To act selfishly for an old friend is called “not abandoning him.” To distribute public wealth is called being a “benevolent person.” To slight salary and value oneself is called being a “gentleman.” To bend the law for relatives is called having “good conduct.” To abandon office for private ties is called being “chivalrous.” To withdraw from society and avoid the ruler is called being “proud and lofty.” To fight privately and disobey orders is called being “firm and talented.” To bestow favors and win the multitude is called “winning the people.”
Yet “not abandoning” allows officials to practice treachery; “benevolence” wastes public wealth; “gentlemanliness” makes the people hard to employ; “good conduct” destroys legal institutions; “chivalry” leaves offices vacant; “pride” makes the people refuse service; “firmness” prevents orders from being carried out; “winning the people” isolates the ruler. These eight are private praises of common men, but great disasters for the sovereign. The opposites of these eight may bring private slander, yet they serve the ruler’s public interest. If the ruler does not examine what benefits or harms the state, but follows the private praises of ordinary people, he cannot hope to keep the country free from danger and disorder.
Appointing people to tasks is the pivot of survival or ruin, order or chaos. Without proper method, every appointment will fail. Rulers usually employ either the eloquent and clever or the morally cultivated. But to appoint someone is to give him power. Clever men are not necessarily trustworthy; because their intelligence is abundant, one may mistakenly trust their character. If a clever man uses his schemes while holding power to serve his private needs, the ruler will surely be deceived. Because clever men cannot always be trusted, rulers sometimes turn to morally cultivated men to decide affairs. Yet such men are not necessarily wise; because they keep themselves pure, one may mistakenly believe them capable. If a foolish man occupies an office of governance and acts as he pleases, affairs will surely fall into disorder. Thus, without method, appointing the clever leads to deception, and appointing the morally pure leads to confusion.
The way of an enlightened ruler is to devalue empty moral prestige, hold subordinates accountable, verify truth through comparison, listen without factional bias, and prevent the clever from deceiving him. He rewards according to merit, assigns tasks according to ability, examines beginnings and observes failures, punishes the guilty, and promotes the capable. Thus the foolish are not given authority. When the clever dare not deceive and the foolish cannot decide, affairs will not go wrong.
What only the discerning can understand should not be made into law, because not all people are discerning. What only the worthy can practice should not be made into law, because not all people are worthy. Yang Zhu and Mo Di were considered the most discerning men in the world, yet their disputes lasted ages without resolution. However discerning they were, their views cannot serve as official commands. Bao Jiao and Hua Jiao were regarded as the worthiest men, yet Bao Jiao withered beside a tree and Hua Jiao threw himself into a river. However worthy, they cannot serve as farmers or soldiers. What the ruler admires determines what the clever will argue; what the ruler honors determines what the able will practice. If a ruler admires useless debate and honors conduct far removed from merit, he cannot make the state rich and strong.
Men as learned and clever as Confucius and Mo Di did not plow or weed; what gain could the state obtain from them? Men as filial and desireless as Zeng Shen and Shi Yu did not fight or attack; what benefit could the state gain from them? Ordinary men seek private convenience; rulers must seek public benefit. To have sufficient livelihood without labor and fame without service is private convenience. To suppress private schools, clarify laws, block private advantage, and unify rewards according to merit is public benefit. If laws are established to guide the people yet literary learning is honored, the people will be confused about what to follow. If rewards are given to encourage merit yet moral self-cultivation is exalted, the people will become lazy in producing benefit. To honor learning in ways that confuse the law, and to honor moral conduct in ways that divide merit, makes it impossible to achieve a rich and strong state.
Ceremonial tablets and shield-and-axe dances are not suited to actual warfare; formal bows and turns cannot match the speed of a hundred reports delivered by noon; archery to the tune of “Li Shou” cannot equal the rapid discharge of a strong crossbow; defending walls against rams is less effective than tunneling and hiding bellows. Ancient times prized virtue, middle ages prized intelligence, and the present age contends by force. In antiquity affairs were few and preparations simple; life was crude and incomplete, so people used shell-tipped hoes and pushed carts. Then people were few, mutually affectionate, goods were plentiful, and benefits were easily yielded; hence rulers could yield the world through courtesy. But to practice courtesy, praise kindness, and preach benevolence is the politics of yielding. To use the simple instruments of an age with few affairs in a time of many affairs is not the preparation of a wise man. To follow the tracks of yielding in an age of great contention is not the governance of a sage. Therefore the wise do not ride pushed carts, and sages do not practice the politics of yielding.
