When law and prohibitions are abandoned and private pleas prevail, ministers sell official posts upward and seek rewards downward. Thus benefits go to private clans and power rests with ministers. Commoners no longer serve the ruler whole‑heartedly but seek connections with the powerful. When people crave high‑level connections, wealth flows upward, and smooth‑talking schemers gain power. Consequently, truly meritorious men grow fewer. As treacherous ministers rise and capable ones retreat, the ruler falls into confusion and the people lose direction. This is the disaster of neglecting law, devaluing merit, honoring empty reputations, and yielding to private requests.
Law‑breaking ministers always employ fraud and pretexts to win proximity to the ruler, and delight in speaking of rare wonders. This is how tyrants and muddled rulers are misled, and worthy ministers are marginalized.
When ministers praise Yi Yin and Guan Zhong‘s achievements, they justify ignoring law for personal wit. When they cite Bi Gan and Wu Zixu’s martyrdom, they excuse impertinent remonstrance. Using ancient sage‑kings to criticize the present ruler through forced analogies must be forbidden.
Rulers establish law as rightful, yet ministers promote private cleverness to deny law’s validity – twisting law by personal intellect. Violating law to assert personal power must be prohibited; this is the ruler’s essential statecraft.
To govern, a ruler must distinguish public from private interests, clarify legal systems, and abolish personal favors. Enforcing decrees and prohibitions is the ruler’s public justice. Upholding private bonds and friendship beyond reward and punishment is ministerial private justice. When private justice prevails, chaos follows; when public justice prevails, order reigns. Thus public and private must be separated.
Ministers possess both private self‑interest and public duty. To cultivate integrity, act righteously, and serve without self‑interest is public duty. To indulge desire for personal and familial gain is private self‑interest. Under an enlightened ruler, ministers abandon self‑interest for public duty. Under a muddled ruler, they abandon public duty for self‑interest. Hence rulers and ministers hold different intentions.
Rulers employ ministers by calculation; ministers serve rulers by calculation. Their relationship is rooted in mutual benefit. Ministers will not harm themselves for state benefit; rulers will not enrich ministers for state prosperity. Ministers avoid self‑harm; rulers avoid state ruin. Rulers and ministers are bound by calculated interest.
Voluntary sacrifice in crisis and whole‑hearted service stem from legal constraints. Therefore ancient sage‑kings clarified rewards to encourage loyalty and imposed severe punishments to deter evil. Clear reward‑punishment inspires people to fight to the death, strengthening the army and exalting the ruler. When rewards and punishments are unclear, undeserving people seek rewards and criminals escape penalty, weakening the army and degrading the ruler. Thus ancient kings and their worthy ministers devoted all their effort.
In conclusion: public and private interests must be strictly distinguished, and law and prohibitions must be carefully enforced – a truth known to all ancient sage‑kings.
Note
This passage delivers the ultimate Legalist political principle: human nature is self‑interested. Rulers must separate public law from private interest, enforce strict rewards and punishments, and rely on institutions rather than personal morality to govern ministers and the state.
Late Warring‑States Legalist philosopher. This passage concludes his essay Exposing Superstition (Shi Xie), defining the core Legalist distinction between public justice and private self‑interest.
Yi Yin, Guan Zhong
Legendary loyal reformer ministers, used by corrupt officials as excuses for breaking laws.
Bi Gan, Wu Zixu
Martyr loyalists who died remonstrating against tyrants, whose stories were misused by ministers to justify insubordination.
Public‑Private Distinction
Foundational Legalist political ethics: state governance must prioritize impartial public law over personal private bonds, favoritism and kinship loyalty.
Calculative Ruler‑Minister Relationship
Han Fei’s realistic view: the ruler‑minister bond is based on mutual benefit and calculation, not natural loyalty or moral affection.
Reward‑Punishment Institutional Constraint
Legalist core mechanism: duty and sacrifice are secured by strict legal incentives and penalties, not moral persuasion.
Private Plea Politics
Common Warring‑States court corruption where officials gained power through personal favor‑seeking rather than merit.
釋法禁而聽請謁，群臣賣官於上，取賞於下，是以利在私家而威在群臣。故民無盡力事主之心，而務為交於上。民好上交則貨財上流，而巧說者用。若是，則有功者愈少。姦臣愈進而材臣退，則主惑而不知所行，民聚而不知所道，此廢法禁、後功勞、舉名譽、聽請謁之失也。凡敗法之人，必設詐託物以來親，又好言天下之所希有，此暴君亂主之所以惑也，人臣賢佐之所以侵也。故人臣稱伊尹、管仲之功，則背法飾智有資；稱比干、子胥之忠而見殺，則疾強諫有辭。夫上稱賢明，下稱暴亂，不可以取類，若是者禁。君之立法，以為是也，今人臣多立其私智。以法為非，者是邪以智。過法立智，如是者禁，主之道也。禁主之道，必明於公私之分，明法制，去私恩。夫令必行，禁必止，人主之公義也；必行其私，信於朋友，不可為賞勸，不可為罰沮，人臣之私義也。私義行則亂，公義行則治，故公私有分。人臣有私心，有公義。修身潔白而行公行正，居官無私，人臣之公義也。汙行從欲，安身利家，人臣之私心也。明主在上則人臣去私心行公義，亂主在上則人臣去公義行私心，故君臣異心。君以計畜臣，臣以計事君，君臣之交，計也。害身而利國，臣弗為也；富國而利臣，君不行也。臣之情，害身無利；君之情，害國無親。君臣也者，以計合者也。至夫臨難必死，盡智竭力，為法為之。故先王明賞以勸之，嚴刑以威之。賞刑明則民盡死，民盡死則兵強主尊。刑賞不察則民無功而求得，有罪而幸免，則兵弱主卑。故先王賢佐盡力竭智。故曰：公私不可不明，法禁不可不審，先王知之矣。
Leave a Reply