The popular saying – “Liu Bei borrowed Jing Province and never returned” – is deeply entrenched in Chinese folklore, largely due to the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Yet historical records tell a far more nuanced story. In fact, the very notion of “borrowing Jingzhou” is something of a misleading construct, if not a pseudo-concept altogether.
To understand why, we must revisit the geopolitical reality after the Battle of Red Cliffs (208 AD).
The tripartite division of Jing Province
Post-Red Cliffs, Jing Province was divided among three powers:
- Cao Cao retained Nanyang Commandery, the largest and most populous.
- Sun Quan controlled Jiangxia and, after a year-long siege, Nan Commandery (centered on Jiangling).
- Liu Bei conquered the four southern commanderies: Changsha, Wuling, Guiyang, and Lingling.
Crucially, Sun Quan’s holdings – Jiangxia and Nanjun (Nan Commandery) – formed a narrow corridor separating Liu Bei’s territory from Cao Cao’s. This meant that Wu bore the full brunt of northern attacks, while Liu Bei enjoyed relative security behind this “human shield.”
This strategic imbalance became unsustainable. As recorded in the Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi), Lu Su – often maligned as naive – proposed a bold solution: cede Nan Commandery to Liu Bei.
Why? Because holding Nan Commandery was a strategic liability for Wu:
- Its long frontier required heavy garrisons.
- Local revenues couldn’t cover defense costs.
- It turned Wu into Liu Bei’s de facto buffer against Cao Cao.
By transferring Nan Commandery, Lu Su shortened Wu’s frontline, consolidated forces in Jiangxia, and – most importantly – shifted Cao Cao’s primary focus onto Liu Bei.
Thus, what later folk tradition called “borrowing Jing Province” was, in reality, the transfer of one commandery (Nanjun) for mutual strategic benefit – not an act of generosity, but of cold-eyed realpolitik.
Shared Conquest, Shared Sovereignty
It’s also vital to note: Nan Commandery wasn’t solely Sun Quan’s prize. Historical accounts confirm that Zhou Yu and Liu Bei jointly besieged Jiangling. Liu Bei even sent Zhang Fei to assist Zhou Yu, and after capturing the four southern commanderies, he returned north to reinforce the campaign. Only then did Cao Ren withdraw to Xiangyang.
So the claim that Sun Quan “gave away” hard-won territory ignores Liu Bei’s direct military contribution.
Moreover, in AD 215, tensions over Jing Province were resolved through the Xiang River Accord:
- Liu Bei ceded Changsha and Guiyang to Sun Quan in exchange for formal recognition of his control over Nan Commandery and the remaining southern commanderies.
- In effect: Liu Bei “returned” two commanderies for one. By this point, the balance was restored – neither side owed the other.
Lu Su’s vision vs. Lü Meng’s shortsightedness
Critics often blame Lu Su for “nurturing a tiger” by aiding Liu Bei. But this view misunderstands his grand strategy. Lu Su sought a stable Sun–Liu alliance to counter Cao Cao – a vision that preserved Wu’s security while sharing the burden of northern defense.
Tragically, after Lu Su’s death, Lü Meng and Sun Quan abandoned this framework. In AD 219, they launched the surprise invasion of Jing Province, killing Guan Yu and seizing three commanderies.
On the surface, it seemed a tactical victory. But strategically, it was catastrophic:
- It shattered the Sun–Liu alliance, turning Shu into a permanent enemy.
- Wu now faced dual threats: Shu in the west and Wei in the north – exactly the scenario Lu Su had sought to avoid.
- With Liu Bei gone from Jing, Cao Wei no longer needed to split its forces. It could consolidate power unchallenged.
As the Zizhi Tongjian implies, this move was “picking up sesame seeds while losing a watermelon” – a classic case of short-term gain for long-term ruin.
No Loan, No Default
In sum, “Liu Bei borrowed Jing Province and never returned it” is a myth unsupported by historical evidence. What occurred was:
- A joint military effort to expel Cao Cao from southern Jingzhou.
- A strategic transfer of Nan Commandery to rebalance defense responsibilities.
- A formal territorial settlement in 215CE that left both sides satisfied.
The real betrayal wasn’t Liu Bei’s retention of Jingzhou – it was Sun Quan’s abandonment of Lu Su’s alliance-based deterrence, which accelerated the asymmetrical rise of Cao Wei and locked the Three Kingdoms into a one-superpower, two-weak-states dynamic that ultimately doomed both Shu and Wu.
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