Lord Gao of Ye asked Confucius about government. Confucius said, “Government consists in making those near you pleased and those far away come.” Duke Ai of Lu asked Confucius about government. Confucius said, “Government consists in selecting the worthy.” Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius said, “Government consists in economizing on expenditure.” After the three dukes had left, Zigong asked, “The three dukes all asked you about government, yet your answers differed. Why?” Confucius said, “Ye is a large city within a small state, and the people are disposed to turn away. Hence I said, ‘Government consists in making those near you pleased and those far away come.’ Duke Ai has three great ministers who block worthy men from the surrounding states on the outside and form cliques on the inside to deceive their ruler. If the ancestral temple is left unswept and the altars of soil and grain receive no sacrifices, it will surely be because of these three ministers. Hence I said, ‘Government consists in selecting the worthy.’ Duke Jing built the Yong Gate and the Lu Qin, and in a single morning bestowed households with three hundred chariots upon three men. Hence I said, ‘Government consists in economizing on expenditure.’”
Someone says: Confucius’ answers were words that would bring states to ruin. If one fears that the people are disloyal and then sincerely tries to please them by “making those near pleased and those far come,” one is teaching the people to expect favors. When government is based on favors, the meritless receive rewards and the guilty escape punishment; this is why law falls into disarray. When law is in disarray and government is chaotic, ruling such people with chaotic administration has never been seen to succeed. Moreover, when the people are disloyal, it is because the ruler’s insight is insufficient. Instead of enhancing Lord Gao’s insight, he is told to please those near and attract those far. This is to abandon the prohibitive power of one’s position and to compete with others for the people’s loyalty by dispensing favors. It is not a way to maintain authority.
Yao was the worthiest of the six ancient kings. Yet when Shun made one circuit and won universal support, Yao lost possession of the realm. If a ruler has no method for restraining those below and relies on being another Shun so as not to lose his people, is he not without method? An enlightened ruler detects small treachery in its earliest signs, so the people do not form great plots. He imposes small punishments for minor offenses, so the people do not rise in great disorder. This is what is meant by “planning for what is difficult while it is still easy, and accomplishing what is great while it is still small.”
Now, when a man has merit he is surely rewarded; those who are rewarded know they have gained it by their own effort, not by the ruler’s favor. When a man is guilty he is surely punished; those who are punished know it arises from their own crime, not from the ruler’s malice. When the people know that reward and punishment both originate in their own conduct, they strive to achieve merit in their tasks and do not regard benefits as gifts from the ruler. “The highest ruler is one of whom the people merely know that he exists.” This means that under the highest ruler the people do not feel special affection for him. Where, then, would one find people bound by favors? When the people of a superior ruler are not swayed by private advantage or injury, the advice to “please those near and attract those far” may be discarded.
Duke Ai had ministers who blocked outsiders and formed inner cliques to deceive him, yet Confucius told him to “select the worthy.” This is not a principle based on measurable merit; it merely asks the ruler to choose those whom his own heart deems worthy. If Duke Ai had known that the three ministers blocked outsiders and conspired within, they would not have lasted a single day. Because Duke Ai did not truly know how to select the worthy, but chose those he personally regarded as worthy, the three ministers were able to hold power. King Kuai of Yan considered Zi Zhi worthy and dismissed Sun Qing, so he died and was disgraced. King Fuchai of Wu regarded Grand Steward Pi as wise and treated Wu Zixu as a fool, so Wu was destroyed by Yue. If the ruler of Lu was not certain to recognize worthiness, yet was told to “select the worthy,” he was exposed to the same dangers as King Kuai and King Fuchai. An enlightened ruler does not personally nominate ministers; ministers are advanced through mutual recommendation. He does not personally declare who is worthy; merit reveals itself. Candidates are evaluated by the office they hold, tested by affairs, and assessed by achievement. Thus ministers serve the public administration without private bias, do not conceal the worthy, and do not advance the unworthy. In such a case, why should the ruler trouble himself with “selecting the worthy”?
