The great principles of governance do not consist merely in giving rewards and punishments appropriately. To reward those who have no merit or to punish innocent people cannot be called clear-sighted. Even when one rewards the meritorious and punishes the guilty without missing the proper persons, this still deals only with what has already occurred; it does not itself generate merit or prevent wrongdoing. Therefore, among laws that prohibit deceit, the highest aim is to prohibit deceitful intentions, the next is to prohibit deceitful speech, and the lowest is to prohibit deceitful acts.
People today say, “Those who honor the ruler and bring security to the state must rely on benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and ability.” They do not realize that what humbles the ruler and endangers the state also comes through benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and ability. Hence a ruler who possesses the Way distances himself from benevolence and righteousness, discards clever wisdom, and brings people into submission through law. Thus his reputation becomes broad, his name awes some, the people are orderly, and the state is secure, because he understands the proper way of employing the people. In general, shu is what the ruler holds; fa is what officials follow. If this is so, it is not difficult for those within the palace to hear the Way each day beyond the palace gates, and for the people throughout the realm to see the law each day.
In former times, the Hu You clan had a man who lost proper measure; the Huan Dou clan had a solitary son; the San Miao had Cheng Ju; Jie had Hou Chi; Zhou had Chong Hou Hu; and Jin had You Shi. These six were ministers who brought states to ruin. They spoke of right as if it were wrong and of wrong as if it were right. Internally they were treacherous and harmful, yet behave discreetly outwardly to make themselves appear good. They praised the past so that worthy undertakings would be discouraged. They skillfully flattered their ruler, gathered his intimate attention, and confused him through what he liked. Such men belong to the type of attendants and those who stand close to the ruler.
Among rulers of past ages, some obtained men and thereby kept their persons safe and their states preserved; others obtained men and thereby endangered their persons and lost their states. The name “obtaining men” is the same, yet the benefits and harms differ a thousandfold. Therefore a ruler must be extremely cautious about those who surround him. If a ruler truly understands what his ministers say, he can distinguish the worthy from the unworthy as clearly as black from white.
Consider Xu You, Xu Ya, Jin Boyang, Qin Dianjie, Wei Qiaoru, Hu Buji, Chong Ming, Dong Bushi, Bian Sui, Wu Guang, Bo Yi, and Shu Qi. These twelve men felt no joy when offered profit above and no fear when faced with danger below. Some would not have accepted the world even if it were given to them. They preferred a reputation for enduring hardship and refused the benefit of eating grain. Since they felt no joy at gain, even generous rewards could not encourage them; since they felt no fear in danger, even severe punishments could not awe them. They are called people who cannot be commanded. These twelve men either hid and died in caves, withered and died among plants, starved in mountain valleys, or drowned in waters. Even the ancient sage-kings could not make them ministers. In the present age, what use could be made of them?
Consider Guan Long Pang, Prince Bi Gan, Ji Liang of Sui, Xie Ye of Chen, Shen Xu of Chu, and Wu Zixu. These six men urgently contended and forcefully remonstrated in order to overcome their rulers. When their words were heard and their proposals carried out, the relationship resembled that between master and disciples. But if a single word was not heard or a single matter not carried out, they would affront their ruler with their speech and stake their own lives upon it. Even if this meant death, the ruin of their families, the severing of head from body, or the separation of limbs, they did not regard it as difficult. Even the ancient sage-kings could not endure such ministers. In the present age, what use could be made of them?
Consider Tian Heng of Qi, Zi Han of Song, Ji Sun Yiru of Lu, Qiao Ru of Jin, Zi Nan Jin of Wei, Grand Administrator Xin of Zheng, Bai Gong of Chu, Shan Tu of Zhou, and Yan Zizhi of Yan. These nine men served as ministers by forming factions and cliques around their ruler. They concealed the proper Way and pursued private ends. They pressured the ruler above and disrupted governance below. They drew on external powers to disturb internal affairs and allied with subordinates to plot against superiors, without hesitation. Only sage-kings and wise rulers can restrain such ministers. Could a disordered ruler detect them?