Law is used to regulate affairs, and affairs are used to establish merit. Some laws are difficult to establish; if, after weighing the difficulty, success can be achieved, they should be established. Some achievements bring harm; if, after weighing the harm, the merit is greater, they should be undertaken. There is no law without difficulty and no achievement without harm. To capture a great city and defeat a huge army inevitably brings casualties, broken weapons, and dead soldiers; yet victory and gained territory are celebrated because small harms are outweighed by great benefits. Washing hair causes hair to fall; lancing sores wounds flesh and blood. To abandon one’s work because others see its difficulty is the act of someone without method. An ancient sage said, “The compass wears down and water forms waves; I wish to change this, but I cannot.” This is the language of one who understands weighing circumstances.
Thus some doctrines are firmly stated yet remote from reality, while some words are clumsy yet urgent in use. The sage does not seek harmless words but undertakes tasks that cannot be altered. People do not tamper with weighing stones and balances not because they are honest and disdain profit, but because a stone cannot change its weight for anyone, and a balance cannot change its measure for anyone. Since no manipulation succeeds, people do not try. In the state of an enlightened ruler, officials dare not bend the law, clerks dare not seek private gain, and bribery does not circulate. Affairs throughout the realm are as impartial as weights and measures. Any treacherous minister will surely be detected, and once detected will surely be punished. Hence a ruler with the Way does not seek spotless officials but insists on methods that ensure detection.
A loving mother’s affection for her young child cannot be surpassed. Yet if the child behaves wrongly, she sends him to a teacher; if he falls seriously ill, she sends him to a physician. Without a teacher he may fall into punishment; without a physician he may die. However much the mother loves him, her love alone cannot save him from punishment or death. Thus preserving the child does not come from love alone. The nature of mother and child is affection; the relation of minister and ruler is strategy. If a mother cannot preserve her household by love alone, how can a ruler maintain the state by love? An enlightened ruler understands that wealth and strength fulfill his aims. Therefore careful administration is the method of wealth and strength. Laws and prohibitions must be clear, and plans must be examined. When laws are clear, there is no internal rebellion; when plans succeed, there is no disaster of death or captivity abroad. Thus preserving the state does not depend on benevolence and righteousness.
A benevolent person is kind, generous, and light with wealth; a violent person is hard-hearted and quick to kill. Kindness makes one unwilling to punish; lightness with wealth makes one give too freely. Hard-heartedness shows hatred to subordinates; quickness to kill brings arbitrary execution. Unwillingness to punish leads to frequent pardons; excessive giving leads to rewards without merit. Hatred displayed below breeds resentment; arbitrary killing breeds rebellion. Hence when a benevolent person rules, subordinates become reckless, lightly violate prohibitions, and hope for favors. When a violent person rules, laws become arbitrary, ruler and ministers diverge, the people resent, and rebellion arises. Therefore both the benevolent and the violent are rulers who lose their states.
One who cannot prepare fine food yet urges a starving person to eat is not truly able to save the starving. One who cannot clear land and grow grain yet urges lending, giving, and rewarding is not truly able to enrich the people. The scholars of today do not attend to the root of production but love secondary matters; they preach empty sagehood to please the people. This is the advice of urging a starving man to eat without providing food. An enlightened ruler does not accept it.
When a book is too brief, disciples dispute; when laws are too sparse, litigation becomes confused. Therefore the sage’s writings must set forth clear arguments, and the enlightened ruler’s laws must specify affairs in detail. To exhaust thought and weigh gains and losses is difficult even for the wise. To think nothing, but take earlier words and demand later results, is easy even for the foolish. The enlightened ruler adopts what is easy for the foolish and uses it to hold the wise to account; thus he need not exhaust his own wisdom and labor, yet the state is well governed.
If sour, sweet, salty, and bland flavors are not judged by the ruler’s own taste but left to the chief cook, the cooks will slight the ruler and respect the chief cook. If high and low, clear and muddy tones are not judged by the ruler’s own ear but left to the music master, the blind musicians will slight the ruler and respect the music master. If right and wrong in governance are not decided by the ruler’s method but left to favored persons, ministers will slight the ruler and respect his favorites. If the ruler does not personally observe and listen, while control rests below, he merely lives off the state.
If people neither clothed nor fed themselves, yet felt no hunger or cold, and did not fear death, they would have no intention of serving their superiors. If they wished not to be controlled by the ruler, they could not be employed. When the power of life and death rests with great ministers, the ruler’s orders have never been carried out. If tigers and leopards did not use their claws and teeth, their power would be no greater than that of a small mouse. If a wealthy household did not use its riches, its resources would be no greater than those of a gatekeeper. A ruler who holds land but cannot benefit those he favors or harm those he dislikes cannot make people fear and honor him.
