The State of Zhao lay in the central plain, a land inhabited by mixed peoples. Its folk were frivolous and hard to command. Its government decrees were ill‑regulated, rewards and punishments lacked credibility, its terrain offered no strategic advantage, and its ruler could not fully mobilize the strength of the people. Zhao already bore the shape of a doomed state, yet its rulers cared little for the common folk.
Zhao conscripted all its people and stationed troops at Changping to contest Shangdang belonging to Han. By Your Majesty’s command, Qin defeated Zhao and captured Wu’an. At that time, Zhao’s rulers and people were estranged, nobles and commoners distrusted one another, so Handan could not be defended firmly.
Had Qin seized Handan, controlled the lands east of the Xiao Mountains and the Hejian region, then marched west to capture Xiuwu, cross Hua and Jiang, and take Shangdang: the forty‑six counties of Dai and the seventy counties of Shangdang would have belonged to Qin without deploying a single extra troop or burdening a single civilian.
With Dai and Shangdang yielding to Qin without war, Dongyang and Hewai would have turned to Qi, and the lands north of Zhongshan and Hutuo would have submitted to Yan. Once Zhao was conquered, Han would fall; with Han fallen, Chu and Wei could not stand alone.
One campaign would have ruined Han, weakened Wei, broken Chu, restrained Qi and Yan in the east, and flooded Wei by opening the Baima ford. In one stroke, the Three Jin states would perish and the Vertical Alliance collapse. Your Majesty need only wait calmly, and all the feudal lords would submit in sequence, achieving the name of hegemon.
Yet your strategic ministers failed to act. They withdrew the army and made peace with Zhao. With Your Majesty’s wisdom and Qin’s military might, you abandoned the hegemonic enterprise, gained no territory, and were even deceived by a state on the verge of ruin — all due to the folly of your ministers.
Zhao ought to have perished yet survived; Qin ought to have attained hegemony yet failed. For the first time, the world judged the incompetence of Qin’s ministers.
Later Qin mobilized all soldiers to attack Handan but could not take it. Troops abandoned armor and crossbows, retreated in fear. For the second time, the world gauged the true limit of Qin’s military strength.
The army regrouped at Fuxia. Your Majesty joined forces there, yet could not win the battle, nor sustain supplies, and had to retreat in exhaustion. For the third time, the world assessed Qin’s weakness.
Internationally, lords saw through Qin’s incompetent ministers; domestically, they saw the exhaustion of Qin’s military power. From this, I hold that the Vertical Alliance of the eastern states will find it far easier to unite against Qin.
Within Qin, weapons are worn out, soldiers and people weary, reserves depleted, farmlands barren, granaries empty. Beyond its borders, all feudal lords share a firm common will. I beg Your Majesty to ponder this perilous situation carefully.
Note
This passage exposes three major blunders of Qin: letting a collapsing Zhao survive, failing to take Handan, and wasting military strength in fruitless campaigns. It warns that internal exhaustion plus foreign solidarity of rivals will place Qin in severe strategic danger.
Zhao
One of the Three Jin states, located in the Central Plains. It had a volatile civilian temperament, unstable governance, poor reward‑punishment credibility, and inherent weaknesses that made it vulnerable to collapse in Han Fei’s view.
The Three Jin States
Collectively Han, Zhao, Wei, derived from the partition of ancient Jin; core powers of the central plains during the Warring States Period.
Vertical Alliance (Hezong)
The coalition of eastern states uniting to resist the expansion of Qin from the west, the main strategic rivalry of the era.
Han Fei
Legalist thinker who analyzes state strength, military strategy, ministerial competence, and the balance of power among warring states. He criticizes short‑sighted peace deals and missed strategic opportunities.
Warring States Statecraft
A state’s survival depended on orderly decrees, credible reward and punishment, popular support, favorable terrain, and far‑sighted ministers. Deficiencies in any of these marked a state as doomed.
Strategic Opportunity in Warfare
Ancient military philosophy stressed striking while the enemy was internally divided; hesitation and premature peace would let a doomed enemy recover and become a future threat.
Judging a State’s Strength
Feudal lords judged Qin’s power through three observations: incompetent ministers, failed sieges, and exhausted military campaigns. Reputation and actual strength determined alliance dynamics.
Legalist Administrative Ideal
Ministers must serve national grand strategy rather than making cautious, short‑term compromises; rulers must assess domestic depletion and foreign alliances to avoid peril.
趙氏，中央之國也，雜民所居也。其民輕而難用也。號令不治，賞罰不信，地形不便，下不能盡其民力。彼固亡國之形也，而不憂民萌。悉其士民，軍於長平之下，以爭韓上黨。大王以詔破之，拔武安。當是時也，趙氏上下不相親也，貴賤不相信也。然則邯鄲不守。拔邯鄲，筦山東河間，引軍而去，西攻脩武，踰華，絳上黨。代四十六縣，上黨七十縣，不用一領甲，不苦一士民，此皆秦有也。以代、上黨不戰而畢為秦矣，東陽、河外不戰而畢反為齊矣，中山、呼沱以北不戰而畢為燕矣。然則是趙舉，趙舉則韓亡，韓亡則荊、魏不能獨立，荊、魏不能獨立則是一舉而壞韓、蠹魏、拔荊，東以弱齊、燕，決白馬之口以沃魏氏，是一舉而三晉亡，從者敗也。大王垂拱以須之，天下編隨而服矣，霸王之名可成。而謀臣不為，引軍而退，復與趙氏為和。夫以大王之明，秦兵之強，棄霸王之業，地曾不可得，乃取欺於亡國，是謀臣之拙也。且夫趙當亡而不亡，秦當霸而不霸，天下固以量秦之謀臣一矣。乃復悉士卒以攻邯鄲，不能拔也，棄甲負弩，戰竦而卻，天下固已量秦力二矣。軍乃引而復，并於孚下，大王又并軍而至，與戰不能剋之也，又不能反運，罷而去，天下固量秦力三矣。內者量吾謀臣，外者極吾兵力。由是觀之，臣以為天下之從，幾不難矣。內者，吾甲兵頓，士民病，蓄積索，田疇荒，囷倉虛；外者、天下皆比意甚固。願大王有以慮之也。
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