The State of Zhao lay in the central plain, a land inhabited by mixed peoples. Its folk were frivolous and hard to command. Its government decrees were ill‑regulated, rewards and punishments lacked credibility, its terrain offered no strategic advantage, and its ruler could not fully mobilize the strength of the people. Zhao already bore the shape of a doomed state, yet its rulers cared little for the common folk.
Zhao conscripted all its people and stationed troops at Changping to contest Shangdang belonging to Han. By Your Majesty’s command, Qin defeated Zhao and captured Wu’an. At that time, Zhao’s rulers and people were estranged, nobles and commoners distrusted one another, so Handan could not be defended firmly.
Had Qin seized Handan, controlled the lands east of the Xiao Mountains and the Hejian region, then marched west to capture Xiuwu, cross Hua and Jiang, and take Shangdang: the forty‑six counties of Dai and the seventy counties of Shangdang would have belonged to Qin without deploying a single extra troop or burdening a single civilian.
With Dai and Shangdang yielding to Qin without war, Dongyang and Hewai would have turned to Qi, and the lands north of Zhongshan and Hutuo would have submitted to Yan. Once Zhao was conquered, Han would fall; with Han fallen, Chu and Wei could not stand alone.
One campaign would have ruined Han, weakened Wei, broken Chu, restrained Qi and Yan in the east, and flooded Wei by opening the Baima ford. In one stroke, the Three Jin states would perish and the Vertical Alliance collapse. Your Majesty need only wait calmly, and all the feudal lords would submit in sequence, achieving the name of hegemon.
Yet your strategic ministers failed to act. They withdrew the army and made peace with Zhao. With Your Majesty’s wisdom and Qin’s military might, you abandoned the hegemonic enterprise, gained no territory, and were even deceived by a state on the verge of ruin — all due to the folly of your ministers.
Zhao ought to have perished yet survived; Qin ought to have attained hegemony yet failed. For the first time, the world judged the incompetence of Qin’s ministers.
Later Qin mobilized all soldiers to attack Handan but could not take it. Troops abandoned armor and crossbows, retreated in fear. For the second time, the world gauged the true limit of Qin’s military strength.
The army regrouped at Fuxia. Your Majesty joined forces there, yet could not win the battle, nor sustain supplies, and had to retreat in exhaustion. For the third time, the world assessed Qin’s weakness.
Internationally, lords saw through Qin’s incompetent ministers; domestically, they saw the exhaustion of Qin’s military power. From this, I hold that the Vertical Alliance of the eastern states will find it far easier to unite against Qin.
Within Qin, weapons are worn out, soldiers and people weary, reserves depleted, farmlands barren, granaries empty. Beyond its borders, all feudal lords share a firm common will. I beg Your Majesty to ponder this perilous situation carefully.
Note
This passage exposes three major blunders of Qin: letting a collapsing Zhao survive, failing to take Handan, and wasting military strength in fruitless campaigns. It warns that internal exhaustion plus foreign solidarity of rivals will place Qin in severe strategic danger.
Zhao
One of the Three Jin states, located in the Central Plains. It had a volatile civilian temperament, unstable governance, poor reward‑punishment credibility, and inherent weaknesses that made it vulnerable to collapse in Han Fei’s view.
The Three Jin States
Collectively Han, Zhao, Wei, derived from the partition of ancient Jin; core powers of the central plains during the Warring States Period.
Vertical Alliance (Hezong)
The coalition of eastern states uniting to resist the expansion of Qin from the west, the main strategic rivalry of the era.
Han Fei
Legalist thinker who analyzes state strength, military strategy, ministerial competence, and the balance of power among warring states. He criticizes short‑sighted peace deals and missed strategic opportunities.
Warring States Statecraft
A state’s survival depended on orderly decrees, credible reward and punishment, popular support, favorable terrain, and far‑sighted ministers. Deficiencies in any of these marked a state as doomed.
Strategic Opportunity in Warfare
Ancient military philosophy stressed striking while the enemy was internally divided; hesitation and premature peace would let a doomed enemy recover and become a future threat.
Judging a State’s Strength
Feudal lords judged Qin’s power through three observations: incompetent ministers, failed sieges, and exhausted military campaigns. Reputation and actual strength determined alliance dynamics.
Legalist Administrative Ideal
Ministers must serve national grand strategy rather than making cautious, short‑term compromises; rulers must assess domestic depletion and foreign alliances to avoid peril.
赵氏，中央之国也，杂民所居也，其民轻而难用也。号令不治，赏罚不信，地形不便，下不能尽其民力。彼固亡国之形也，而不忧民萌，悉其士民军于长平之下，以争韩上党。大王以诏破之，拔武安。当是时也，赵氏上下不相亲也，贵贱不相信也。然则邯郸不守。拔邯郸，管山东河间，引军而去，西攻修武，逾华，降代、上党。代四十六县，上党七十县，不用一领甲，不苦一士民，此皆秦有也。以代、上党不战而毕为秦矣，东阳、河外不战而毕反为齐矣，中山、呼沲以北不战而毕为燕矣。然则是赵举，赵举则韩亡，韩亡则荆、魏不能独立，荆、魏不能独立，则是一举而坏韩、蠹魏、拔荆，东以弱齐、燕，决白马之口以沃魏氏，是一举而三晋亡，从者败也。大王垂拱以须之，天下编随而服矣，霸王之名可成。而谋臣不为，引军而退，复与赵氏为和。夫以大王之明，秦兵之强，弃霸王之业，地曾不可得，乃取欺于亡国。是谋臣之拙也。且夫赵当亡而不亡，秦当霸而不霸，天下固以量秦之谋臣一矣。乃复悉士卒以攻邯郸，不能拔也，弃甲兵弩，战竦而却，天下固已量秦力二矣。军乃引而复，并于孚下，大王又并军而至，与战不能克之也，又不能反，军罢而去，天下固量秦力三矣。内者量吾谋臣，外者极吾兵力。由是观之，臣以为天下之从，几不能矣。内者，吾甲兵顿，士民病，蓄积索，田畴荒，囷仓虚；外者，天下皆比意甚固。愿大王有以虑之也。
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