This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 39.2 presents two successive rebuttals over imprisoning fugitive rebel Yang Hu. It debates whether punishing known rebels deters hidden treachery, examining ministerial loyalty, human greed and royal deterrent statecraft.
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 38.4 rejects Confucius’ varied governance advice for three rulers. It argues “knowing subordinates” via objective assessment and strict reward‑punishment, not subjective virtues, is the core of sound rulership.
This Han Feizi‑Chapter 34.4 Legalist section collects multiple anecdotes. It stresses rulers must eliminate ungovernable threats early and control ministers via power and rewards‑punishments, rather than merely competing through private benevolence.
This is Explanation Six from Han Feizi: Inner Congested Sayings, Part II. Han Fei reveals a political law: a foe’s deadliest attack is not military invasion, but espionage and stratagems to manipulate a ruler’s official appointments. Enemies seek to muddle the ruler’s judgment and steer his decisions astray.
Duke Jing of Qi planned to offer Confucius a middle-tier official rank but later declined to employ him, claiming old age. Confucius left Qi at once, refusing a powerless post and upholding his dignity to seek a ruler willing to fully implement his moral ideals.