Consider Hou Ji, Gao Yao, Yi Yin, the Duke of Zhou, Taigong Wang, Guan Zhong, Xi Peng, Baili Xi, Jian Shu, Jiu Fan, Zhao Xiang, Fan Li, Grand Master Zhong, Feng Tong, and Hua Deng. These fifteen men served as ministers by rising early and resting late, humbling their persons, steadying their minds, and purifying their intentions. They clarified laws, administered offices, and served their ruler. They offered good counsel and followed the Way and the law, yet did not boast of their goodness. When they achieved success, they did not boast of their labor. They did not hesitate to ruin their households if it benefited the state, nor to give up their lives if it secured the ruler. They regarded their ruler as lofty as high heaven and Mount Tai, and regarded themselves as low as valleys and streams. The ruler gained clear reputation and broad fame within the state, while they did not hesitate to accept a humble position. With such ministers, success could be achieved even under a disordered ruler, let alone under an enlightened one. They are called the assistants of hegemons and kings.
Consider Hua Zhi of Zhou, Wangsun Shen of Zheng, Gongsun Ning and Yi Xingfu of Chen, Shen Hai, the Yin of Yu in Chu, the Young Master of Sui, Zhong Gan of Yue, Wangsun E of Wu, Yang Chengxie of Jin, and Shu Diao and Yi Ya of Qi. These twelve men served as ministers by thinking of small profit and forgetting law and righteousness. When advancing, they concealed worthy men and darkened their ruler’s vision; when withdrawing, they disrupted the offices and created disaster. They assisted their ruler and indulged his desires. If they could gain a single pleasure from their ruler, they did not hesitate to ruin the state and kill the people. With such ministers, even a sage-king might fear being displaced; how could a disordered ruler avoid loss? Such ministers all died and caused their states to perish, becoming laughingstocks under heaven. Thus Duke Wei of Zhou was killed and his state split in two; Zi Yang of Zheng was killed and his state split in three; Duke Ling of Chen was killed by Xia Zhengshu; King Ling of Chu died at Qianxi; Sui was conquered by Chu; Wu was absorbed by Yue; Zhi Bo was destroyed at Jinyang; and Duke Huan of Qi died and lay unburied for seven days. Hence it is said: flattering ministers are recognized only by sage-kings, yet disordered rulers draw near to them, and so they bring about death and the ruin of the state.
Sage-kings and enlightened rulers are not like this. In recommending men from within, they do not avoid relatives; in recommending men from without, they do not avoid enemies. If someone is worthy, they recommend him; if someone is wrong, they punish him. Thus worthy men advance and deceitful men withdraw, and with one action they can bring the feudal lords into submission. The records say: Yao had Dan Zhu; Shun had Shang Jun; Qi had the Five Guan; the Shang had Tai Jia; and King Wu had Guan and Cai. The five kings punished men who were their own fathers, brothers, sons, or close relatives. Why did they kill them, ruin their persons, and destroy their households? Because they harmed the state, injured the people, and corrupted the law. As for those they recommended, some were found in forests, marshes, and caves; some were in prisons, bound with ropes; and some were engaged in cooking, herding, or feeding cattle. Yet enlightened rulers were not ashamed of their low status. Because they were capable of clarifying the law and benefiting the state and the people, the rulers recommended them, and so kept their persons safe and their names honored.
Disordered rulers are not like this. They do not understand their ministers’ intentions and conduct, yet they entrust them with the state. Hence, in small matters, their names are humbled and their territory reduced; in great matters, their states perish and they themselves die. This is because they do not understand how to employ ministers. A ruler who lacks methods for measuring his ministers will judge them by popular talk. If the crowd praises someone, he is pleased; if the crowd condemns someone, he hates him. Thus ministers ruin households and injure the lowly, form factions within, and connect with neighborhood groups outside to create reputation. They secretly bind themselves together for strength and falsely promise rank and salary to encourage one another. They say, “Those who join us will benefit; those who do not will be harmed.” The masses covet their benefits and fear their power: “If he is pleased, he can benefit us; if he is jealous or angry, he can harm us.” The masses rally to them, the people remain with them, their reputation fills the state, and reports reach the ruler. The ruler cannot sort out the truth and therefore takes them to be worthy. They also send cunning men to pose abroad as favored envoys of other lords, lending them carriages and horses, trusting them with tallies, supporting them with fine words, and supplying them with silk and gifts. These men then use excessive speech to influence foreign rulers, while secretly advancing private interests under the guise of public discussion. The envoys are rulers of other states, yet those who speak are the attendants at court. The ruler is pleased by their words and impressed by their eloquence, and concludes that these men are worthy scholars of the world. Inside and outside, among attendants and neighbors, they chant in one voice and speak in agreement. In major matters, they do not hesitate to humble themselves and lower high offices to gain support; in minor matters, they offer high rank and heavy salary to win advantage. When deceitful men receive heavy rank and salary and their factions grow ever larger, and when they also harbor deceitful intentions, they turn back and flatter the ruler, saying: “The so-called sage-kings and enlightened rulers of antiquity did not truly observe seniority, youth, weakness, or proper order. They formed factions, gathered neighborhood groups, pressured their superiors, killed their rulers, and sought advantage.” When asked, “How do you know this?” they reply: “Shun pressured Yao; Yu pressured Shun; Tang exiled Jie; and King Wu attacked Zhou. These four kings were ministers who killed their rulers, yet the world praised them. Examining their intentions, they were greedy to win people’s hearts; judging their conduct, they used violent and disorderly armies. Yet because they broadened their own position, the world called them great; because they made their names illustrious, the world called them enlightened. Their authority was sufficient to rule the world, and their benefits sufficient to surpass all others, so the world followed them.” They also say: “From what is heard today, Tian Chengzi took Qi; Sikong Zi Han took Song; Grand Administrator Xin took Zheng; the Shan clan took Zhou; Yi Ya took Wei; and the three houses of Han, Zhao, and Wei divided Jin. These six were ministers who killed their rulers.” When deceitful ministers hear this, they prick up their ears and approve. Thus they form factions within, extend connections among neighborhood groups outside, watch for the right moment, and in one move seize the state.