When a minister indulges his desires, it is called “chivalrous”; when a ruler does so, it is called “disorder.” When a minister treats his superior lightly, it is called “arrogant”; when a ruler treats his inferiors lightly, it is called “tyrannical.” The acts may be similar in substance, yet the subordinate gains praise while the superior receives blame. When ministers gain greatly, the ruler is greatly endangered.
In the state of an enlightened ruler there are honored ministers but no weighty ministers. Honored ministers hold high rank and great office. Weighty ministers have their words obeyed and possess excessive private power. In such a state, promotion follows merit, so honored ministers exist. But if one’s words do not match one’s conduct and deceit is found, punishment follows; therefore weighty ministers do not arise.
Note
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 47 (Eight Sayings) criticizes eight popular private‑virtue praises harmful to state. It advocates objective legal standards, merit‑based official appointment and curbing over‑powerful ministers for national wealth and strength.
Eight private praises (八说):
Han Fei lists eight behaviors that common people praise but that weaken state authority, such as using public wealth for private generosity or abandoning office for friendship.
Private schools:
Here “literary learning” or “private schools” means independent moral and philosophical teaching outside state control. Han Fei sees it as competing with law and agricultural-military service.
Yang Zhu (杨朱):
A Warring States thinker associated with “valuing oneself” and “preserving life.” Mencius criticized him for refusing to pluck even one hair to benefit the world.
Founder of Mohism, which advocated universal love, frugality, and defensive warfare. Han Fei respects his discipline but rejects his influence on state policy.
Bao Jiao (鲍焦) and Hua Jiao (华角):
Legendary figures praised for moral purity. Bao Jiao supposedly starved while clinging to a tree; Hua Jiao threw himself into a river. Han Fei uses them to show that extreme personal virtue may be useless for farming and war.
Confucius and Mozi (孔、墨):
Representative founders of Confucianism and Mohism. Han Fei argues that their learning did not directly produce grain or military victory.
Zeng Shen and Shi Yu (曾、史):
Zeng Shen, a disciple of Confucius known for filial piety, and Shi Yu, an upright minister of Wei. They symbolize moral integrity, but Han Fei considers them inadequate models for statecraft.
“Li Shou” (狸首):
An ancient musical piece associated with ritual archery. Han Fei contrasts ceremonial archery with the practical speed of crossbows.
Weights and measures (衡石):