Duke Jing bestowed households capable of supplying a hundred chariots, yet Confucius told him to “economize.” This left Duke Jing without any method to restrain the extravagance of those enriched by his gifts, so that only the ruler himself was frugal, while poverty remained unavoidable. If a ruler used a thousand li of territory merely to feed his own mouth and belly, even Jie and Zhou would not seem extravagant. The state of Qi extended three thousand li in all directions, and Duke Huan used half of it to support himself; in this respect he was more extravagant than Jie or Zhou. Yet he became the foremost of the five hegemons because he understood where extravagance and frugality properly belong.
When a ruler cannot restrain those below but restrains only himself, he is said to be coerced. When he cannot rectify those below but rectifies only himself, there is disorder. When he does not regulate those below but regulates only himself, there is poverty. An enlightened ruler makes men free of private scheming and prohibits those who live by deceit. Those who exhaust their strength in service and bring benefit to the ruler are surely known; when they are known, they are surely rewarded. Those who engage in corrupt private gain are surely known; when they are known, they are surely punished. Thus loyal ministers devote their loyalty to the public interest, the people exert themselves for their households, and the hundred officials serve the ruler with precision and restraint. Even if extravagance were twice that of Duke Jing, it would not be a disaster for the state. Hence telling Duke Jing to “economize” was not the most urgent counsel.
A single answer that could free the three dukes from trouble depended on knowing those below. When a ruler knows his ministers clearly, he can prohibit misconduct at its incipient stage. When he prohibits it at its incipient stage, treachery does not accumulate. When treachery does not accumulate, cliques do not form. When cliques do not form, public and private interests are distinguished. When public and private interests are distinguished, factions dissolve. When factions dissolve, there is no danger of outsiders being blocked and insiders forming conspiracies. When a ruler knows his ministers clearly, he perceives even the finest details. When he perceives fine details, reward and punishment become clear. When reward and punishment are clear, the state does not become impoverished. Hence it is said: one answer that freed the three dukes from trouble is called “knowing those below.”
Note
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 38.4 rejects Confucius’ varied governance advice for three rulers. It argues “knowing subordinates” via objective assessment and strict reward‑punishment, not subjective virtues, is the core of sound rulership.
Han Feizi and the “Nan” chapters:
The Han Feizi is a major Legalist text from the late Warring States period. The Nan chapters often take admired Confucian or historical advice and test whether it would really secure political order.
Confucius and Zigong:
Confucius, founder of Confucianism, often advised rulers to cultivate virtue, choose worthy ministers, and care for the people. Zigong was one of his most prominent disciples.
Lord Gao of Ye:
A Chu official associated with the city of Ye. He appears in several early Chinese texts as a ruler who asks about governance.
Duke Ai of Lu:
A ruler of Lu, the state closely associated with Confucius. During his time, powerful ministerial families constrained ducal authority.
Duke Jing of Qi:
A ruler of Qi during the late Spring and Autumn period. His court is often used in early texts to discuss extravagance and ministerial influence.
“Making those near pleased and those far come”:
A classic Confucian idea that good government attracts people through moral influence and benevolent administration.
Ancestral temple and altars of soil and grain:
The ancestral temple honored the ruler’s forebears; the altars of soil and grain represented the state itself. If they were neglected, it signaled that the ruler had lost effective control.
Yao and Shun:
Yao and Shun were sage-kings of ancient legend. Confucian tradition praises them as models of moral rule. Han Fei uses them to argue that moral charisma alone cannot guarantee political control.
King Kuai of Yan and Zi Zhi:
King Kuai transferred power to his minister Zi Zhi, causing chaos in Yan. Sun Qing may refer here to a worthy minister or adviser whom King Kuai rejected.
