In the chaotic aftermath of Yuan Shao’s death in 202 CE, his sons Yuan Tan and Yuan Shang turned from heirs into enemies, igniting a civil war that would seal the fate of northern China.
As recorded in both Romance of the Three Kingdoms and historical texts like the Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi) and Zizhi Tongjian, their fratricidal conflict became the perfect opening for Cao Cao – already ascendant after the Battle of Guandu – to dismantle the Yuan regime piece by piece.
When Yuan Tan, besieged at Pingyuan, desperately appealed to Liu Biao of Jing Province for aid, he unknowingly triggered a strategic dilemma that exposed the fatal flaw of all divided houses: internal discord invites external conquest. Liu Biao’s response – guided by Liu Bei and framed through the ancient parable of “Han Lu chasing Dong Guo” – was not merely diplomatic caution, but a prophetic warning about the self-destructive logic of infighting. Though it failed to save the Yuans, it left a timeless lesson for all who would rule in turbulent times.
A desperate plea from a doomed heir
After Yuan Shao’s death, Yuan Tan, the eldest son, and Yuan Shang, the favored younger son backed by key advisors like Shen Pei, clashed over succession. Their rivalry escalated into open warfare, with Yuan Tan seizing parts of eastern Ji Province and absorbing remnants of Yuan Shang’s forces. But Cao Cao, ever watchful, saw an opportunity. In 204 CE, he marched north and besieged Yuan Tan at Pingyuan, cutting off escape routes.
Cornered and desperate, Yuan Tan sent envoys to Liu Biao, Governor of Jingzhou, pleading for military relief – a move rooted in the classical principle of “when lips are gone, teeth grow cold” (Chinese idiom): if Hebei fell, Jingzhou would be next.
Liu Biao’s dilemma: Between reputation and realism
Liu Biao, though no conqueror, was a seasoned survivor. He understood the risks:
- Intervening meant provoking Cao Cao at the height of his power and entangling Jing in a hopeless civil war.
- Refusing outright risked moral condemnation and future isolation once Cao Cao turned south.
Caught between these dangers, Liu Biao consulted Liu Bei, then living as a guest in Xinye. His question was less about strategy and more about how to appear virtuous without acting recklessly.
Liu Bei’s clear-eyed assessment: The inevitability of collapse
Liu Bei, hardened by years of exile and alliance politics, saw through the illusion. To him, Yuan Tan’s plight was not a crisis of invasion – but of self-destruction. He reasoned:
“The Yuan brothers have torn their house apart from within, Cao Cao need only watch. Even if we send troops, they will not unite. Their defeat is certain.”
Historically, the Sanguozhi confirms that Yuan Shang refused to aid Yuan Tan, even as Cao Cao besieged him – proof of total fragmentation. Liu Bei’s advice – to decline Yuan Tan with grace – was not cruelty, but clarity: no amount of external aid could heal a body already rotting from within.
The parable of Han Lu and Dong Guo
Following Liu Bei’s counsel, Liu Biao chose diplomatic mediation over military intervention. He sent two letters – one to each brother – laced with moral rebuke and historical allegory.
- To Yuan Tan, he criticized his earlier submission to Cao Cao as dishonorable.
- To Yuan Shang, he invoked the famed parable from Chunyu Kun of Qi during the Warring States period.
As described in the parable:
“Han Lu, the swiftest hound, chased Dong Guo Jun, the cleverest hare, around the mountain three times and over five ridges – until both collapsed from exhaustion. A farmer then walked by and seized them both without effort.”
This story, originally used by Chunyu Kun to warn the king of Qi that if Qi and Wei were to go to war, it would give Qin and Chu an opportunity to take advantage. Upon hearing Chunyu Kun’s words, King Wei of Qi found them reasonable and consequently canceled his plan to invade Wei. Now Liu Biao used this parable to mirror the Yuan brothers’ folly perfectly. Cao Cao was the farmer; the brothers, the doomed hunter and prey.
Liu Biao’s message was clear:
“You fight each other while Cao Cao sharpens his knife. Do you not fear the fate of Han Lu and Dong Guo?”
Too late for reconciliation
But the warning came too late. Blinded by ambition and mutual hatred, Yuan Tan and Yuan Shang ignored the plea. By early 205 CE, Cao Cao crushed Yuan Tan at Nanpi, executing him and his advisor Guo Tu. Yuan Shang and Yuan Xi fled to the Wuhuan, only to be hunted down later. Within two years, all four provinces of Hebei – Ji, Qing, You, and Bing – fell under Cao Cao’s control.
Liu Biao, though spared immediate war, had missed his chance to shape the northern balance of power. When Cao Cao finally turned south in 208 CE, Jing Province stood alone – and quickly collapsed.
Legacy of a Lost Lesson: Unity as the First Line of Defense
The tragedy of the Yuan brothers endures not as a tale of military defeat, but as a cautionary archetype: no external threat is as lethal as internal division. Liu Biao’s letters, though futile, crystallized a truth echoed across Chinese political philosophy – from Confucius to Sima Guang:
“When kin turn on kin, the enemy needs no sword.”
The parable of Han Lu and Dong Guo thus transcends its era. It reminds rulers that talent, territory, and legacy mean nothing without cohesion. In the end, the Yuans didn’t lose Hebei to Cao Cao – they handed it to him, exhausted and divided, like game fallen at a farmer’s feet.
And so, Liu Biao’s quiet diplomacy, though unable to alter fate, etched into history the heaviest verdict of all:
The greatest danger is not the enemy outside the gate – but the feud within the walls.
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