There are six kinds of people who are praised by the world yet harmful to the state, and six who are slandered yet beneficial. This is called the “Six Contraries.”
Those who fear death and avoid danger are people who surrender and flee, yet the world honors them as “gentlemen who value life.” Those who study doctrines and establish reputations, yet depart from the law, are honored as “men of letters.” Those who wander and dwell in comfort, living off others, are honored as “men of ability.” Those who speak deviously and seek cleverness through deceit are honored as “eloquent and wise men.” Those who carry swords and attack and kill are honored as “fierce and brave men.” Those who harbor criminals and conceal the wicked, though deserving death, are honored as “men of trust and reputation.” These six are praised by the world.
Those who face danger, die for integrity, and keep their principles are slighted as “men who miscalculate.” Those who have little learning but obey orders and preserve the law are slighted as “simple and crude people.” Those who labor hard and live by their produce are slighted as “people of little skill.” Those who are fine, thick, pure, and upright are slighted as “foolish and stupid people.” Those who respect commands and fear trouble are slighted as “cowardly and timid people.” Those who check criminals and stop the wicked, thereby enlightening their ruler, are slighted as “flatterers and slanderers.” These six are slandered by the world.
Six kinds of treacherous and useless people are praised; six kinds of farming and fighting people who benefit the state are slandered. This is the “Six Contraries.” Common people praise out of private interest, and rulers, misled by empty reputation, honor them. Where honor goes, benefit follows. Common people slander out of private prejudice, and rulers, blocked by custom, despise them. Where despising goes, harm follows. Thus name and reward go to those who privately do evil and deserve punishment, while slander and harm fall on those who publicly do good and deserve reward. To seek the state’s wealth and strength under such conditions is impossible.
An old proverb says: “Governing is like washing the hair. Though hair falls out, one must still do it.” To grudge the loss of fallen hair and forget the benefit of long hair is not to understand weighing. Lancing a boil is painful; taking medicine is bitter. If one refuses to lance or take medicine because of pain and bitterness, the body will not live and the disease will not end.
Relations between ruler and minister lack the bond of father and son. To try to restrain subordinates by moral righteousness will surely produce resentment. Even parents, when a son is born, congratulate one another; when a daughter is born, they kill her. Both come from their parents’ bodies, yet the son is congratulated and the daughter killed because they consider future advantage and long-term benefit. Even between parents and children there is calculation; how much more so between ruler and minister, who lack familial affection?
Scholars who advise rulers all ask them to abandon the desire for profit and practice mutual love. This demands that rulers love their ministers more than parents love their children. Such talk does not examine the nature of favor; it is deceitful and false. Hence an enlightened ruler does not accept it.
The sage governs by making laws and prohibitions clear. When laws are clear, officials follow them. He makes rewards and punishments certain and impartial, so the people are usable. When officials govern well, the state becomes rich; when the state is rich, the army becomes strong; and the work of hegemon and king is achieved. Hegemony and kingship are the ruler’s greatest benefit. Holding this great benefit, he appoints officials according to ability and gives rewards and punishments without favoritism. If scholars and people understand this, they will exert themselves and risk death, so that merit can be established and rank and salary obtained. When rank and salary are obtained, their wealth and honor are secured. Wealth and honor are the minister’s greatest benefit. Holding this great benefit, ministers will face danger and death and exhaust their strength without resentment. Thus the ruler need not be “benevolent,” nor the minister “loyal” in the moral sense; still, hegemony and kingship can be achieved.
If wrongdoing is surely known, people guard against it; if it is surely punished, they stop. If it is not known, they act boldly; if it is not punished, they proceed. Place light goods in a hidden spot, and even Zeng Shen or Shi Yu may be suspected. Hang a hundred gold in the marketplace, and even a great thief will not take them. If detection is uncertain, even Zeng and Shi may be suspected in private; if detection is certain, even a great thief will not take exposed gold. Therefore, an enlightened ruler multiplies guards and increases penalties, so that people are restrained by law, not by personal integrity.