King Fuchai, Wu Zixu, and Grand Steward Pi:
Fuchai was the last powerful king of Wu. Wu Zixu warned him about the threat from Yue, but Fuchai trusted the minister Pi instead. Wu was eventually destroyed by Yue.
Legalist “shu”:
“Shu” means the ruler’s techniques for controlling officials, detecting deception, and maintaining authority. Han Fei thinks these techniques matter more than personal virtue or selective generosity.
Reward and punishment:
For Han Fei, stable government depends on clear, impersonal systems of reward and punishment, not on the ruler’s private favors or subjective judgment of who is “worthy.”
四
叶公子高问政于仲尼，仲尼曰：“政在悦近而来远。”哀公问政于仲尼，仲尼曰：“政在选贤。”齐景公问政于仲尼，仲尼曰：“政在节财。”三公出，子贡问曰：“三公问夫子政一也。夫子对之不同，何也？”仲尼曰：“叶都大而国小，民有背心，故曰‘政在悦近而来远’。鲁哀公有大臣三人，外障距诸侯四邻之士，内比周而以愚其君，使宗庙不扫除，社稷不血食者，必是三臣也，故曰‘政在选贤’。齐景公筑雍门，为路寝，一朝而以三百乘之家赐者三，故曰‘政在节财’。”
或曰：仲尼之对，亡国之言也。恐民有倍心，而诚说之“悦近而来远”，则是教民怀惠。惠之为政，无功者受赏，而有罪者免，此法之所以败也。法败而政乱，以乱政治败民，未见其可也。且民有倍心者，君上之明有所不及也。不绍叶公之明，而使之悦近而来远，是舍吾势之所能禁而使与不行惠以争民，非能持势者也。夫尧之贤，六王之冠也。舜一从而咸包，而尧无天下矣。有人无术以禁下，恃为舜而不失其民，不亦无术乎？明君见小奸于微，故民无大谋；行小诛于细，故民无大乱。此谓“图难于其所易也，为大者于其所细也。”今有功者必赏，赏者不得君，力之所致也；有罪者必诛，诛者不怨上，罪之所生也。民知诛罚之皆起于身也，故疾功利于业，而不受赐于君。“太上，下智有之。”此言太上之下民无说也，安取怀惠之民？上君之民无利害，说以“悦近来远”，亦可舍已。
哀公有臣外障距内比周以愚其君，而说之以“选贤”，此非功伐之论也，选其心之所谓贤者也。使哀公知三子外障距内比周也，则三子不一日立矣。哀公不知选贤，选其心之所谓贤，故三子得任事。燕子哙贤子之而非孙卿，故身死为僇；夫差智太宰嚭而愚子胥，故灭于越。鲁君不必知贤，而说以选贤，是使哀公有夫差、燕哙之患也。明君不自举臣，臣相进也；不自贤，功自徇也。论之于任，试之于事，课之于功，故群臣公政而无私，不隐贤，不进不肖。然则人主奚劳于选贤？
景公以百乘之家赐，而说以“节财”，是使景公无术使智富之侈，而独俭于上，未免于贫也。有君以千里养其口腹，则虽桀、纣不侈焉。齐国方三千里而桓公以其半自养，是侈于桀、纣也；然而能为五霸冠者，知侈俭之地也。为君不能禁下而自禁者谓之劫，不能饰下而自饰者谓之乱，不节下而自节者谓之贫。明君使人无私，以诈而食者禁；力尽于事、归利于上者必闻，闻者必赏；污秽为私者必知，知者必诛。然，故忠臣尽忠于公，民士竭力于家，百官精克于上，侈倍景公，非国之患也。然则说之以节财，非其急者也。
夫对三公一言而三公可以无患，知下之谓也。知下明，则禁于微；禁于微，则奸无积；奸无积，则无比周；无比周，则公私分；分私分，则朋党散；朋党散，则无外障距内比周之患。知下明，则见精沐；见精沐，则诛赏明，诛赏明，则国不贫。故曰：一对而三公无患，知下之谓也。
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