Han Feizi – Chapter 31.10

Category:

Explanation 2

A man and wife of Wei were praying together. The wife prayed: “Let me, without cause, obtain a hundred bundles of cloth.” Her husband said, “Why so little?” She replied, “If you had more, you would use it to buy a concubine.”

The King of Chu wished to place his princely sons in official positions in neighboring states. Dai Xie said, “This must not be done. If princely sons serve as officials in neighboring states, those states will surely value them highly. Once valued, they will inevitably become partisans of the states that value them – this is tantamount to teaching your sons to build factions abroad. It is not advisable.”

The Mengsun, Shusun, and Jisun clans of Lu joined forces to coerce Duke Zhao, and ultimately seized control of his state and monopolized its governance. When the Three Huan of Lu pressed upon the duke, Duke Zhao attacked the Jisun clan. The Mengsun and Shusun clans deliberated: “Shall we rescue them?” The charioteer of the Shusun clan said, “I am a retainer of the Jisun – what do I know of the ducal house?” “Which is more advantageous to us – the existence of the Jisun or its absence?” All replied, “Without the Jisun, there would certainly be no Shusun.” “Then let us rescue them.” And so they broke through the northwest corner and entered. When Lord Mengsun saw the banners of the Shusun advancing, he too came to the rescue. The Three Huan became one, and Duke Zhao could not prevail. They expelled him, and he died at Ganhou.

When Gongshu served as chancellor of Han and launched an attack on Qi, Gongzhong was highly valued by the king. Fearing that the king would appoint Gongzhong as chancellor, Gongshu arranged for Qi and Han to form an alliance and attack Wei. He then brought the Qi army into Zheng to coerce his own ruler, thereby securing his position and solidifying the alliance between the two states.

Zhai Huang was a minister of the King of Wei, yet he was on good terms with Han. He summoned the Han army and ordered it to attack Wei, then volunteered to mediate on behalf of Wei – all to inflate his own importance.

When the King of Yue attacked the King of Wu, the King of Wu submitted and begged for surrender. The King of Yue was inclined to grant it. Fan Li and Grandee Zhong said, “This must not be. In the past, Heaven delivered Yue to Wu, but Wu did not accept it. Now Heaven has reversed this and delivered Wu to Fu Chai – this too is a calamity from Heaven. To be given Wu by Heaven – one should accept it with two bows. It must not be permitted to escape.” Grandee Pi sent a letter to Grandee Zhong, which read: “When the cunning hare is exhausted, the good dog is cooked; when the rival state is destroyed, the strategist perishes. Why does the Grandee not spare Wu and preserve a source of trouble for Yue?” Grandee Zhong received the letter, read it, sighed deeply, and said, “Kill him. Yue and Wu share the same fate.”

Da Cheng Niu, from Zhao, said to Shen Buhai of Han: “Use Han to elevate me in Zhao, and I shall use Zhao to elevate you in Han. Thus you will have two Hans, and I shall have two Zhaos.”

Sima Xi was a minister of the Lord of Zhongshan, yet he was on good terms with Zhao. He once secretly conveyed Zhongshan’s military plans to the King of Zhao.

Lü Cang was a minister of the King of Wei, yet he was on good terms with Qin and Chu. He secretly encouraged Qin and Chu to attack Wei, then volunteered to negotiate peace – all to inflate his own importance.

Song Shi was a general of Wei; Lord Jun of Wei was a general of Chu. When the two states were locked in conflict, both men served as commanders. Song Shi sent a letter to Lord Jun of Wei, saying: “Our two armies face each other, our banners are within sight of one another. It would be best if we did not fight – for if we do, surely neither side will survive intact. This is a matter between our two sovereigns; you and I have no personal grudge. The wise should avoid one another.”

Bai Gui served as chancellor of Wei, and Bao Qian served as chancellor of Han. Bai Gui said to Bao Qian: “You use the power of Han to support me in Wei; I shall use the power of Wei to support you in Han. Thus I shall long hold power in Wei, and you shall long hold power in Han.”