A mother’s love for her child may be twice that of a father, yet the father’s orders are obeyed ten times more. Officials have no love for the people, yet their commands are obeyed ten thousand times more than a father’s. Accumulated love fails to make orders effective; authority and sternness make the people obey. Thus the choice between severity and love is clear.
Parents want their children to be safe and profitable in action and to keep far from crime. A ruler, in times of danger, uses the people to die; in times of peace, he uses them to exhaust their strength. A parent, with deep love, cannot make his child obey in seeking safety and profit; a ruler, without love, can make the people die and labor by command. An enlightened ruler knows this, so he does not cultivate affection but increases authority. Where a mother’s deep love prevails, children often go wrong, because love is indulgent. Where a father’s lesser love and whipping prevail, children often become good, because severity is used.
In managing a household, if members endure hunger and cold and force themselves to labor, then even amid war and famine they will have warm clothing and good food. If they pity one another with food and clothing and indulge one another in ease and pleasure, then in famine years they will sell wives and children. Thus law as a way brings hardship first and long-term benefit later. Benevolence as a way brings stolen pleasure and later poverty. The sage weighs these, chooses the greater benefit, and uses the mutual harshness of law rather than the mutual pity of the benevolent.
Scholars all say, “Reduce punishments.” This is the art of disorder and ruin. Rewards and punishments, when certain, encourage and prohibit. If rewards are generous, desired gains come quickly; if punishments are heavy, hated harms are prevented urgently. Those who desire profit must hate harm; harm is the opposite of profit. How can one not hate what opposes one’s desire? Those who desire order must hate disorder; disorder is the opposite of order. Hence those who desire order most must make rewards generous; those who hate disorder most must make punishments heavy.
Those who advocate light punishment do not hate disorder greatly, nor do they desire order greatly. This shows not only lack of statecraft but also lack of conduct. The distinction between worthy and unworthy, foolish and wise, depends on whether rewards and punishments are light or heavy.
Heavy punishment is not merely for the criminal. The enlightened ruler’s law is a standard. Punishing a thief is not only to deal with that thief; it is to warn others. Punishing one criminal heavily stops evil throughout the state. The one punished is the thief; those who tremble in fear are the good people. Why should one who desires order hesitate to use heavy penalties?
Generous reward is not only to reward merit; it also encourages the whole state. The rewarded enjoy the benefit; the unrewarded admire the achievement. Thus rewarding one person encourages the multitude. Why should one who desires order hesitate to give generous rewards?
Those who do not understand governance say, “Heavy punishments harm the people. Light punishments can stop wrongdoing. Why must punishments be heavy?” They do not examine governance. What heavy punishment stops, light punishment may not stop. What light punishment stops, heavy punishment will certainly stop. Thus if the ruler establishes heavy punishments and wrongdoing ceases, how does this harm the people?
Heavy punishment means that the criminal’s gain is small, while the ruler’s penalty is great. People will not risk a great crime for a small profit, so wrongdoing stops. Light punishment means that the criminal’s gain is large, while the ruler’s penalty is small. People covet the profit and slight the penalty, so wrongdoing does not stop.
An ancient proverb says: “One does not stumble over a mountain, but stumbles over a molehill.” A mountain is large, so people are cautious. A molehill is small, so people slight it. If punishments are light, people will slight them. If they offend and are not punished, the ruler drives the state into abandonment. If they offend and are punished, the ruler has set a trap for the people. Thus light offenses are the people’s molehills. To make light offenses the people’s path is either to disorder the state or to set traps for the people. This truly harms the people.
Scholars recite praises from books and do not examine present realities. They say, “If the ruler does not love the people, and taxes are always heavy, resources will be insufficient, the people will fear the ruler, and the world will fall into great disorder. If resources are sufficient and love is added, even light punishments can bring order.” This is false.
