Canon 2: Divergent Interests
The interests of the ruler and the minister are divergent; therefore, no minister is truly loyal. When the minister’s interests are established, the ruler’s interests are destroyed. Thus, treacherous ministers invite enemy armies to eliminate their domestic rivals, and fabricate foreign affairs to dazzle the ruler. As long as they can achieve their private gain, they care nothing for the calamity of the state. This principle is illustrated by the prayer of the husband and wife of Wei. Hence, Dai Xie debated the dispatch of princely sons, and the Three Huan attacked Duke Zhao; Gongshu brought in the Qi army, and Zhai Huang summoned the Han troops; Grand Administrator Pi persuaded Grand Master Zhong, and Da Chengniu instructed Shen Buhai; Sima Xi informed the King of Zhao, and Lü Cang plotted with Qin and Chu; Song Shi sent a letter to Lord Wei, and Bai Gui instructed Bao Qian.
Note
This excerpt comes from “Canon Two: Conflicting Interests” in Han Feizi · Inner Congeries Part II‑Six Subtleties. One of Han Fei’s most radical propositions, it rejects Confucian moral narratives of loyal ministers and reduces the ruler‑minister bond to a cold‑blooded interest formula: when ministers gain benefit, the sovereign’s interest perishes.
The Husband and Wife of Wei
The story of the Wei couple praying to the gods is one of Han Fei’s most vivid metaphors. The wife prays for “a hundred bundles of cloth” – a modest sum. Her husband asks why so little. She replies: “If you get more than that, you will use it to buy a concubine.” This reveals that even within the closest human bond – marriage – interests are structurally opposed. The wife’s interest is to maintain her position; the husband’s growing wealth directly threatens it. Han Fei uses this domestic scene to argue that if even husband and wife cannot share identical interests, how much less can a ruler and his ministers?
The Three Huan of Lu:
The three powerful ministerial clans – Mengsun (孟孙), Shusun (叔孙), and Jisun (季孙) – who collectively dominated the state of Lu during the Spring and Autumn period. When Duke Zhao of Lu attempted to attack the Jisun clan, the other two clans immediately came to Jisun’s rescue, reasoning that “without Jisun, there would be no Shusun either.” The three clans united, defeated the duke, and drove him into exile, where he eventually died at Qianhou (乾侯) in the state of Jin. This is one of the most famous examples in Chinese history of ministerial clans overpowering the sovereign.
Gongshu of Han:
Gongshu (公叔, 公叔伯婴, Prince Ying), a prime minister of Han who feared that the king would appoint his rival Gongzhong (公仲, 公仲朋, 公仲侈) as chancellor. To prevent this, he orchestrated a joint military campaign between Qi and Han against Wei, then brought the Qi army into Han’s capital under the pretext of the alliance – using the foreign military presence to coerce his own king and consolidate his position.
Zhai Huang of Wei:
Zhai Huang (翟璜), a minister of Wei who maintained close ties with the state of Han. He deliberately invited Han troops to attack Wei, then offered to negotiate peace on Wei’s behalf – thereby making himself indispensable and elevating his own status. This is a classic example of “creating a crisis in order to solve it”.
Grand Administrator Pi (Bo Pi) and Grand Master Zhong (Wen Zhong):
After King Goujian of Yue defeated King Fuchai of Wu, Bo Pi (伯嚭) – a treacherous minister of Wu who had secretly defected to Yue – wrote a letter to Wen Zhong: “When the cunning hares are all caught, the good hunting dogs are cooked; when enemy states are destroyed, the strategists perish. Why not spare Wu and let it remain a threat to Yue?” This is the origin of the famous Chinese idiom “狡兔死，良狗烹” (When the cunning hare dies, the good dog is cooked). Wen Zhong read the letter and sighed deeply, saying: “If they kill me, Yue will share the same fate as Wu.” His prediction came true – Goujian eventually forced Wen Zhong to commit suicide.
Da Chengniu and Shen Buhai:
Da Chengniu (大成牛), a minister from Zhao, proposed a mutual exploitation pact to Shen Buhai (申不害), the chancellor of Han: “Use Han’s power to make me important in Zhao, and I will use Zhao’s power to make you important in Han. Thus you will have two Hans, and I will have two Zhaos.” This illustrates how ministers from rival states could collude to create cross-border power networks.
