The reason a ruler endangers himself and loses his state is that his great ministers become too noble and his attendants become too powerful. Those who are “too noble” act without regard to law, seize the handles of state, and use them for private advantage. Those who are “too powerful” monopolize authority and decide matters of weight and importance at will. These two dangers must be carefully examined.
A horse can bear heavy loads, pull a carriage, and travel long distances because of its sinews and strength. A lord of ten thousand chariots or a ruler of a thousand chariots can control the world and campaign against the feudal lords because of his authority and power. Authority and power are the sinews and strength of the ruler.
If great ministers gain authority and attendants monopolize power, the ruler loses his strength. When a ruler loses his strength, it is rare indeed for him to preserve his state. Tigers and leopards can overcome men and capture beasts because of their claws and fangs. If tigers and leopards lose their claws and fangs, men will surely control them. Power and position are the claws and fangs of the ruler. A ruler who loses his claws and fangs becomes no different from a tiger or leopard without them.
The ruler of Song lost his claws and fangs to Zihan, and Duke Jian of Qi lost his claws and fangs to Tian Chang. Because they did not seize them back in time, they died and their states perished. Today, rulers who lack statecraft clearly know the faults of the rulers of Song and Qi, yet they do not recognize their own errors. They fail to see that the same kind of danger applies to them.
Moreover, men of law and statecraft cannot coexist with ministers who hold power. How can this be shown? If a ruler employs men of statecraft, his great ministers cannot dominate decisions, and his close attendants cannot sell their influence. When the power of great ministers and attendants declines, the ruler’s way becomes clear.
But this is not what happens today. Ministers who hold power use their position to serve private interests, while close attendants form factions and cliques to control those who are distant from the ruler. Under such conditions, when can men of law and statecraft be employed? When can the ruler make impartial judgments? Thus, even if the ruler possesses statecraft, he may not be able to apply it, because power cannot be shared between opposing forces. How can men of law and statecraft avoid danger?
Unless a ruler can reject the proposals of his great ministers, turn away the disputes of his attendants, and alone follow the words that accord with the right way, how can men of law and statecraft dare to risk death in order to present their views? This is why the world remains ungoverned.
An enlightened ruler grants rank and emolument according to merit and assigns offices according to ability. Those he promotes are truly worthy, and those he employs are truly capable. When worthy and capable men advance, private solicitations cease. When those with merit receive generous rewards and those with ability hold high office, men who rely on private bravery will turn instead to resisting the enemy, and men who seek office through wandering patronage will break away from private gates and devote themselves to integrity. This is how a ruler gathers worthy and capable men and disperses the followers of private interests.
At present, however, close attendants are not necessarily wise. A ruler may favor someone and listen to him, yet he then discusses that person’s words with his attendants. He listens to his attendants without considering whether they are wise. This is like consulting fools about wisdom.
Those who hold power are not necessarily worthy. A ruler may esteem someone and treat him with respect, yet he then evaluates that person’s conduct through those who hold power. He listens to their words without employing the worthy. This is like consulting the unworthy about worthiness.
Thus, if wise decisions are made by fools, and the conduct of worthy men is judged by the unworthy, when can worthy and wise men ever be employed? The ruler’s insight becomes blocked.
In the past, Guan Long Pang remonstrated with Jie and had his limbs injured. Bi Gan remonstrated with Zhou and had his heart cut out. Wu Zixu was loyal and straightforward with Fuchai, yet he was executed at the Shu Lou sword. These three men were not disloyal as ministers, nor were their remonstrations improper. Nevertheless, they could not escape death because their rulers failed to examine the words of the wise and were blinded by foolish and unworthy ministers.
If a ruler is unwilling to employ men of law and statecraft and instead listens to foolish and unworthy ministers, which worthy and wise men would dare to face the same dangers and present their wisdom? This is why the world falls into disorder.
Note
This Han Feizi ‑ Chapter 52 (The Ruler) warns powerful ministers and court favorites rob the ruler of his crucial authority. It notes statecraft thinkers face mortal peril under corrupt cliques and advocates merit‑based appointments to block private factional influence.
A prince of the State of Han and the leading synthesizer of Legalist thought in the late Warring States period. He emphasizes law, administrative method, and the ruler’s control of power.