Symbolize impartial, impersonal standards. Han Fei wants administration to be as objective as a scale.
Chief cook (宰尹) and music master (乐正):
Officials in charge of food and music. Han Fei uses them to warn that if judgment is delegated to specialists or favorites, the ruler loses authority.
Honored ministers vs. weighty ministers (贵臣 / 重臣):
Honored ministers have high rank earned by merit; weighty ministers have excessive private influence. Han Fei accepts the former but rejects the latter.
八说第四十七
为故人行私谓之“不弃”，以公财分施谓之“仁人”，轻禄重身谓之“君子”，枉法曲亲谓之“有行”，弃官宠交谓之“有侠”，离世遁上谓之“高傲”，交争逆令谓之“刚材”，行惠取众谓之“得民”。不弃者，吏有奸也；仁人者，公财损也；君子者，民难使也；有行者，法制毁也；有侠者，官职旷也；高傲者，民不事也；刚材者，令不行也；得民者，君上孤也。此八者，匹夫之私誉，人主之大败也。反此八者，匹夫之私毁，人主之公利也。人主不察社稷之利害，而用匹夫之私毁，索国之无危乱，不可得矣。
任人以事，存亡治乱之机也，无术以任人，无所任而不败。人君之所任，非辩智则修洁也。任人者，使有势也。智士者未必信也，为多其智，因惑其信也。以智士之计，处乘势之资而为其私急，则君必欺焉。为智者之不可信也，故任修士者，使断事也。修士者未必智，为洁其身、因惑其智。以愚人之所惽，处治事之官而为所然，则事必乱矣。故无术以用人，任智则君欺，任修则君事乱，此无术之患也。明君之道，贱德义贵，下必坐上，决诚以参，听无门户，故智者不得诈欺。计功而行赏，程能而授事，察端而观失，有过者罪，有能者得，故愚者不任事。智者不敢欺，愚者不得断，则事无失矣。
察士然后能知之，不可以为令，夫民不尽察。贤者然后行之，不可以为法，夫民不尽贤。杨朱、墨翟，天下之所察也，干世乱而卒不决，虽察而不可以为官职之令。鲍焦、华角，天下之所贤也，鲍焦木枯，华角赴河，虽贤不可以为耕战之士。故人主之察，智士尽其辩焉；人主之所尊，能士能尽其行焉。今世主察无用之辩，尊远功之行，索国之富强，不可得也。博习辩智如孔、墨，孔、墨不耕耨，则国何得焉？修孝寡欲如曾、史，曾、史不战攻，则国何利焉？匹夫有私便，人主有公利。不作而养足，不仕而名显，此私便也；息文学而明法度，塞私便而一功劳，此公利也。错法以道民也，而又贵文学，则民之所师法也疑；赏功以劝民也，而又尊行修，则民之产利也惰。夫贵文学以疑法，尊行修以贰功，索国之富强，不可得也。
搢笏干戚，不适有方铁铦；登降周旋，不逮日中奏百；《狸首》射侯，不当强弩趋发；干城距衡冲，不若堙穴伏橐。古人亟于德，中世逐于智，当今争于力。古者寡事而备简，朴陋而不尽，故有珧铫而推车者。古者人寡而相亲，物多而轻利易让，故有揖让而传天下者。然则行揖让，高慈惠，而道仁厚，皆推政也。处多事之时，用寡事之器，非智者之备也；当大争之世，而循揖让之轨，非圣人之治也。故智者不乘推车，圣人不行推政也。
法所以制事，事所以名功也。法有立而有难，权其难而事成，则立之；事成而有害，权其害而功多，则为之。无难之法，无害之功，天下无有也。是以拔千丈之都，败十万之众，死伤者军之乘，甲兵折挫，士卒死伤，而贺战胜得地者，出其小害计其大利也。夫沐者有弃发，除者伤血肉。为人见其难，因释其业，是无术之事也。先圣有言曰：“规有摩而水有波，我欲更之，无奈之何！”此通权之言也。是以说有必立而旷于实者，言有辞拙而急于用者。故圣人不求无害之言，而务无易之事。人之不事衡石者，非贞廉而远利也，石不能为人多少，衡不能为人轻重，求索不能得，故人不事也。明主之国，官不敢枉法，吏不敢为私利，货赂不行，是境内之事尽如衡石也。此其臣有奸者必知，知者必诛。是以有道之主，不求清洁之吏，而务必知之术也。
慈母之于弱子也，爱不可为前。然而弱子有僻行，使之随师；有恶病，使之事医。不随师则陷于刑，不事医则疑于死。慈母虽爱，无益于振刑救死，则存子者非爱也。子母之性，爱也；臣主之权，策也。母不能以爱存家，君安能以爱持国？明主者通于富强，则可以得欲矣。故谨于听治，富强之法也。明其法禁，察其谋计。法明则内无变乱之患，计得于外无死虏之祸。故存国者，非仁义也。仁者，慈惠而轻财者也；暴者，心毅而易诛者也。慈惠，则不忍；轻财，则好与。心毅，则憎心见于下；易诛，则妄杀加于人。不忍，则罚多宥赦；好与，则赏多无功。憎心见，则下怨其上；妄诛，则民将背叛。故仁人在位，下肆而轻犯禁法，偷幸而望于上；暴人在位，则法令妄而臣主乖，民怨而乱心生。故曰：仁暴者，皆亡国者也。
不能具美食而劝饿人饭，不为能活饿者也；不能辟草生粟而劝贷施赏赐，不能为富民者也。今学者之言也，不务本作而好末事，知道虚圣以说民，此劝饭之说。劝饭之说，明主不受也。
书约而弟子辩，法省而民讼简，是以圣人之书必著论，明主之法必详尽事。尽思虑，揣得失，智者之所难也；无思无虑，挈前言而责后功，愚者之所易也。明主虑愚者之所易，以责智者之所难，故智虑力劳不用而国治也。
酸甘咸淡，不以口断而决于宰尹，则厨人轻君而重于宰尹矣。上下清浊，不以耳断而决于乐正，则瞽工轻君而重于乐正矣。治国是非，不以术断而决于宠人，则臣下轻君而重于宠人矣。人主不亲观听，而制断在下，托食于国者也。
使人不衣不食而不饥不寒，又不恶死，则无事上之意。意欲不宰于君，则不可使也。今生杀之柄在大臣，而主令得行者，未尝有也。虎豹必不用其爪牙而与鼷鼠同威，万金之家必不用其富厚而与监门同资。有土之君，说人不能利，恶人不能害，索人欲畏重己，不可得也。
人臣肆意陈欲曰“侠”，人主肆意陈欲曰“乱”；人臣轻上曰“骄”，人主轻下曰“暴”。行理同实，下以受誉，上以得非。人臣大得，人主大亡。
明主之国，有贵臣，无重臣。贵臣者，爵尊而官大也；重臣者，言听而力多者也。明主之国，迁官袭级，官爵受功，故有贵臣。言不度行而有伪，必诛，故无重臣也。
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