The ruler’s misfortune lies in trusting others; to trust others is to be controlled by them. Ministers share no blood bond with their ruler. Bound by power, they have no choice but to serve him.
Therefore ministers spy on the ruler’s mind without a moment’s rest, yet the ruler dwells above in idleness and arrogance. This is why rulers are seized and assassinated in the world.
If a ruler overly trusts his son, treacherous ministers may exploit the prince for private gain. Hence Li Dui assisted the King of Zhao and starved Lord Fu to death.
If a ruler overly trusts his wife, treacherous ministers may exploit the queen for private gain. Hence You Shi aided Li Ji, killing Prince Shensheng and installing Xiqi as heir.
If even one’s close wife and beloved son cannot be trusted, no one else can be trusted at all.
Note
This passage delivers a radical Legalist warning: trusting family is riskier than trusting outsiders. Rulers must guard against wives, sons, and close kin as potential tools of treacherous ministers.
Late Warring‑States Legalist thinker. This passage is excerpted from Guarding against Internal Threats (Bei Nei), arguing that family members are potential political dangers rather than loyal allies.
Li Dui
Minister of Zhao State who manipulated royal succession and caused the death of King Wuling of Zhao (Lord Fu).
Lord Fu (King Wuling of Zhao)
King Wuling was the famous reformer‑king of Zhao, starved to death in a palace coup.
You Shi
A court jester who helped Li Ji scheme against Prince Shensheng.
Li Ji
Prince Shensheng, Xiqi
Jin royal princes, victims of internal royal intrigue.
Self‑Interest Human Nature (Legalist Core Premise)
Han Fei holds that all human relationships are based on benefit‑seeking, including spousal and filial bonds. No natural loyalty exists.
Internal Threats (Bei Nei)
A key Legalist concept: the most dangerous enemies of a ruler are not external foes but family members, queens, princes, and close ministers.
Warring‑States Royal Intrigues
Regicide, succession coups, and intra‑family power struggles were common in the Warring‑States Period, providing real‑world evidence for Han Fei’s theory.
人主之患在於信人，信人則制於人。人臣之於其君，非有骨肉之親也，縛於勢而不得不事也。故為人臣者，窺覘其君心也無須臾之休，而人主怠傲處其上，此世所以有劫君弒主也。為人主而大信其子，則姦臣得乘於子以成其私，故李兌傅趙王而餓主父。為人主而大信其妻，則姦臣得乘於妻以成其私，故優施傅麗姬，殺申生而立奚齊。夫以妻之近與子之親而猶不可信，則其餘無可信者矣。
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