Moreover, among rulers of ten‑thousand‑chariot and one‑thousand‑chariot states, some imperial concubines, legal wives, and crown princes wish their lords to die early. Why? Husband and wife share no blood bond; they are close when loving, distant when not. A proverb says: “The child of a beautiful mother is cherished.” Conversely, the child of an unattractive mother is neglected. A man’s desire for beauty does not fade even at fifty, while a woman’s charm declines by thirty. When a fading woman serves a lustful ruler, she is abandoned and her heir doubted. This is why consorts wish the ruler dead.
Only when the mother becomes queen‑mother and the son ruler can all orders be enforced, private pleasures continue unbroken, and supreme power be held without restraint – hence poison and strangulation are used. Thus the Tao‑zuo Spring‑and‑Autumn Annals records: “Fewer than half of rulers die of natural illness.” Unaware of this, rulers feed chaos. Therefore, when many gain profit from the ruler’s death, he is endangered.
Wang Liang loved horses, King Gou Jian of Yue loved people – all for warfare and chariot‑racing. Physicians suck wounds and taste blood not from kinship, but for profit. Wagon‑makers wish others wealthy to sell carriages; coffin‑makers wish others to die young to sell coffins. It is not that wagon‑makers are kind and coffin‑makers cruel. Without wealth, carriages cannot be sold; without death, coffins cannot be bought. They do not hate people – their profit lies in others’ death.
Therefore consorts, wives and crown princes form cliques to wish the ruler dead, for their power depends on his demise. They do not hate him, yet gain from his death. Rulers must guard against those who profit from their death.
When the sun and moon are ringed by halos, harm comes from within. We guard those we hate, yet disaster often arises from those we love. Thus wise rulers avoid unchecked deeds and unusual food. They observe far and near to examine internal and external faults, compare statements to detect factions, cross‑verify evidence to test truthfulness, judge past claims by later outcomes, govern by law, and inspect from multiple angles. Scholars receive no undeserved rewards and commit no excess deeds. Executions are just, crimes unforgiven, leaving no room for treachery.
Heavy corvee burdens the people; hardship breeds powerful ministers; powerful ministers gain tax exemptions and grow rich. Enriching nobles by oppressing commoners builds ministerial power, harming long‑term state interests. Light corvée secures the people’s peace; peace prevents ministerial dominance; without dominance, factional power fades; with fading factions, virtue returns to the ruler.
It is obvious water extinguishes fire, yet a cauldron separates them: water boils away above while fire burns fiercely below, robbing water of its power. Similarly, though law should clearly suppress treachery, ministers act like cauldrons, keeping law private and neutralizing its purpose.
Ancient tales and the Spring‑and‑Autumn Annals record that all major traitors are high‑ranking nobles. Yet laws and punishments target only commoners, leaving them hopeless with nowhere to appeal. Ministers collude, deceive the ruler, pretend disunity while secretly plotting, spy for weaknesses, and leave the ruler with only empty title, as the Zhou kings were. Partial delegation of power reverses ruler‑minister status. Hence royal power must never be lent to ministers.
Note
This section delivers Han Fei‘s ultimate internal security lesson: self‑interest turns even family members into threats. Rulers must enforce impartial law, avoid delegating power, and guard against those closest to them above all.
Han Fei
Late Warring‑States Legalist philosopher. This passage is from Guarding against Internal Threats (Bei Nei), his sharpest analysis of household‑court power intrigue.
Wang Liang
Legendary master charioteer in ancient China, symbolizing practical self‑interested loyalty.
King Gou Jian of Yue – Goujian
King Gou Jian, famous hegemon‑king who won popular support for military survival.
Zhou Kings
Symbol of nominal rulers stripped of real power by ministers.
Interest‑Driven Human Nature
Han Fei’s core theory: all human relations (spousal, familial, ministerial) are governed by self‑gain, not affection or morality.
Wagon‑Maker vs Coffin‑Maker Allegory
A famous Legalist metaphor proving people’s intentions are shaped by their economic interests.
Internal Threats (Bei Nei)
The deadliest dangers to rulers come from wives, heirs, and close ministers, not external enemies.
Class‑Biased Law Enforcement
Laws punish commoners while powerful nobles escape justice, causing public despair and ministerial usurpation.
Cauldron Metaphor
Ministers act as barriers between ruler and people, neutralizing legal authority for private gain.
且萬乘之主，千乘之君，后妃、夫人、適子為太子者，或有欲其君之蚤死者。何以知其然？夫妻者，非有骨肉之恩也，愛則親，不愛則疏。語曰：「其母好者其子抱。」然則其為之反也，其母惡者其子釋。丈夫年五十而好色未解也，婦人年三十而美色衰矣。以衰美之婦人事好色之丈夫，則身死見疏賤，而子疑不為後，此后妃、夫人之所以冀其君之死者也。唯母為后而子為主，則令無不行，禁無不止，男女之樂不減於先君，而擅萬乘不疑，此鴆毒扼昧之所以用也。故桃左春秋曰：「人主之疾死者不能處半。」人主弗知則亂多資，故曰：利君死者眾則人主危。故王良愛馬，越王勾踐愛人，為戰與馳。醫善吮人之傷，含人之血，非骨肉之親也，利所加也。故輿人成輿則欲人之富貴，匠人成棺則欲人之夭死也，非輿人仁而匠人賊也，人不貴則輿不售，人不死則棺不買，情非憎人也，利在人之死也。故后妃、夫人、太子之黨成而欲君之死也，君不死則勢不重，情非憎君也，利在君之死也，故人主不可以不加心於利己死者。故日月暈圍於外，其賊在內，備其所憎，禍在所愛。是故明王不舉不參之事，不食非常之食，遠聽而近視以審內外之失，省同異之言以知朋黨之分，偶參伍之驗以責陳言之實，執後以應前，按法以治眾，眾端以參觀，士無幸賞，無踰行，殺必當，罪不赦，則姦邪無所容其私。徭役多則民苦，民苦則權勢起，權勢起則復除重，復除重則貴人富，苦民以富貴人起勢，以藉人臣，非天下長利也。故曰徭役少則民安，民安則下無重權，下無重權則權勢滅，權勢滅則德在上矣。今夫水之勝火亦明矣，然而釜鬵閒之，水煎沸竭盡其上，而火得熾盛焚其下，水失其所以勝者矣。今夫治之禁姦又明於此，然守法之臣為釜鬵之行，則法獨明於胸中，而已失其所以禁姦者矣。上古之傳言，春秋所記，犯法為逆以成大姦者，未嘗不從尊貴之臣也。然而法令之所以備，刑罰之所以誅，常於卑賤，是以其民絕望，無所告愬。大臣比周，蔽上為一，陰相善而陽相惡，以示無私，相為耳目，以候主隙，人主掩蔽，無道得聞，有主名而無實，臣專法而行之，周天子是也。偏借其權勢則上下易位矣，此言人臣之不可借權勢也。
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