In ancient times, the fall of King Zhou of Shang and the decline of the Zhou royal house both resulted from excessive power held by feudal lords. The partition of Jin and the usurpation of Qi were both caused by ministers growing too wealthy and powerful. The regicides in Yan and Song all followed the same pattern.
From the decline of Yin and Zhou in early times to the killing of rulers in Yan and Song in later ages, every disaster arose from subordinates gaining too much power and the ruler losing control.
Therefore, an enlightened ruler controls his ministers entirely by law and restrains them with institutional checks. He never pardons death penalties nor mitigates punishments. To pardon capital crimes or reduce penalties is to allow royal authority to dissipate, endangering the state and letting power fall into the hands of ministers.
Hence, even if high‑ranking officials receive generous salaries, they must not use their influence to control cities and towns. Even if they have numerous followers, they must not make soldiers their personal subordinates. Ministers must not hold private court factions within the state or form personal alliances in the military. State treasury goods must not be lent privately to individual households. These are how enlightened rulers ban treachery.
Ministers are forbidden to travel with large retinues or carry concealed weapons. Anyone transporting weapons and armor without official courier permission shall be executed without pardon. These are how enlightened rulers guard against unexpected rebellions.
Note
Han Fei draws lessons from multiple fallen dynasties and states to establish strict institutional rules: limit ministers’ wealth, troops, followers and weapons; enforce severe laws; keep all power centralized with the ruler.
Han Fei
Leading Legalist thinker of the Warring States Period. This passage is from his essay *Favored Ministers (Ai Chen)*, which provides practical rules for rulers to restrict ministerial power.
King Zhou of Shang
The tyrannical last king of Shang Dynasty, whose downfall was partly due to regional lords growing stronger than central authority.
Zhou Royal House
The Zhou Dynasty gradually declined as feudal states gained independent power.
Partition of Jin & Usurpation of Qi
Jin was split into Han, Zhao and Wei by its powerful noble clans. Qi’s royal power was seized by minister Tian Chang. Both are classic examples of ministerial usurpation.
Yan & Song Regicides
Historical cases where high‑ranked ministers killed their rulers, used by Han Fei as warnings of ministerial over‑power. For details about the Yan’s tragedy, refer to the following article: The Abdication that Almost Destroyed a Kingdom: Zizhi Rebellion.
Legalist Absolute Monarchy
Legalism insists that power must be fully centralized in the ruler. Ministers must never gain private military, financial or regional power.
Strict Legal Punishment
Pardoning serious crimes weakens royal prestige. Harsh, consistent law enforcement is essential for stability.
Ban on Private Military Power
Ministers cannot have personal armies, private alliances or hidden weapons, which were seen as direct threats to the throne.
Central‑Local Power Balance
Han Fei summarizes historical lessons: regional lords and court nobles must be strictly controlled, otherwise they will overthrow the central government.
昔者纣之亡，周之卑，皆从诸侯之博大也；晋也分也，齐之夺也，皆以群臣之太富也。夫燕、宋之所以弑其君者，皆此类也。故上比之殷周，中比之燕、宋，莫不从此术也。是故明君之蓄其臣也，尽之以法，质之以备。故不赦死，不宥刑；赦死宥刑，是谓威淫。社稷将危，国家偏威。是故大臣之禄虽大，不得藉威城市；党羽虽众，不得臣士卒。故人臣处国无私朝，居军无私交，其府库不得私贷于家。此明君之所以禁其邪。是故不得四从，不载奇兵，非传非遽，载奇兵革，罪死不赦。此明君之所以备不虞者也。
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