Moreover, there are countless cases in which ministers use internal factions to coerce or kill their rulers, while externally using the approval of other lords to treat their state lightly, concealing proper duty, holding to private ends, restraining the ruler above, and disrupting governance below. Why is this? Because they do not understand how to choose ministers. The records say: “Since the time of King Xuan of Zhou, dozens of states have perished, and many ministers have killed their rulers and seized their states.” Thus disasters arising from within and those arising from without are about equal. Even rulers who could fully exhaust their people’s strength yet still lost their states and died may still be called worthy. But those who turned the law around, changed their positions, preserved their followers, and handed the state to others represent the gravest disease.
If a ruler truly understands what his ministers say, then even if he shoots wildfowl, races about, strikes bells, and dances with women, his state will still survive. If he does not understand what his ministers say, then even if he is frugal, diligent, wears plain clothes, and eats poor food, his state will still perish. The former ruler of Zhao, Jing Hou, did not cultivate virtuous conduct and loved indulgence. He followed what pleased his body and delighted his ears and eyes. In winter he hunted; in summer he floated about in pleasure. He held long night banquets and for several days did not stop drinking. Those who could not drink had wine poured into their mouths through tubes. Those who were not respectful in advancing or retreating, or not respectful in answering, were beheaded before him. His dwelling and diet were thus extremely unrestrained. His punishments and killings were equally measureless. Yet Jing Hou held the state for decades. His armies were not defeated by enemy states; his territory was not reduced by neighbors; there was no disorder among ruler, ministers, and officials within; and there was no trouble from feudal lords or neighboring states without. This was because he understood how to appoint ministers.
The ruler of Yan, Zi Kuai, was a descendant of Shao Gong. His land extended for thousands of li, and he maintained hundreds of thousands of spear-bearing troops. He did not indulge in the pleasures of women, did not listen to bells and chimes, did not fill his inner palace with ponds, terraces, and pavilions, and did not go hunting outside. He even personally took up the plow and hoe to cultivate the fields. Zi Kuai afflicted his body and worried for the people to such an extreme that even the ancient sage-kings and enlightened rulers were not more diligent in person or more concerned for the world. Yet Zi Kuai died, his state perished, and his power was seized by Zi Zhi, making him a laughingstock under heaven. Why was this? Because he did not understand how to appoint ministers.
Hence it is said: ministers have five kinds of deceit, which the ruler does not recognize. Among ministers, some extravagantly spend wealth and offer bribes to win reputation; some busy themselves with rewards and gifts to shift popular support; some form factions, flatter the wise, honor scholars, and thereby seize power; some busy themselves with releasing and pardoning prisoners to create private authority; and some busy themselves with flattering inferiors, twisting right and wrong, using strange words, remarkable clothes, and extraordinary titles to dazzle the people’s eyes and ears. These five are what enlightened rulers suspect and sage rulers prohibit. When these five are removed, noisy and deceitful persons will not dare to stand and speak in court; those who have many fine words but few proper deeds, and whose conduct does not accord with law, will not dare to distort the truth in speech. Thus ministers cultivate themselves when at rest and expend their strength when acting. Without the ruler’s command, they will not dare to act rashly, speak falsely, or misrepresent affairs. This is how sage-kings govern their ministers.