People accept heavy rewards and punishments only after their basic needs are met. Even if resources are sufficient and the ruler is generous, light punishment still leads to disorder. In a household, if a beloved child has ample wealth, he spends lightly; spending lightly leads to extravagance. If parents love him and cannot bear to correct him, he becomes arrogant and violent. Extravagance makes the household poor; arrogance makes conduct brutal. Thus even with sufficient wealth and deep love, light restraint brings harm.
Generally, when people have sufficient resources, they slacken in effort; when the ruler is weak, they indulge in wrongdoing. Only someone like Shennong would labor hard despite sufficient wealth; only someone like Zeng Shen or Shi Yu would behave well under weak rule. That ordinary people do not equal Shennong, Zeng, or Shi is clear.
Lao Dan said, “Know contentment and avoid disgrace; know when to stop and avoid danger.” Lao Dan himself refrained from seeking more than enough to avoid danger and disgrace. To think that making the people content is sufficient for governance is to assume all people are like Lao Dan. Jie, though Son of Heaven, was not content with honor; though master of all within the seas, he was not content with treasure. A ruler may make the people content, but cannot make them content as a Son of Heaven; and even a Jie might not be content if he were Son of Heaven. Then how can merely contenting the people bring order?
Thus an enlightened ruler, in governing, takes resources according to the times, assesses taxes to balance rich and poor, gives generous rank and salary to exhaust the worthy and able, and imposes heavy punishments to prohibit treachery and evil. He makes the people gain wealth through labor, attain honor through service, receive punishment for faults, and obtain rewards for merit. He does not rely on gifts of kindness. This is the government of emperors and kings.
When all are asleep, the blind are not known; when all are silent, the mute are not known. Wake them and make them look; question them and make them answer; then the blind and mute are exposed. If a ruler does not listen to words, he cannot know the unskilled; if he does not assign tasks, he cannot know the unworthy. Listen to their words and demand correctness; assign them tasks and demand results; then the unskilled and unworthy are exposed.
To find a strong man, if one listens only to self-praise, even an ordinary person cannot be distinguished from Wu Huo. Give him a tripod to lift, and weakness and strength appear. Offices and tasks are the tripods of capable men. Assign affairs, and foolishness and wisdom are distinguished.
The unskilled escape detection by not being tested; the unworthy escape detection by not being employed. Those whose words are not tested decorate themselves as eloquent; those whose persons are not employed decorate themselves as lofty. Worldly rulers are dazzled by their eloquence and misled by their loftiness, honoring them without testing. This is like trying to determine clear sight without making one look, or eloquence without making one speak; then the mute and blind cannot be detected.
An enlightened ruler, when he listens to words, demands practical use; when he observes conduct, demands achievement. Then empty and outdated doctrines will not be discussed, and boastful and false conduct will not be displayed.
Note
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 46 condemns reversed social values in governance. It warns private morality and factions erode royal power, advising rulers to prioritize impartial state law rather than unregulated personal reputations for political stability.
Six Contraries (六反):
Han Fei‘s term for the reversal of social evaluation. People harmful to the state are praised, while people useful to agriculture and war are slandered.
Zeng and Shi:
Zeng Shen, a disciple of Confucius known for filial piety, and Shi Yu, a minister of Wei known for uprightness. Han Fei uses them as examples of morally reputed figures, arguing that even such people cannot be trusted without clear detection and law.
Wu Huo (乌获):
A legendary strong man of ancient China. Han Fei uses him to show that ability should be tested by tasks, not by self-description.
Shennong:
The “Divine Farmer,” a mythical culture hero associated with agriculture. Han Fei argues that ordinary people are not as self-disciplined as Shennong.
Another name for Laozi, associated with Daoism. Han Fei quotes “Know contentment and avoid disgrace” to argue that most people are not naturally content, so governance cannot rely on moral self-restraint.
Jie:
The last ruler of the Xia dynasty, traditionally portrayed as a tyrant. Han Fei uses him to show that even supreme wealth and rank cannot satisfy unlimited desire.
Legalism:
Han Fei’s school emphasizes law, reward, punishment, centralized authority, agriculture, and war. It is skeptical of Confucian benevolence, Daoist contentment, and private moral reputations.
