夫田氏甚得齐民，其于民也，上之请爵禄行诸大臣，下之私大斗斛区釜以出贷，小斗斛区釜以收之。杀一牛，取一豆肉，馀以食士。终岁，布帛取二制焉，馀以衣士。故市木之价不加贵于山，泽之鱼监龟鳖蠃蚌不贵于海。君重敛，而田成氏厚施。齐尝大饥，道旁饿死者不可胜数也，父子相牵而趋田成氏者，不闻不生。故周秦之民相与歌之曰：’讴乎，其已乎！苞乎，其往归田成子乎！’《诗》曰：’虽无德与女，式歌且舞。’今田成氏之德而民之歌舞，民德归之矣。故曰：’其田成氏乎！’“公泫然出涕曰：“不亦悲乎！寡人有国而田成氏有之，今为之奈何？”晏子对曰：“君何患焉？若君欲夺之，则近贤而远不肖，治其烦乱，缓其刑罚，振贫穷而恤孤寡，行恩惠而给不足，民将归君，则虽有十田成氏，其如君何？”
或曰：景公不知用势，而师旷、晏子不知患。夫猎者托车舆之安，用六马之足，使王良佐辔，则身不劳而易及轻兽矣。今释车舆之利，捐六马之足与王良之御，而下走逐兽，则虽楼季之足无时及兽矣。托良马固车，则臧获有馀。国者，君之车也；势者，君之马也。夫不处势以禁诛擅爱之臣，而必德厚以与天下齐行以争民，是皆不乘君之车，为因马之利，释车而下走者也。故曰：景公不知用势之主也，而师旷、晏子不知除患之臣也。
子夏曰：“《春秋》之记臣杀君、子杀父者，以十数矣，皆非一日之积也，有渐而以至矣。凡奸者，行久而成积，积成而力多，力多而能杀，故明主蚤绝之。”今田常之为乱，有渐见矣，而君不诛。晏子不使其君禁侵陵之臣，而使其主行惠，故简公受其祸。故子夏曰：“善持势者，蚤绝奸之萌。”
季孙相鲁，子路为郈令。鲁以五月起众为长沟，当此之为，子路以其私秧粟为浆饭，要作沟者于五父之衢而飡之。孔子闻之，使子贡往覆其饭，击毁其器，曰：“鲁君有民，子奚为乃餐之？”子路怫然怒，攘肱而入，请曰：“夫子疾由之为仁义乎？所学于夫子者，仁义也；仁义者，与天下共其所有而同其利其也。今以由之伯粟而餐民，其不可何也？”孔子曰：“由之野也！吾以女知之，女徒未及也。女故如是之不知礼也！女之餐之，为受之也。夫礼，天子爱天下，诸候爱境内，大夫爱官职，士爱其家，过其所受曰侵。今鲁君有民而子擅爱之，是子侵也，不亦诬乎！“言未卒，而季孙使者至，让曰：“肥也起民而使之，先生使弟子止徒役而餐之，将夺肥之民耶？”孔子驾而去鲁。以孔子之贤，而季孙非鲁君也，以人臣之资，假人主之术，蚤禁于未形，而子路不得行其私惠，而害不得生，况人主乎！以景公之势而禁田常之侵也，则必无劫弑之患矣。
太公望东封于齐，齐东海上有居士曰狂矞、华士昆弟二人者立议曰：“吾不臣天子，不友诸侯，耕作而食之，掘井而饮之，吾无求于人也。无上之名，无君之禄，不事仕而事力。”太公望至于营丘，使吏执而杀之，以为首诛。周公旦从鲁闻之，发急传而问之曰：“夫二子，贤者也。今日飨国而杀贤者，何也？”太公望曰：“是昆弟二人立议曰：’吾不臣天子，不友诸侯，耕作而食之，掘井而饮之，吾无求于人也。无上之名，无君之禄，不事仕而事力。’彼不臣天子者，是望不得而臣也；不友诸侯者，是望不得而使也；耕作而食之，掘井而饮之，无求于人者，是望不得以赏罚劝禁也。且无上名，虽知，不为望用；不仰君禄，虽贤，不为望功。不仕，则不治；不任，则不忠。且先王之所以使其臣民者，非爵禄则刑罚也。今四者不足以使之，则望当谁为君乎？不服兵革而显，不亲耕耨而名，又非所以教于国也。今有马于此，如骥之状者，天下之至良也。然而驱之不前，却之不止，左之不左，右之不右，则臧获虽贱，不托其足。臧获之所愿托其足于骥者，以骥之可以追利辟害也。今不为人用，臧获虽贱，不托其足焉。已自谓以为世之贤士，而不为主用，行极贤而不用于君，此非明主之所以臣也，亦骥之不可左右矣，是以诛之。”
一曰：太公望东封于齐。海上有贤者狂矞，太公望闻之，往请焉，三却马于门而狂矞不报见也，太公望诛之。当是时也，周公旦在鲁，驰往止之；比至，已诛之矣。周公旦曰：狂矞，天下贤者也，夫子何为诛之？”太公望曰：“狂矞也议不臣天子，不友诸候，吾恐其乱法易教也，故以为首诛。今有马于此，形容似骥也，然驱之不往，引之不前，虽臧获不托足于其轸也。”
如耳说卫嗣公，卫嗣公说而太息。左右曰：“公何为不相也？”公曰：“夫马似鹿者，而题之千金。然而有百金之马而无千金之鹿者，何也？马为人用而鹿不为人用也。今如耳万乘之相也，外有大国之意，其心不在卫，虽辩知，亦不为寡人用，吾是以不相也。”
薛公子相魏昭候也，左右有栾子者曰阳胡，潘，其于王甚重，而不为薛公。薛公患之，于是乃召与之博，予之人百金，令之昆弟博；俄又益之人二百金。方博有问，谒者言客张季之子在门，公怫然怒，抚兵而授谒者曰：“杀之！吾闻季之不为文也。”立有间，时季羽在侧，曰：“不然。窃闻季为公甚，顾其人阴未闻耳。”乃辍不杀客大礼之，曰：“曩者闻季之不为文也，故欲杀之；今诚为文也，岂忘季哉！“告廪献千石之粟，告府献五百金，告驺私厩献良马固车二乘，因令奄将宫人之美妾二十人并遗季也。栾子因相谓曰：“为公者必利，不为公者必害，吾曹何爱不为公？”因私竞劝而遂为之。薛公以人臣之势，假人主之术也，而害不得生，况错之人主乎！夫驯鸟者断其下翎，则必恃人而食，焉得不驯乎？夫明主畜臣亦然，令臣不得不利君之禄，不得无服上之名。夫利君之禄，服上之名，焉得不服？
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