Sage rulers and enlightened monarchs do not merely use suspicious signs to spy on their ministers. If one sees suspicious signs and does not reflect upon them, such cases are rare in the world. Hence it is said: when a concubine’s son rivals the legitimate son, a favored concubine rivals the wife, a minister in court rivals the chief minister, and a minister’s favor rivals the ruler’s authority, these four bring danger to the state. Thus it is said: when inner favorites equal the queen, outer favorites duplicate governance, branch-line sons rival legitimate sons, and great ministers rival the ruler, this is the way of disorder. Therefore the Zhou Ji says: “Do not honor a concubine and humble the wife; do not displace the legitimate son and honor a junior branch; do not honor a favored minister and place him equal to the high ministers; do not honor a great minister so that he rivals his ruler.” If these four rivalries are broken, there will be no improper designs above and no strange disturbances below. If they are not broken, the ruler will perish and the state will be destroyed.
Note
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 44 classifies five minister‑types and five treacherous court tricks. It stresses rulers must master official‑assessment techniques, curb power‑usurping rivalry, rather than merely relying on personal virtue or frugality.
Fa and Shu:
Fa means public laws, rewards, punishments, and administrative rules. Shu means the ruler’s methods for observing, testing, and controlling ministers. Han Fei argues that both are essential.
Prohibiting heart, speech, and acts:
Han Fei ranks legal control from deepest to shallowest. The best law prevents harmful intentions; weaker control only punishes harmful actions after they occur.
Critique of benevolence and wisdom:
Han Fei does not deny that benevolence and wisdom can be valuable. He warns that rulers who rely on moral reputation or clever speech instead of clear law may be deceived.
Hu You, Huan Dou, San Miao:
These names come from ancient Chinese traditions about rebellious tribes or figures challenged by early sage-rulers. Han Fei uses them as examples of dangerous men around power.
Jie and Zhou:
Jie was the last ruler of the Xia dynasty; Zhou was the last ruler of the Shang dynasty. Both became standard examples of tyrants who lost the state.
Chong Hou Hu:
A minister associated with the last Shang ruler. He is traditionally viewed as a flattering courtier who misled his sovereign.
You Shi:
A entertainer or jester-like figure at the court of Jin, used here to represent those who influence rulers through amusement and speech rather than proper governance.
Xu You, Bian Sui, Bo Yi, Shu Qi:
Famous recluses or morally strict figures who refused office or worldly profit. Han Fei sees them as useless for state administration because they cannot be motivated by reward or punishment.
Guan Long Pang and Bi Gan:
Loyal ministers who remonstrated with tyrannical rulers and were killed. Han Fei recognizes their integrity but argues that confrontational remonstrance is not an effective method of governance.
A famous minister associated with Wu and Chu. He is remembered for strong remonstrance and tragic death.
Tian Heng / Tian Chengzi:
A ministerial figure from Qi who came to dominate the state. The Tian family eventually replaced the original ruling house of Qi.
Zi Zhi and Zi Kuai of Yan:
Zi Kuai, ruler of Yan, famously yielded power to his minister Zi Zhi. This led to chaos, invasion, and Zi Kuai’s death. Han Fei treats it as a warning against improper transfer of authority.
Shu Diao and Yi Ya:
Ministers of Duke Huan of Qi. Yi Ya is infamous for allegedly cooking his own son to please the ruler. After Duke Huan’s death, court factionalism left his body unburied for days.
Sage-kings punishing relatives:
Dan Zhu, Shang Jun, the Five Guan, Tai Jia, Guan, and Cai are figures connected to Yao, Shun, Yu, the Shang, and the early Zhou. Han Fei cites them to show that even close kin must be punished if they harm the state.
Usurpation justified by ancient models:
Han Fei warns that ministers may cite Shun, Yu, Tang, and King Wu to present rebellion as moral succession. For him, this is dangerous rhetoric that can disguise power grabs.
Four rivalries:
The text warns against situations where a concubine rivals the wife, a branch-line son rivals the legitimate heir, a minister rivals the chief minister, or a favorite minister rivals the ruler. These disruptions of hierarchy are seen as sources of political danger.