Private schools:
Independent scholars and their disciples, often promoting moral or philosophical teachings outside state control. Han Fei sees them as competing with state law.
六反第四十六
畏死远难，降北之民也，而世尊之曰“贵生之士”。学道立方，离法之民也，而世尊之曰“文学之士”游居厚养，牟食之民也，而世尊之曰“有能之士”。语曲牟知，伪诈之民也。而世尊之曰“辩智之士”。行剑攻杀，暴憿之民也，而世尊之曰“磏勇之士”。活贼匿奸，当死之民也，而世尊之曰“任誉之士”。此六民者，世之所誉也。赴险殉诚，死节之民，而世少之曰“失计之民”也。寡闻从令，全法之民也，而世少之曰“朴陋之民”也。力作而食，生利之民也，而世少之曰“寡能之民”也，嘉厚纯粹，整谷之民也，而世少之曰“愚戆之民”也。重命畏事，尊上之民也，而世少之曰“怯慑之民”也。挫贼遏奸，明上之民也，而世少之曰“謟谗之民”也。此六民者，世之所毁也。奸伪无益之民六，而世誉之如彼；耕战有益之民六，而世毁之如此：此之谓“六反”。布衣循私利而誉之，世主听虚声而礼之，礼之所在，利必加焉。百姓循私害而訾之，世主壅于俗而贱之，贱之所在，害必加焉。故名赏在乎私恶当罪之民，而毁害在乎公善宜赏之士，索国之富强，不可得也。
古者有谚曰：“为政犹沐也，虽有弃发，必为之。”爱弃发之费而忘长发之利，不知权者也。夫弹痤者痛，饮药者苦，为苦惫之故不弹痤饮药，则身不活，病不已矣。今上下之接，无子父之泽，而欲以行义禁下，则交必有郄矣。且父母之于子也，产男则相贺，产女则杀之。此俱出父母之怀衽，然男子受贺，女子杀之者，虑其后便，计之长利也。故父母之于子也，犹用计算之心以相待也，而况无父子之泽乎？今学者之说人主也，皆去求利之心，出相爱之道，是求人主之过父母之亲也，此不熟于论恩，诈而诬也，故明主不受也。圣人之治也，审于法禁，法禁明著，则官法；必于赏罚，赏罚不阿，则民用。官治则国富，国富则兵强，而霸王之业成矣。霸王者，人主之大利也。人主挟大利以听治，故其任官者当能，其赏罚无私。使士民明焉，尽力致死，则功伐可立而爵禄可致，爵禄致而富贵之业成矣。富贵者，人臣之大利也。人臣挟大利以从事，故其行危至死，其力尽而不望。此谓君不仁，臣不忠，则可以霸王矣。
夫奸必知则备，必诛则止；不知则肆，不诛则行。夫陈轻货于幽隐，虽曾、史可疑也；悬百金于市，虽大盗不取也。不知，则曾、史可疑于幽隐；必知，则大盗不取悬金于市。故明主之治国也，众其守而重其罪，使民以法禁而不以廉止。母之爱子也倍父，父令之行于子者十母；吏之于民无爱，令之行于民也万父。母积爱而令穷，吏威严而民听从，严爱之策亦可决矣。且父母之所以求于子也，动作则欲其安利也，行身则欲其远罪也。君上之于民也，有难则用其死，安平则尽其力。亲以厚爱关子于安利而不听，君以无爱利求民之死力而令行。明主知之，故不养恩爱之心而增威严之势。故母厚爱处，子多败，推爱也；父薄爱教笞，子多善，用严也。