Legalism:
A Chinese political tradition that stresses clear laws, rewards and punishments, bureaucratic accountability, and the ruler’s monopoly on authority.
Men of law and statecraft:
Officials who govern through law, administrative methods, and objective standards. Han Fei sees them as essential but endangered by powerful ministers and favorites.
Ministers who hold power:
High officials who dominate government and use state authority for private interests. Han Fei warns that they can strip the ruler of real power.
Close attendants:
Courtiers, eunuchs, favorites, or other insiders near the ruler. Han Fei argues they can distort judgment and block worthy men from serving.
Ruler of Song and Zihan:
A reference to a minister in the State of Song who allegedly seized power. Han Fei uses it as a warning about ministers taking control of the ruler’s authority.
Duke Jian of Qi and Tian Chang:
Duke Jian was a ruler of Qi; Tian Chang, also known as Chen Heng, was a powerful minister who seized control. This became a classic example of ministerial usurpation in early Chinese political thought.
Guan Long Pang and Jie:
Guan Long Pang was a loyal minister who remonstrated with Jie, the last ruler of the Xia dynasty. His death illustrates the danger faced by honest advisers under tyrants.
Bi Gan and King Zhou of Shang:
Wu Zixu and Fuchai:
Wu Zixu was a loyal minister of Wu. He warned King Fuchai about the threat from Yue but was forced to commit suicide. His story is often cited as a tragedy of loyal remonstrance.
Private gates:
Powerful families or factions that attract clients, retainers, and office-seekers. Han Fei sees them as rivals to public law and the ruler’s authority.
Wandering office-seekers:
Men who travel among states seeking patronage and position. Han Fei argues they often serve private interests unless the ruler rewards merit through law.
人主第五十二
人主之所以身危国亡者，大臣太贵，左右太威也。所谓贵者，无法而擅行，操国柄而便私者也。所谓威者，擅权势而轻重者也。此二者，不可不察也。夫马之所以能任重引车致远道者，以筋力也。万乘之主、千乘之君所以制天下而征诸侯者，以其威势也。威势者，人主之筋力也。今大臣得威，左右擅势，是人主失力；人主失力而能有国者，千无一人。虎豹之所以能胜人执百兽者，以其爪牙也，当使虎豹失其爪牙，则人必制之矣。今势重者，人主之爪牙也，君人而失其爪牙，虎豹之类也。宋君失其爪牙于子罕，简公失其爪牙于田常，而不蚤夺之，故身死国亡。今无术之主皆明知宋、简之过也，而不悟其失，不察其事类者也。
且法术之士与当涂之臣，不相容也。何以明之？主有术士，则大臣不得制断，近习不敢卖重；大臣、左右权势息，则人主之道明矣。今则不然，其当涂之臣得势擅事以环其私，左右近习朋党比周以制疏远，则法述之士奚时得进用，人主奚时得论裁？故有术不必用，而势不两立。法述之士焉得无危？故君人者非能退大臣之议，而背左右之讼，独合乎道言也，则法术之士安能蒙死亡之危而进说乎？此世之所以不治也。明主者，推功而爵禄，称能而官事，所举者必有贤，所用者必有能，贤能之士进，则私门之请止矣。夫有功者受重禄，有能者处大官，则私剑之士安得无离于私勇而疾距敌，游宦之士焉得无挠于私门而务于清洁矣？此所以聚贤能之士，而散私门之属也。今近习者不必智，人主之于人也或有所知而听之，入因与近习论其言，听近习而不计其智，是与愚论智也。其当涂者不必贤，人主之于人或有所贤而礼之，入因与当途者论其行，听其言而不用贤，是与不肖论贤也。故智者决策于愚人，贤士程行于不肖，则贤智之士奚时得用，而人主之明塞矣。昔关龙逄说桀而伤其四肢，王子比干谏纣而剖其心，子胥忠直夫差而诛于属镂。此三子者，为人臣非不忠，而说非不当也，然不免于死亡之患者，主不察贤智之言，而蔽于愚不肖之患也。今人主非肯用法术之士，听愚不肖之臣，则贤智之士孰敢当三子之危而进其智能者乎？此世之所以乱也。
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