I venture to speak plainly. In former times, the State of Qi defeated Chu in the south, conquered Song in the east, subdued Qin in the west, and vanquished Yan in the north. It controlled Han and Wei in the central plains. With vast territory and powerful troops, it won every battle, captured every city, and issued commands to all under heaven.
Qi had the Qingji and Zhuo Rivers as natural boundaries, and the Great Wall and grand fortresses as strong defensive barriers. Though Qi had endured five major wars and remained standing, it perished after just one defeat.
From this we see: warfare determines the survival or downfall of a great kingdom.
An old saying goes: Eliminate trouble without leaving any root; do not leave a source of disaster to neighboring states, and misfortune will not befall you.
Once Qin fought against Chu, routed its army, raided Ying, and seized Dongting, the Five Lakes, and the lands south of the Yangtze. The king and ministers of Chu fled in defeat and retreated east to Chen.
At that moment, if Qin had pressed its attack, Chu could have been completely conquered. Conquering Chu would have brought abundant people and fertile land under Qin’s control. Qin could have weakened Qi and Yan in the east, and overawed the Three Jin states in the center.
This single campaign could have secured hegemony and made all neighboring feudal lords pay homage to Qin.
Yet Qin’s strategic ministers failed to seize the chance. They withdrew the army and made peace with Chu. This allowed Chu to restore its fallen state, gather scattered people, rebuild its national shrines and ancestral temples. Later Chu even led other states to confront Qin from the west. This was Qin’s first lost chance to achieve hegemony.
Later, the allied lords massed their troops at Huaxia. By your royal order, Qin defeated the coalition, and its army advanced to the outer city of Liang, the capital of Wei.
If Qin had besieged Liang for several tens of days, the city would have fallen, and Wei could have been annexed. With Wei conquered, the alliance between Chu and Zhao would have collapsed. Zhao would have fallen into peril, and Chu would have hesitated in doubt. Again Qin could have weakened Qi and Yan in the east and dominated the Three Jin states.
Once more, one campaign could have won hegemony and the homage of all states. Still the ministers urged retreat and made peace with Wei, letting Wei recover and rebuild its realm. This was Qin’s second lost chance at hegemony.
In earlier years, when Marquis Rang governed Qin, he sought to use Qin’s military strength to pursue personal gains that served two private interests. Consequently, the army endured endless campaigns abroad, while civilians grew weary and exhausted at home. The glory of hegemony was never achieved. This was Qin’s third lost chance to attain supremacy.
Note
This passage summarizes three major strategic blunders of Qin:
making premature peace with defeated Chu and Wei, and allowing Marquis Rang’s self-serving governance to waste national strength. It delivers a timeless lesson: military success requires decisive follow-through, no mercy to fallen rivals, and selfless loyal ministers to fulfill a nation’s grand strategic ambition.
State of Qi
A powerful hegemonic state in the Warring States Period, with natural river barriers and the Great Wall for defense. Once dominant over surrounding states, it ultimately collapsed after a single critical defeat, serving as a warning of warfare’s decisive impact.
Marquis Rang (Marquis of Rang)
Wei Ran, a powerful prime minister of Qin in the late Warring States era. He controlled state affairs and military power, prioritized personal fame and gain over the national long-term strategy, draining Qin’s strength without completing hegemony.
Han Fei
Representative of Legalism. He stresses that national survival hinges on war strategy; rulers and ministers must eliminate rival states completely, avoid futile peace talks, and ban selfish official conduct that harms state interests.
Three Jin States
Refers to Han, Zhao, Wei, the three states split from the old Jin Kingdom, major political forces in the central plains during the Warring States Period.
Ying
The capital city of the State of Chu, a major political and cultural center of southern China in ancient times.
Hegemony Politics of Warring States
All major states aimed to defeat rivals, expand territory, and attain hegemony to command other vassal states. Complete annexation of enemy states was regarded as the most effective strategic goal.
Eliminate trouble without leaving roots
An ancient strategic maxim, reflects traditional Chinese military strategy: to defeat an enemy thoroughly and never allow it a chance to revive and become a future threat.
Legalist Statecraft
Han Fei criticizes short-sighted peace negotiations and self-serving ministers. Legalism advocates decisive military action, thorough elimination of rivals, and loyal ministers who prioritize national interests over personal gain.
Natural Military Barriers
Rivers, mountains, and the Great Wall were viewed as vital strategic defences in ancient geopolitics, yet no natural defense could save a state from foolish strategic decisions.
臣敢言之，往者齊南破荊，東破宋，西服秦，北破燕，中使韓、魏，土地廣而兵強，戰剋攻取，詔令天下。齊之清濟濁河，足以為限；長城巨防，足以為塞。齊五戰之國也，一戰不剋而無齊。由此觀之，夫戰者，萬乘之存亡也。且聞之曰：「削跡無遺根，無與禍鄰，禍乃不存。」秦與荊人戰，大破荊，襲郢，取洞庭、五湖、江南，荊王君臣亡走，東服於陳。當此時也，隨荊以兵則荊可舉，荊可舉，則民足貪也，地足利也。東以弱齊、燕，中以凌三晉。然則是一舉而霸王之名可成也，四鄰諸侯可朝也。而謀臣不為，引軍而退，復與荊人為和，令荊人得收亡國，聚散民，立社稷，主置宗廟，令率天下西面以與秦為難，此固以失霸王之道一矣。天下又比周而軍華下，大王以詔破之，兵至梁郭下，圍梁數旬則梁可拔，拔梁則魏可舉，舉魏則荊、趙之意絕，荊、趙之意絕則趙危，趙危而荊狐疑，東以弱齊、燕，中以凌三晉。然則是一舉而霸王之名可成也，四鄰諸侯可朝也。而謀臣不為，引軍而退，復與魏氏為和，令魏氏反收亡國，聚散民，立社稷，主置宗廟，令，此固以失霸王之道二矣。前者穰侯之治秦也，用一國之兵而欲以成兩國之功。是故兵終身暴露於外，士民疲病於內，霸王之名不成，此固以失霸王之道三矣。
Leave a Reply