说疑
凡治之大者，非谓其赏罚之当也。赏无功之人，罚不辜之民，非谓明也。赏有功，罚有罪，而不失其人，方在于人者也，非能生功止过者也。是故禁奸之法，太上禁其心，其次禁其言，其次禁其事。今世皆曰：“尊主安国者，必以仁义智能”，而不知卑主危国者之必以仁义智能也。故有道之主，远仁义，去智能，服之以法。是以誉广而名威，民治而国安，知用民之法也。凡术也者，主之所以执也；法也者，官之所以师也。然使郎中日闻道于郎门之外，以至于境内日见法，又非其难者也。
昔者有扈氏有失度，讙兜氏有孤男，三苗有成驹，桀有侯侈，纣有崇侯虎，晋有优施，此六人者，亡国之臣也。言是如非，言非如是，内险以贼，其外小谨，以征其善；称道往古，使良事沮；善禅其主，以集精微，乱之以其所好：此夫郎中左右之类者也。往世之主，有得人而身安国存者，有得人而身危国亡者。得人之名一也，而利害相千万也，故人主左右不可不慎也。为人主者诚明于臣之所言，则别贤不肖如黑白矣。
若夫许由、续牙、晋伯阳、秦颠颉、卫侨如、狐不稽、重明、董不识、卞随、务光、伯夷、叔齐，此十二者，皆上见利不喜，下临难不恐，或与之天下而不取，有萃辱之名，则不乐食谷之利。夫见利不喜，上虽厚赏，无以劝之；临难不恐，上虽严刑，无以威之：此之谓不令之民也。此十二人者，或伏死于窟穴，或槁死于草木，或饥饿于山谷，或沉溺于水泉。有如此，先古圣王皆不能臣，当今之世，将安用之？
若夫关龙逄、王子比干、随季梁、陈泄冶、楚申胥、吴子胥，此六人者，皆疾争强谏以胜其君。言听事行，则如师徒之势；一言而不听，一事则不行，则陵其主以语，待之以其身，虽死家破，要领不属，手足异处，不难为也。如此臣者，先古圣王皆不能忍也，当今之时，将安用之？
若夫齐田恒、宋子罕、鲁季孙意如、晋侨如、卫子南劲、郑太宰欣、楚白公、周单荼、燕子之，此九人者之为其臣也，皆朋党比周以事其君，隐正道而行私曲，上逼君，下乱治，援外以挠内，亲下以谋上，不难为也。如此臣者，唯圣王智主能禁之，若夫昏乱之君，能见之乎？
若夫后稷、皋陶、伊尹、周公旦、太公望、管仲、隰朋、百里奚、蹇叔、舅犯、赵襄、范蠡、大夫种、逢同、华登，此十五人者为其臣也，皆夙兴夜寐，单身贱体，竦心白意；明刑辟、治官职以事其君，进善言、通道法而不敢矜其善，有成功立事而不敢伐其劳；不难破家以便国，杀身以安主，以其主为高天泰山之尊，而以其身为壑谷洧之卑；主有明名广誉于国，而身不难受壑谷洧之卑。如此臣者，虽当昏乱之主尚可致功，况于显明之主乎？此谓霸王之佐也。
若夫周滑之、郑王孙申、陈公孙宁、仪行父、荆芋尹申亥、随少师、越种干、吴王孙额、晋阳成泄、齐竖刁、易牙，此十二人者之为其臣也，皆思小利而忘法义，进则掩蔽贤良以阴暗其主，退则挠乱百官而为祸难；皆辅其君，共其欲，苟得一说于主，虽破国杀众，不难为也。有臣如此，虽当圣王尚恐夺之，而况昏乱之君，其能无失乎？有臣如此者，皆身死国亡，为天下笑。故周威公身杀，国分为二；郑子阳身杀，国分为三；陈灵身死于夏征舒氏；荆灵王死于乾谿之上；随亡于荆；吴并于越；知伯灭于晋阳之下；桓公身死七日不收。故曰：謟谀之臣，唯圣王知之，而乱主近之，故至身死国亡。
圣王明君则不然，内举不避亲，外举不避仇。是在焉，从而举之；非在焉，从而罚之。是以贤良遂进而奸邪并退，故一举而能服诸侯。其在记曰：尧有丹朱，而舜有商均，启有五观，商有太甲，武王有管、蔡。五王之所诛者，皆父兄子弟之亲也，而所杀亡其身残破其家者何也？以其害国伤民败法类也。观其所举，或在山林薮泽岩穴之间，或在囹圄緤绁缠索之中，或在割烹刍牧饭牛之事。然明主不羞其卑贱也，以其能，为可以明法，便国利民，从而举之，身安名尊。
