The difficulty of implementing law and statecraft exists not only in great states of ten‑thousand chariots but also in medium‑sized states of one‑thousand chariots.
The ruler’s personal attendants are not necessarily wise. If the ruler regards someone as wise and accepts his counsel, yet discusses his views with these attendants, he judges the wise by fools.
The ruler’s attendants are not necessarily virtuous. If the ruler respects someone as virtuous yet evaluates his conduct with these attendants, he judges the virtuous by unworthy men.
When wise men’s decisions are judged by fools and virtuous men’s conduct assessed by the unworthy, wise and virtuous officials feel humiliated, and the ruler’s judgments become mistaken.
Among ministers seeking official posts, upright men maintain purity and self‑discipline, while intelligent men advance state affairs through sound governance and reasoning.
Upright men do not curry favor with bribes. Relying on their integrity, they refuse to govern by bending the law. Thus upright and intelligent officials do not serve attendants or yield to private pleas.
The ruler’s attendants are not as incorruptible as Boyi (Bo Yi). When they fail to obtain favors and bribes, they suppress the achievements of upright and capable officials and spread slanderous accusations.
When administrative ability is controlled by personal attendants and pure conduct judged by praise or slander, upright and intelligent officials are dismissed, and the ruler’s insight is blocked.
If the ruler does not judge intelligence and conduct by proven merits, or verify faults through cross‑examination, but merely listens to personal attendants, incompetent men fill the court, and foolish, corrupt officials occupy official positions.
Note
This passage exposes a structural political flaw: rulers who rely on unworthy personal attendants to judge officials will suppress upright talent, enable corruption, and prevent the implementation of impartial law and statecraft.
Han Fei
The leading Legalist thinker of the late Warring‑States Period. This passage is excerpted from Lonely Indignation (Gu Fen) of Han Feizi, analyzing how royal attendants sabotage the rule of law by manipulating the ruler’s judgment.
Boyi
Bo Yi, a legendary ancient noble famous for extreme integrity and moral purity, used as the benchmark of incorruptibility in Chinese political ethics.
Judging the Wise by Fools
A core critique: rulers delegate evaluation of talented officials to unqualified personal attendants, reversing proper political judgment.
Bribery and Favor‑Seeking
Palace attendants demand bribes from officials; upright Legalist statesmen refuse, leading to slander and political exclusion.
Cross‑Examination
A key Legalist administrative principle: verify officials’ merits and faults through multiple sources rather than single‑source hearsay.
Attendant‑Centered Corruption
Inner‑palace personal attendants are a major source of political corruption, controlling information flow to the ruler.
凡法術之難行也，不獨萬乘，千乘亦然。人主之左右不必智也，人主於人有所智而聽之，因與左右論其言，是與愚人論智也。人主之左右不必賢也，人主於人有所賢而禮之，因與左右論其行，是與不肖論賢也。智者決策於愚人，賢士程行於不肖，則賢智之士羞而人主之論悖矣。人臣之欲得官者，其修士且以精絜固身，其智士且以治辯進業。其修士不能以貨賂事人，恃其精潔，而更不能以枉法為治，則修智之士，不事左右，不聽請謁矣。人主之左右，行非伯夷也，求索不得，貨賂不至，則精辯之功息，而毀誣之言起矣。治辯之功制於近習，精潔之行決於毀譽，則修智之吏廢，則人主之明塞矣。不以功伐決智行，不以參伍審罪過，而聽左右近習之言，則無能之士在廷，而愚污之吏處官矣。
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