Note

This is Explanation Two from Han Feizi: Inner Congested Sayings, Part II. It elaborates on Canon Two “Divergent Interests”. With over ten cases covering households, courts and state relations, it illustrates the structural conflicts between ministers’ private interests and national interests.

Dai Xie (戴歇):

A minister of Chu who advised against sending princely sons to serve in neighboring states. His argument was that once princes gained influence abroad, their loyalties would shift to their host states, effectively turning them into foreign agents. This illustrates Han Fei’s principle that even blood ties cannot override structural incentives.

The Three Huan (三桓) – Mengsun (孟孙), Shusun (叔孙), Jisun (季孙):

Three powerful aristocratic clans that dominated the state of Lu during the Spring and Autumn period. They were descendants of Duke Huan of Lu (hence “Huan”). By the time of Duke Zhao (鲁昭公, r. 541–510 BCE), they had become so powerful that they effectively controlled the state. When Duke Zhao attempted to strike back at the Jisun clan, the other two clans came to Jisun’s defense – demonstrating that the bonds of mutual self-interest among powerful ministers were stronger than loyalty to the ruler. Duke Zhao was expelled and eventually died in exile at Ganhou (乾侯).

Gongshu (公叔, 公叔伯婴) and Gongzhong (公仲, 公仲朋, 公仲侈):

Ministers of the state of Han. Gongshu feared that the king would replace him with Gongzhong as chancellor, so he engineered an international crisis (an alliance between Qi and Han to attack Wei) and then used the crisis to consolidate his own position. This is a classic example of the “create a crisis, then solve it” strategy.

Zhai Huang (翟璜):

A minister of Wei who secretly colluded with Han. He arranged for Han to attack Wei, then positioned himself as the mediator – thereby inflating his own value to the King of Wei. This is the same “manufacture a problem, sell the solution” pattern.

Fan Li (范蠡) and Grandee Zhong (大夫种 / Wen Zhong):

Two of the most celebrated strategists of the state of Yue. Fan Li and Wen Zhong served King Goujian of Yue (越王勾践) in his legendary campaign to destroy the state of Wu. Fan Li is famous for his role in the “beauty trap” – sending the beautiful Xi Shi to distract King Fuchai of Wu. After Wu’s eventual destruction, Fan Li wisely retired from public life, while Wen Zhong stayed and was later executed by Goujian – precisely fulfilling the prophecy of Bo Pi’s letter: “When the rival state is destroyed, the strategist perishes.”

Grandee Pi / Bo Pi (太宰嚭 / 伯嚭):

The Grand Chancellor (太宰) of the state of Wu. He was notoriously corrupt and had accepted bribes from Yue. His letter to Wen Zhong – “When the cunning hare is exhausted, the good dog is cooked” (meaning “When the rival state is destroyed, the strategist perishes”) – is one of the most famous political maxims in Chinese history. It reveals the paradox that a strategist’s value depends on the continued existence of the enemy.

Da Cheng Niu (大成牛) and Shen Buhai (申不害):

Da Cheng Niu was from Zhao; Shen Buhai was a famous Legalist thinker who served as chancellor of Han. Da Cheng Niu proposed a cross-border mutual elevation scheme: “Use Han to elevate me in Zhao, and I’ll use Zhao to elevate you in Han.” This illustrates how ministers’ interest networks transcended national boundaries.

Sima Xi (司马喜):

A minister of the small state of Zhongshan (中山), who secretly leaked Zhongshan’s military plans to the King of Zhao. This is a straightforward case of a minister betraying his own state for personal advantage.

Lü Cang (吕仓):

A minister of Wei who secretly encouraged Qin and Chu to attack Wei, then offered to negotiate peace – all to inflate his own importance. This is the third instance of the “manufacture a crisis, sell the solution” pattern in this passage.

Song Shi (宋石) and Lord Jun of Wei / Wei Jun (卫君):

Generals of Wei and Chu respectively, facing each other on the battlefield. Song Shi wrote to his counterpart proposing that they avoid battle, since the war was “a matter between our two sovereigns” and they had “no personal grudge.” This reveals the absurdity of ministers’ interests: the generals had more in common with each other than with their own rulers.

