In every case where a state is vast and its ruler honored, it has always relied on heavy law and has been able to make commands carried out and prohibitions obeyed throughout the land. Therefore, when a ruler distributes ranks and regulates salaries, the law must be strict and weighty. When the state is well governed, the people are at peace; when affairs are disordered, the state is in danger. Heavy penalties accord with human realities; light prohibitions cause one to lose sight of actual conditions.
The people possess the strength to risk death. By nature, none fails to exert such strength in order to obtain what they desire. Likes and dislikes are controlled by the ruler. The people favor profit and rank and detest punishment. The ruler holds these likes and dislikes in order to direct the people’s strength; in managing affairs, one should not lose sight of reality. Yet when prohibitions are light and affairs go wrong, it is because punishment and reward have been misapplied. If the ruler governs the people not by holding to law but by relying on vague goodness, then there is no law at all.
Thus, in the logic of order and disorder, the most urgent task is to draw clear distinctions in punishment and reward. Every ruler of an ordered state has laws, yet some states survive and others perish. Those that perish fail because their regulation of punishment and reward lacks clear distinction. Rulers of well-ordered states always distinguish punishment and reward. If distinctions are made arbitrarily according to personal difference, they cannot be called true distinctions. The distinction made by an enlightened ruler is independent and uniform. Therefore his people take law seriously and fear prohibitions; they wish only to avoid crime and dare not hope for undeserved reward. Hence it is said: without waiting for punishment or reward, the people will attend to their duties.
Therefore, in a state of highest order, the primary task is to stop deceit. Why? Because its laws penetrate human nature and bear directly on governance. How, then, can subtle deceit be removed? One must cause people to observe one another’s true intentions. How can this be done? By establishing mutual responsibility within local units. When prohibitions implicate oneself, people cannot help watching one another, fearing that they will not escape blame. Those with deceitful intentions cannot forget this, because many eyes are upon them. In this way, each person guards himself and watches others, exposing hidden deceit. Those who report wrongdoing are pardoned and rewarded; those who fail to detect deceit are punished through collective liability. In this manner, all kinds of deceit are revealed. Deceit cannot remain even in small matters, because private accusation and shared responsibility produce this result.
The clearest method of governance relies on systematic measures rather than on individuals. Hence a state that possesses statecraft does not depend on reputation; it remains orderly within its borders because it relies on method. A doomed state allows enemy troops to march openly through its territory yet cannot resist or prohibit them, because it relies on individuals instead of method. Self-destruction comes from reliance on persons; the power to overcome others comes from method. Therefore, a state that possesses statecraft discards empty speech and relies on law.
When irregular merit appears to follow agreements, it may still be hard to recognize; when a minister’s fault is sought only in his words, it is difficult to detect. Thus punishment and reward become confused by doubleness. What seems to conform to agreement yet is hard to know is deceitful merit. What makes a minister’s fault hard to see is the root of failure. If one follows ordinary appearances, one will not perceive false achievement; if one judges by human feelings, one may deviate from the root of deceit. How, then, can both not be lost?
Thus, empty scholars build reputations within the state, while talkers seize influence abroad. The foolish, the cowardly, the bold, and the clever become linked, relying on hollow ways to conform to custom and gain acceptance in the world. As a result, law is not applied, and punishment does not reach those who deserve it. How, then, can punishment and reward avoid admitting distortion? Reality has its true extent, but judgment loses its measure. This loss of measure is not caused by law itself; it occurs when law is fixed but personal cleverness is trusted. If one abandons law and trusts personal cleverness, how can those who handle affairs grasp what is essential? When essentials do not match affairs, how can law avoid error, and punishment avoid disorder? Thus reward and punishment become confused, the way of the state goes astray, and the cause is that punishment and reward are not clearly distinguished.
Note
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter55 (Defining Divisions) stresses sharp, impartial reward‑punishment distinctions. It advocates collective‑liability surveillance to uncover hidden deceit and prioritizes impersonal institutional systems over fallible individual judgment or hollow reputations.
A time of intense rivalry among Chinese states, roughly 475–221 BCE, when Legalist ideas became especially influential.
A major Legalist thinker of the late Warring States period. He argues that stable government depends on clear laws, consistent rewards and punishments, and institutional control rather than moral reputation.
Legalism:
A Chinese political tradition that emphasizes strict law, centralized authority, practical administration, and the ruler’s control over incentives.
Rank and salary:
Official titles and material rewards distributed by the ruler. Han Fei insists they must be tied to law and measurable achievement, not to reputation or private favor.
Heavy law:
Not merely cruelty, but a Legalist belief that firm, predictable penalties make law effective and prevent disorder.
Likes and dislikes:
The ruler’s main tools of control. People seek reward and avoid punishment; the ruler uses this to direct behavior.
Mutual responsibility and collective liability:
A system in which members of a local unit are held responsible for one another’s conduct. It was meant to make hidden wrongdoing harder to conceal.
Local units:
Small neighborhood or administrative groups in ancient China. Members could be rewarded for reporting crimes and punished for failing to detect them.
Empty scholars and talkers:
Han Fei criticizes people who gain status through reputation, debate, or private lobbying rather than through real service to the state.
Method versus persons:
A central Legalist contrast. “Method” means institutional rules and administrative systems; “persons” means reliance on individual virtue, cleverness, or loyalty.
Deceitful merit:
Achievements that look legitimate on the surface but are actually false, exaggerated, or obtained through manipulation.
制分第五十五
夫凡国博君尊者，未尝非法重而可以至乎令行禁止于天下者也。是以君人者分爵制禄，则法必严以重之。夫国治则民安，事乱则邦危。法重者得人情，禁轻者失事实。且夫死力者，民之所有者也，情莫不出其死力以致其所欲；而好恶者，上之所制也，民者好利禄而恶刑罚。上掌好恶以御民力，事实不宜失矣，然而禁轻事失者，刑赏失也。其治民不秉法为善也，如是，则是无法也。
故治乱之理，宜务分刑赏为急。治国者莫不有法，然而有存有亡；亡者，其制刑赏不分也。治国者，其刑赏莫不有分：有持以异为分，不可谓分；至于察君之分，独分也。是以其民重法而畏禁，愿毋抵罪而不敢胥赏。故曰：不待刑赏而民从事矣。
是故夫至治之国，善以止奸为务。是何也？其法通乎人情，关乎治理也。然则去微奸之道奈何？其务令之相规其情者也。则使相窥奈何？曰：盖里相坐而已。禁尚有连于己者，理不得相窥，唯恐不得免。有奸心者不令得忘，窥者多也。如此，则慎己而窥彼，发奸之密。告过者免罪受赏，失奸者必诛连刑。如此，则奸类发矣。奸不容细，私告任坐使然也。
夫治法之至明者，任数不任人。是以有术之国，不用誉则毋适，境内必治，任数也。亡国使兵公行乎其地，而弗能圉禁者，任人而无数也。自攻者人也，攻人者数也。故有术之国，去言而任法。
凡畸功之循约者虽知，过刑之于言者难见也，是以刑赏惑乎贰。所谓循约难知者，奸功也。臣过之难见者，失根也。循理不见虚功，度情诡乎奸根，则二者安得无两失也？是以虚士立名于内，而谈者为略于外，故愚、怯、勇、慧相连而以虚道属俗而容乎世。故其法不用，而刑罚不加乎僇人。如此，则刑赏安得不容其二？实故有所至，而理失其量，量之失，非法使然也，法定而任慧也。释法而任慧者，则受事者安得其务？务不与事相得，则法安得无失，而刑安得无烦？是以赏罚扰乱，邦道差误，刑赏之不分白也。
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