乱主则不然，不知其臣之意行，而任之以国，故小之名卑地削，大之国亡身死。不明于用臣也。无数以度其臣者，必以其众人之口断之。众人所誉，从而悦之；众之所非，从而憎之。故为人臣者破家残賥，内构党与、外接巷族以为誉，从阴约结以相固也，虚相与爵禄以相劝也。曰：“与我者将利之，不与我者将害之。”众贪其利，劫其威：“彼诚喜，则能利己；忌怒，则能害己。”众归而民留之，以誉盈于国，发闻于主。主不能理其情，因以为贤。彼又使谲诈之士，外假为诸侯之宠使，假之以舆马，信之以瑞节，镇之以辞令，资之以币帛，使诸侯淫说其主，微挟私而公议。所为使者，异国之主也；所为谈者，左右之人也。主说其言而辩其辞，以此人者天下之贤士也。内外之于左右，其讽一而语同。大者不难卑身尊位以下之，小者高爵重禄以利之。夫奸人之爵禄重而党与弥众，又有奸邪之意，则奸臣愈反而说之，曰：“古之所谓圣君明王者，非长幼弱也，及以次序也；以其构党与，聚巷族，逼上弑君而求其利也。”彼曰：“何知其然也？”因曰：“舜逼尧，禹逼舜，汤放桀，武王伐纣。此四王者，人臣弑其君者也，而天下誉之。察四王之情，贪得人之意也；度其行，暴乱之兵也。然四王自广措也，而天下称大焉；自显名也，而天下称明焉。则威足以临天下，利足以盖世，天下从之。”又曰：“以今时之所闻，田成子取齐，司城子罕取宋，太宰欣取郑，单氏取周，易牙之取卫，韩、魏、赵三子分晋，此六人者，臣之弑其君者也。”奸臣闻此，然举耳以为是也。故内构党与，外摅巷族，观时发事，一举而取国家。且夫内以党与劫弑其君，外以诸侯之讙骄易其国，隐敦适，持私曲，上禁君，下挠治者，不可胜数也。是何也？则不明于择臣也。记曰：“周宣王以来，亡国数十，其臣弑其君取国者众矣。”然则难之从内起与从外作者相半也。能一尽其民力，破国杀身者，尚皆贤主也。若夫转身法易位，全众傅国，最其病也。
为人主者，诚明于臣之所言，则虽弋驰骋，撞钟舞女，国犹且存也；不明臣之所言，虽节俭勤劳，布衣恶食，国犹自亡也。赵之先君敬侯，不修德行，而好纵欲，适身体之所安，耳目之所乐，冬日弋，夏浮淫，为长夜，数日不废御觞，不能饮者以筒灌其口，进退不肃、应对不恭者斩于前。故居处饮食如此其不节也。制刑杀戮如此其无度也，然敬侯享国数十年，兵不顿于敌国，地不亏于四邻，内无君臣百官之乱，外无诸侯邻国之患，明于所以任臣也。燕君子哙，邵公之后也，地方数千里，持戟数十万，不安子女之乐，不听钟石之声，内不堙污池台榭，外不弋田猎，又亲操耒耨以修畎亩。子哙之苦身以忧民如此其甚也，虽古之所谓圣王明君者，其勤身而忧世不甚于此矣。然而子哙身死国亡，夺于子之，而天下笑之。此其何故也？不明乎所以任臣也。
故曰：人臣有五奸，而主不知也。为人主者，有侈用财货赂以取誉者，有务庆赏赐予以移众者，有务朋党徇智尊士以擅逞者，有务解免赦罪狱以事威者，有务奉下直曲、怪言、伟服、瑰称以眩民耳目者。此五者，明君之所疑也，而圣主之所禁也。去此五者，则譟诈之人不敢北面谈立；文言多、实行寡而不当法者，不敢诬情以谈说。是以群臣居则修身，动则任力，非上之令不敢擅作疾言诬事，此圣王之所以牧臣下也。彼圣主明君，不适疑物以窥其臣也。见疑物而无反者，天下鲜矣。故曰：孽有拟适之子，配有拟妻之妾，廷有拟相之臣，臣有拟主之宠，此四者，国之所危也。故曰：内宠并后，外宠贰政，枝子配适，大臣拟主，乱之道也。故《周记》曰：“无尊妾而卑妻，无孽适子而尊小枝，无尊嬖臣而匹上卿，无尊大臣以拟其主也。”四拟者破，则上无意、下无怪也；四拟不破，则陨身灭国矣。
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