Gaozi said, “Eating and sexual desire are human nature. Benevolence is internal, not external; righteousness is external, not internal.”
Mencius asked, “Why do you say benevolence is internal and righteousness is external?”
Gaozi explained, “Because a person is old, I respect him. This respect arises from his external characteristic of being old, not from within me. It is like seeing a white object and calling it white because of its external whiteness. Therefore, I say righteousness is external.”
Mencius countered, “The whiteness of a white horse is like the whiteness of white snow. But is the pity for an old horse the same as the respect for an elderly person? Furthermore, does your ‘righteousness’ lie in the old person, or in the one who respects them?”
Gaozi replied, “I respect my elder brother, and I also respect an elder from the state of Chu. This is determined by their external status, so I say righteousness is external.”
Mencius continued, “Liking roast meat from the state of Qin is no different from liking roast meat from one’s own state. Things share external commonalities; is your liking for roast meat also external?”
Note
Drawing on historical context and traditional commentaries, we can understand this concluding battle through the following dimensions:
- “Eating and Sexual Desire are Human Nature”: The Rationalization and Limitations of Biological Instincts
Gaozi’s assertion that eating and sexual desire are human nature had progressive significance in facing natural physiological needs. However, his limitation lies in reducing humans entirely to biological creatures driven by survival and reproductive instincts. Mencius did not deny these desires, but he considered them merely the “smaller parts” (physiological senses) shared with animals. What truly defines humans is the inner moral conscience (the “greater part”). - The Logical Fallacy of “Benevolence is Internal, Righteousness is External”: Confusing “Triggers” with “Inner Roots”
Gaozi argued that righteousness is external because respect is triggered by the external trait of old age. Mencius astutely pointed out the absurdity of this logic: the other person’s age is merely the “trigger,” but isn’t the feeling of respect itself emitted from within? If righteousness were purely external, pity for an old horse would be identical to respect for an elder. Mencius used this to prove that the roots of moral emotions must be deeply planted within the human heart, with external objects merely serving as the medium to awaken them. - Senses and Morality Sharing the Same Origin: Refuting “External Determinism”
Finally, Mencius delivered the ultimate blow using the example of “liking roast meat.” If Gaozi believes that reactions triggered by external objects are “external,” then the liking for roast meat is also triggered by external meat. Doesn’t that make the liking external? Through this counter-question, Mencius completely dismantled Gaozi’s theoretical foundation. Mencius ultimately established a complete theoretical loop: both physiological desires and moral conscience are internal, but a gentleman must “first establish the greater part,” using inner moral conscience to govern and guide physiological instincts, rather than being enslaved by them.
告子曰：“食色，性也。仁，内也，非外也；义，外也，非内也。”
孟子曰：“何以谓仁内义外也？”
曰：“彼长而我长之，非有长于我也；犹彼白而我白之，从其白于外也，故谓之外也。”
曰：“异于白马之白也，无以异于白人之白也；不识长马之长也，无以异于长人之长与？且谓长者义乎？长之者义乎？”
曰：“吾弟则爱之，秦人之弟则不爱也，是以我为悦者也，故谓之内。长楚人之长，亦长吾之长，是以长为悦者也，故谓之外也。”
曰：“耆秦人之炙，无以异于耆吾炙。夫物则亦有然者也，然则耆炙亦有外与？”
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