Bai Gui (白圭) and Bao Qian (暴谴):

Chancellors of Wei and Han respectively. Bai Gui proposed a mutual support arrangement: “You use Han’s power to back me in Wei; I’ll use Wei’s power to back you in Han.” This is the most explicit statement of the “cross-border cartel” model – two ministers from rival states forming a partnership to perpetuate their own power.

Divergence of Interests:

Han Fei argues that the interests of rulers and ministers are structurally opposed – not because ministers are inherently evil, but because their incentive structures naturally lead them to prioritize personal power over national loyalty.

“When the cunning hare is exhausted, the good dog is cooked”:

One of the most famous political proverbs in Chinese. It means that those who are useful in times of crisis become expendable once the crisis is resolved. The full version adds: “When the rival state is destroyed, the strategist perishes.” This proverb has been cited throughout Chinese history to explain why successful generals and advisors are often purged after their victories.

Manufacturing a crisis to inflate one’s own value:

A recurring pattern in this passage, exemplified by Gongshu, Zhai Huang, and Lü Cang. The minister creates or encourages an external threat, then positions himself as the only person who can resolve it. This is the ancient Chinese equivalent of what modern political scientists call “the politics of crisis making” or “manufactured emergency.”

Transnational interest networks:

A key theme throughout the passage. Ministers’ personal interests – wealth, power, survival – often transcended national boundaries. They formed alliances with counterparts in rival states, creating a shadow diplomatic system that operated independently of, and often contrary to, their rulers’ interests.

说二

卫人有夫妻祷者而祝曰:”使我无故,得百束布。”其夫曰:”何少也?”对曰:”益是,子将以买妾。”

荆王欲宦诸公子于四邻,戴歇曰:”不可。””宦公子于四邻,四邻必重之。”曰:”子出者重,重则必为所重之国党,则是教子于外市也,不便。”

鲁孟孙、叔孙、季孙相戮力劫昭公,遂夺其国而擅其制。鲁三桓逼公,昭公攻季孙氏,而孟孙氏、叔孙氏相与谋曰:”救之乎?”叔孙氏之御者曰:”我家臣也,安知公家?””凡有季孙与无季孙于我孰利?”皆曰:”无季孙必无叔孙。””然则救之。”于是撞西北隅而入。孟孙见叔孙之旗入,亦救之。三桓为一,昭公不胜。逐之,死于乾侯。

公叔相韩而有攻齐,公仲甚重于王,公叔恐王之相公仲也,使齐、韩约而攻魏。公叔因内齐军于郑以劫其君,以固其位而信两国之约。

翟璜,魏王之臣也,而善于韩。乃召韩兵令之攻魏,因请为魏王构之以自重也。

越王攻吴王,吴王谢而告服,越王欲许之。范蠡、大夫种曰:”不可。昔天以越与吴,吴不受,今天反夫差,亦天祸也。以吴予越,再拜受之,不可许也。”太宰嚭遗大夫种书曰:”狡兔尽则良犬烹,敌国灭则谋臣亡。大夫何不释吴而患越乎?”大夫种受书读之,太息而叹曰:”杀之,越与吴同命。”

大成牛从赵谓申不害于韩曰:”以韩重我于赵,请以赵重子于韩,是子有两韩,我有两赵。”

司马喜,中山君之臣也,而善于赵,尝以中山之谋微告赵王。

吕仓,魏王之臣也,而善于秦、荆。微讽秦、荆令之攻魏,因请行和以自重也。

宋石,魏将也;卫君,荆将也。两国构难,二子皆将。宋石遗卫君书曰:”二军相当,两旗相望,唯毋一战,战必不两存。此乃两主之事也,与子无有私怨,善者相避也。”

白圭相魏,暴谴相韩。白圭谓暴谴曰:”子以韩辅我于魏,我以魏待子于韩,臣长用魏,子长用韩。”

Share this:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *