Therefore, in the present age, those who abandon self‑serving crooked ways and uphold public law will bring peace to the people and order to the state. Those who discard private interests and enforce public law will strengthen their army and weaken enemies.
Hence, when a ruler judges ministers’ merits and faults by legal institutions, he cannot be deceived by fraud and pretense. When he manages distant affairs by objective standards, he cannot be misled by false assessments of power across the realm.
Now if officials are promoted based on reputation alone, ministers will desert the ruler and collude with one another. If officials are recommended through cliques, people will devote themselves to private connections rather than seeking official appointment through law. Thus incompetent officials bring chaos to the state.
Rewarding by praise and punishing by slander makes those craving rewards and fearing penalties abandon public duty, practice self‑serving schemes, and form cliques for private gain. Ignoring the ruler’s interests, they build personal factions outside the court, weakening their loyalty to the sovereign.
With extensive personal networks and internal‑external cliques, even serious crimes can be covered up by many accomplices. Consequently, loyal ministers face danger and death without guilt, while treacherous officials gain security and profit without merit.
When loyal ministers suffer undeserved harm, virtuous officials retreat from service. When treacherous officials advance without merit, villains rise to power – this is the root of state collapse.
In such conditions, ministers discard state law, prioritize private factions, and neglect public statutes. They frequently visit powerful families rather than the royal court; they plan for personal benefit rather than state welfare. Though their followers are numerous, they do not honor the ruler. Though officials are abundant, they cannot serve the state. Thus the ruler bears the title of sovereign while actual power lies in ministerial private factions.
Therefore I say: the court of a doomed state has no true ministers. This does not mean the court lacks people. Great ministers seek mutual profit rather than national strength, mutual prestige rather than honoring the ruler. Junior officials take salaries to build personal connections and neglect official duties.
This occurs because the ruler fails to make decisions by law from above and lets subordinates act arbitrarily.
Hence an enlightened ruler selects men by law instead of personal preference, assesses achievements by law instead of personal judgment. The talented cannot be suppressed, the incompetent cannot be whitewashed. Those with false reputations cannot be promoted, those unjustly criticized cannot be dismissed. Distinction between ruler and ministers becomes clear and governance easy. The ruler need only uphold the law.
Note
Han Fei stresses that clique‑based governance ruins states. Only impartial, objective rule by law can prevent ministerial collusion, protect loyal officials, and secure monarchical authority.
Han Fei
Representative Legalist thinker of the late Warring States Period. This passage is excerpted from *On Measuring Standards (You Du)*, his core work advocating rule by law and anti‑clique politics.
Public Law vs Private Interest
The core Legalist dichotomy: public national law must override personal private gains, cliques and favoritism. Private factions are regarded as the primary threat to monarchical power.
Clique Politics
Collusion among officials for self‑interest was common in the Warring States Period. Han Fei strongly condemns cliques that shelter crimes and manipulate appointments.
Subjective vs Objective Governance
Rulers must not rely on personal likes, reputations or slander to reward or punish. Only law provides objective standards for appointment and assessment.
Empty Title of Sovereign
A key warning: if ministers control private power networks, the ruler becomes a nominal figurehead with no real authority.
Impartial Legal Assessment
Talent, achievement, promotion and dismissal should all be judged by law rather than personal judgment or public praise.
故当今之时，能去私曲就公法者，民安而国治；能去私行行公法者，则兵强而敌弱。故审得失有法度之制者，加以群臣之上，则主不可欺以诈伪；审得失有权衡之称者，以听远事，则主不可欺以天下之轻重。今若以誉进能，则臣离上而下比周；若以党举官，则民务交而不求用于法。故官之失能者其国乱。以誉为赏，以毁为罚也，则好赏恶罚之人，释公行，行私术，比周以相为也。忘主外交，以进其与，则其下所以为上者薄也。交众、与多，外内朋党，虽有大过，其蔽多矣。故忠臣危死于非罪，奸邪之臣安利于无功。忠臣之所以危死而不以其罪，则良臣伏矣；奸邪之臣安利不以功，则奸臣进矣。此亡之本也。若是，则群臣废法而行私重，轻公法矣。数至能人之门，不一至主之廷；百虑私家之便，不一图主之国。属数虽多，非所尊君也；百官虽具，非所以任国也。然则主有人主之名，而实托于群臣之家也。故臣曰：亡国之廷无人焉。廷无人者，非朝廷之衰也；家务相益，不务厚国；大臣务相尊，而不务尊君；小臣奉禄养交，不以官为事。此其所以然者，由主之不上断于法，而信下为之也。故明主使法择人，不自举也；使法量功，不自度也。能者不可弊，败者不可饰，誉者不能进，非者弗能退，则君臣之间明辩而易治，故主仇法则可也。
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