Han Fei

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 19.4

    When Wei strictly enforced criminal laws and decrees, merit‑earners were rewarded and criminals punished. It grew powerful enough to regulate the realm and intimidate neighboring states. When laws slackened and rewards were granted arbitrarily, its territory shrank day by day.

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 19.3

    Therefore I state: he who understands statecraft can enrich a small state. With careful and trustworthy rewards‑and‑punishments, he can strengthen a sparse population. When rewards and punishments lack standards, even a large state with numerous troops loses its land and people. Without land and people, even Yao and Shun could not become kings, nor…

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 19.2

    In ancient times, former kings devoted themselves to caring for the people and clarifying laws. When laws are clear, loyal ministers are encouraged; when punishments are enforced without exception, treacherous ministers are restrained. With loyal ministers encouraged and wicked ones restrained, territory expands and rulers gain honor – such was Qin. When ministers form…

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 19.1

    Zhao cracked tortoise‑shells and counted milfoil stalks for divination; the oracle showed great good fortune, so it attacked Yan. Yan also performed tortoise‑shell and milfoil divination with the same great‑fortune omen and attacked Zhao.

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 18.3

    Those ignorant of governance always claim: “Do not change the ancient ways, do not alter established customs.” Whether to reform or not, sages ignore such empty words and merely pursue proper governance. Thus preserving ancient institutions depends on whether they are viable or not.

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 18.2

    A ruler may be tempted by state affairs or blocked by ministers’ words; both must be examined carefully.

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 18.1

    The ruler’s fault lies in this: having appointed certain ministers, he then uses those he distrusts to check them. Such checkers inevitably oppose the appointed ministers in speech, and the ruler ends up controlled by those he distrusts. Moreover, those whom the ruler uses to check others are themselves former objects of surveillance.

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 17.2

    Moreover, among rulers of ten‑thousand‑chariot and one‑thousand‑chariot states, some imperial concubines, legal wives, and crown princes wish their lords to die early. Why? Husband and wife share no blood bond; they are close when loving, distant when not. A proverb says: “The child of a beautiful mother is cherished.” Conversely, the child of an…

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 17.1

    The ruler’s misfortune lies in trusting others; to trust others is to be controlled by them. Ministers share no blood bond with their ruler. Bound by power, they have no choice but to serve him.