今家人之治产也，相忍以饥寒，相强以劳苦，虽犯军旅之难，饥馑之患，温衣美食者，必是家也；相怜以衣食，相惠以佚乐，天饥岁荒，嫁妻卖子者，必是家也。故法之为道，前苦而长利；仁之为道，偷乐而后穷。圣人权其轻重，出其大利，故用法之相忍，而弃仁人之相怜也。学者之言皆曰“轻刑”，此乱亡之术也。凡赏罚之必者，劝禁也。赏厚，则所欲之得也疾；罚重，则所恶之禁也急。夫欲利者必恶害，害者，利之反也。反于所欲，焉得无恶？欲治者必恶乱，乱者，治之反也。是故欲治甚者，其赏必厚矣；其恶乱甚者，其罚必重矣。今取于轻刑者，其恶乱不甚也，其欲治又不甚也。此非特无术也，又乃无行。是故决贤、不肖、愚、知之美，在赏罚之轻重。且夫重刑者，非为罪人也。明主之法，揆也。治贼，非治所揆也；所揆也者，是治死人也。刑盗，非治所刑也；治所刑也者，是治胥靡也。故曰：重一奸之罪而止境内之邪，此所以为治也。重罚者，盗贼也；而悼惧者，良民也。欲治者奚疑于重刑名！若夫厚赏者，非独赏功也，又劝一国。受赏者甘利，未赏者慕业，是报一人之功而劝境内之众也，欲治者何疑于厚赏！今不知治者皆曰：“重刑伤民，轻刑可以止奸，何必于重哉？”此不察于治者也。夫以重止者，未必以轻止也；以轻止者，必以重止矣。是以上设重刑者而奸尽止，奸尽止，则此奚伤于民也？所谓重刑者，奸之所利者细，而上之所加焉者大也。民不以小利加大罪，故奸必止者也。所谓轻刑者，奸之所利者大，上之所加焉者小也。民慕其利而傲其罪，故奸不止也。故先圣有谚曰：“不踬于山，而踬于垤。”山者大，故人顺之；垤微小，故人易之也。今轻刑罚，民必易之。犯而不诛，是驱国而弃之也；犯而诛之，是为民设陷也。是故轻罪者，民之垤也。是以轻罪之为民道也，非乱国也，则设民陷也，此则可谓伤民矣！
今学者皆道书策之颂语，不察当世之实事，曰：“上不爱民，赋敛常重，则用不足而下恐上，故天下大乱。”此以为足其财用以加爱焉，虽轻刑罚，可以治也。此言不然矣。凡人之取重赏罚，固已足之之后也；虽财用足而后厚爱之，然而轻刑，犹之乱也。夫当家之爱子，财货足用，货财足用则轻用，轻用则侈泰。亲爱之则不忍，不忍则骄恣。侈泰则家贫，骄恣则行暴。此虽财用足而爱厚，轻利之患也。凡人之生也，财用足则隳于用力，上懦则肆于为非。财用足而力作者，神农也；上治懦而行修者，曾、史也，夫民之不及神农、曾、史亦明矣。老聃有言曰：“知足不辱，知止不殆。”夫以殆辱之故而不求于足之外者，老聃也。今以为足民而可以治，是以民为皆如老聃。故桀贵在天子而不足于尊，富有四海之内而不足于宝。君人者虽足民，不能足使为君天子，而桀未必为天子为足也，则虽足民，何可以为治也？故明主之治国也，适其时事以致财物，论其税赋以均贫富，厚其爵禄以尽贤能，重其刑罚以禁奸邪，使民以力得富，以事致贵，以过受罪，以功致赏，而不念慈惠之赐，此帝王之政也。
人皆寐，则盲者不知；皆嘿，则喑者不知。觉而使之视，问而使之对，则喑盲者穷矣。不听其言也，则无术者不知；不任其身也，则不肖者不知。听其言而求其当，任其身而责其功，则无术不肖者穷矣。夫欲得力士而听其自言，虽庸人与乌获不可别也；授之以鼎俎，则罢健效矣。故官职者，能士之鼎俎也，任之以事而愚智分矣。故无术者得于不用，不肖者得于不任。言不用而自文以为辩，身不任者而自饰以为高。世主眩其辩、滥其高而尊贵之，是不须视而定明也，不待对而定辩也，喑盲者不得矣。明主听其言必责其用，观其行必求其功，然则虚旧之学不谈，矜诬之行不饰矣。
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