Sima Xi of Zhongshan:
Sima Xi (司马喜), a minister of the small state of Zhongshan who secretly leaked Zhongshan’s military plans to the King of Zhao, demonstrating how ministers could serve as intelligence assets for enemy states.
Lü Cang of Wei:
Lü Cang (吕仓), a minister of Wei who was close to both Qin and Chu. He secretly encouraged these two powerful states to attack Wei, then offered to negotiate peace – making himself the indispensable mediator and thereby increasing his own power.
Song Shi and Lord Wei:
Song Shi (宋石) was a general of Wei, and Lord Wei (卫君) was a general of Chu. When their two states went to war, Song Shi wrote to Lord Wei: “Our armies are evenly matched. If we fight, both sides will suffer. This is a matter for our respective rulers – you and I have no personal grudge. The best course is to avoid each other.” This reveals how personal interests could override national loyalty even on the battlefield.
Bai Gui and Bao Qian:
Bai Gui (白圭) served as chancellor of Wei, and Bao Qian (暴谴) as chancellor of Han. Bai Gui proposed to Bao Qian: “Use Han’s power to support me in Wei, and I will use Wei’s power to support you in Han. Thus we shall both hold office for a long time.” This is the ultimate expression of cross-border ministerial collusion – two ministers in rival states forming a mutual protection pact.
Dai Xie of Chu:
When the King of Chu wanted to send his princely sons to serve as officials in neighboring states, Dai Xie (戴歇) objected: “If your sons go abroad and are valued by foreign rulers, they will inevitably become partisans of those states. This is equivalent to teaching your sons to build foreign alliances.” Dai Xie’s argument reveals the paradox of “Divergent Interests” – even the ruler’s own sons, once sent abroad, could become instruments of foreign powers.
Divergent Interests:
This is Han Fei’s most radical departure from Confucian political philosophy. Confucianism holds that loyalty is a moral virtue that ministers should cultivate. Legalism rejects this entirely: loyalty is not a matter of character but of structural incentives. When interests align, ministers appear loyal; when they diverge, ministers will betray. The ruler must therefore design institutions that make betrayal impossible, rather than hoping for moral virtue.
Zero-Sum Game:
Han Fei’s political philosophy assumes that power is a fixed resource – a zero-sum game. Any gain by a minister is necessarily a loss for the ruler. This is why “when the minister’s interests are established, the ruler’s interests are destroyed” – there is no possibility of mutual gain.
When the cunning hare dies, the good dog is cooked:
One of the most enduring Chinese idioms, originating from Bo Pi’s letter to Wen Zhong. It means that those who are useful only in times of crisis will be discarded once the crisis is over. This idiom has been used for over two thousand years to describe the fate of meritorious officials who are eliminated after their usefulness expires.
Inviting enemy troops to eliminate domestic rivals:
A recurring pattern in Chinese political history where ministers or factions invite foreign military intervention to settle internal power struggles. This tactic always carries the risk of the foreign power becoming a permanent occupier – a theme that recurs throughout Chinese history from the Warring States period to the late Qing dynasty.
The stratagem has many historical precedents. Qin Hui, Prime Minister of the Southern Song Dynasty, is regarded by later generations as a Jin‑planted traitor. He pushed hard for peace talks with Jin. To conclude the Shaoxing Peace Treaty, he imprisoned and secretly executed the anti‑Jin general Yue Fei on fabricated charges. The Jin explicitly demanded Yue Fei’s death for peace. Qin Hui leveraged foreign power to purge domestic war advocates and secure his own authority.
经二 利异
君臣之利异，故人臣莫忠，故臣利立而主利灭。是以奸臣者召敌兵以内除，举外事以眩主，苟成其私利，不顾国患。其说在卫人之夫妻祷祝也。故戴歇议子弟，而三桓攻昭公；公叔内齐军，而翟黄召韩兵；太宰嚭说大夫种，大成牛教申不害；司马喜告赵王，吕仓规秦、楚；宋石遗卫君书，白圭教暴谴。
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