Mozi – Chapter 18

Chapter 18: Condemning Offensive War – Part II

Master Mozi said: “When the ancient princes and high officials governed their states, they sincerely desired that their reputations be carefully examined, their rewards and punishments be appropriate, and their penal administration be free from error…” Therefore, Master Mozi said: “The ancients had a saying: ‘If one’s deliberations yield no answer, one must use the past to know the future, and use the obvious to know the hidden.’ If one deliberates in this way, the answer can be obtained.”

Now, whenever an army is mobilized, marching in winter brings fear of cold, and marching in summer brings fear of heat; thus, campaigns cannot be conducted in winter or summer. In spring, military campaigns cause the people to neglect plowing and planting; in autumn, they cause the people to neglect harvesting. If but one season is wasted, the number of people who die of starvation and cold is incalculable. Now, let us calculate the military expenditures: bamboo arrows, feathers, yak tails, tents, armor, shields, and large shields that are worn out and broken on the campaign and never return are incalculable. Furthermore, spears, halberds, daggers, swords, and chariots that are shattered and ruined in formation and never return are incalculable. As for their oxen and horses, they depart fat and return emaciated; those that die on the way and never return are incalculable. Because the roads are long and distant, and the grain supply is cut off and cannot be sustained, the number of people who die of starvation is incalculable. Because their camps are insecure, their meals are irregular, and their eating is unregulated, the number of people who die of disease on the road is incalculable. The loss of troops is incalculable, and the total annihilation of armies is incalculable; consequently, the number of ghosts and spirits deprived of their ancestral sacrifices is also incalculable.

When a state initiates war, it deprives the people of their resources and wastes their benefits; the losses are enormous. Yet why do they do it? The answer is: “I covet the fame of victory and the profits gained from it, therefore I do it.” Master Mozi said: “If one calculates what is gained from victory, it is of no use; if one calculates the profits obtained, they are actually less than the losses incurred.” Now, to attack a city of threeli in diameter and an outer wall of sevenli, can one obtain it without using elite troops and without killing? The number of people killed must be in the tens of thousands, or at least in the thousands, before a city of threeli and an outer wall of sevenli can be obtained. Now, a great state with ten thousand chariots has thousands of empty cities that it cannot fully occupy, and tens of thousands ofmu of land that it cannot fully cultivate. Thus, land is in surplus, while people are in deficit. Yet they exhaust the lives of their people and multiply the calamities of superiors and subordinates to fight for empty cities. This is to abandon what is deficient and overvalue what is in surplus. To govern in this way is not the proper business of a state.

Those who justify offensive war say: “The kings of Chu and Wu in the south, and the rulers of Qi and Jin in the north, when they were first enfeoffed under heaven, had territories of less than several hundredli and populations of less than several hundred thousand. Because of offensive warfare, their territories expanded to several thousandli, and their populations grew to several million. Therefore, offensive warfare must not be condemned.” Master Mozi said: “Even if four or five states profit from it, it still cannot be called the right path. It is like a physician prescribing medicine to the sick. Suppose a physician here mixes his medicine and gives it to all the sick people in the world. If ten thousand people take it and only four or five profit, it still cannot be called an effective medicine. Therefore, a filial son would not give it to his parents, and a loyal minister would not give it to his lord. Among the ancient enfeoffed states, those far away known by what the ears have heard, and those near known by what the eyes have seen, that perished through offensive warfare are incalculable.” How do we know this? In the east, there was the state of Ju, which was very small and situated between great states. It did not serve the great states respectfully, nor did the great states favor or benefit it. Thus, the Yue people in the east continually reduced its territory, and the Qi people in the west annexed it. The reason Ju perished between Qi and Yue was offensive warfare. Even Chen and Cai in the south perished between Wu and Yue for the same reason. Even the northern tribes perished between Yan, Dai, Hu, and Mo for the same reason. Therefore, Master Mozi said: “The ancient princes and high officials sincerely desired gain and abhorred loss, desired peace and abhorred danger; therefore, offensive warfare must be condemned.”

Those who justify offensive war say: “They could not rally and use their people, therefore they perished; I can rally and use my people. With this, if I wage war in the world, who would dare not submit?” Master Mozi said: “Although you can rally and use your people, are you comparable to the ancient King Helü of Wu?” In ancient times, King Helü of Wu trained his troops for seven years. Clad in armor and bearing weapons, they ran three hundred li before camping. They camped at Zhulin, emerged from the narrow pass of Ming’e, fought at Boju, penetrated deep into the heart of Chu, and made the states of Song and Lu come to pay respects. In the time of his son Fuchai, he attacked Qi in the north, camped on the north bank of the Wen River, fought at Ailing, greatly defeated the Qi army, and stationed troops at Mount Tai. In the east, he attacked Yue, crossed the Three Rivers and Five Lakes, and stationed troops at Kuaiji. No state among the Nine Yi tribes dared not submit. But afterwards, he could not reward orphans or show charity to the people. Relying on his own strength, he boasted of his merits and praised his ambitions, neglecting instruction and training. He built the Gusu Terrace, which remained unfinished for seven years. At this point, the people of Wu harbored feelings of alienation and exhaustion. King Goujian of Yue, seeing that the superiors and subordinates of Wu were discordant, rallied his people to avenge his grievance. He entered the northern city, moved the grand inner palace, surrounded the royal palace, and the state of Wu perished.

In ancient times, Jin had six generals, among whom Zhi Bo was the most powerful. Considering the vastness of his land and the multitude of his people, he desired to resist the feudal lords and achieve a heroic reputation through swift offensive warfare. Thus, he selected his elite soldiers and arrayed his chariots and troops to attack and annex the Zhonghang clan. Believing his strategy was sufficient, he then attacked the Fan clan and greatly defeated them, merging the three clans into one. Not stopping there, he besieged Zhao Xiangzi at Jinyang. At this point, the Han and Wei clans conspired together, saying: “The ancients had a saying: ‘When the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold.’ If the Zhao clan perishes in the morning, we shall follow in the evening; if they perish in the evening, we shall follow in the morning. The Book of Songs says: ‘If the fish does not strive in the water, how will it survive on land?’ Therefore, the lords of the three clans united their hearts and combined their strength. They opened the gates and cleared the roads, donned armor, and raised troops. Han and Wei attacked from the outside, while the Zhao clan attacked from the inside, striking and greatly defeating Zhi Bo.”

Therefore, Master Mozi said: “The ancients had a saying: ‘The gentleman does not use water as a mirror, but uses people as a mirror.’ Using water as a mirror, one only sees the reflection of one’s face; using people as a mirror, one knows good fortune and misfortune. Now, if one considers offensive warfare profitable, why not take the case of Zhi Bo as a mirror? Its outcome was inauspicious and disastrous, and this is now clearly known.”

Note

King Helü and King Fuchai of Wu:

Helü was a highly successful military strategist who transformed Wu into a dominant power. However, his son Fuchai became arrogant, neglected his people, and indulged in massive construction projects (like the Gusu Terrace). Mozi uses this father-son contrast to argue that military success is fragile and easily destroyed by domestic mismanagement and hubris.

King Goujian of Yue:

The archetypal patient and vengeful ruler in Chinese history. Mozi highlights Goujian’s strategic patience in waiting for Wu’s internal discord to strike, illustrating that internal cohesion is more important than mere military might.

Zhi Bo (Viscount Zhi of Jin):

The most powerful of the six ministers in the state of Jin during the late Spring and Autumn period. His aggressive expansion and ultimate destruction at the hands of the allied Han, Wei, and Zhao clans serve as Mozi’s ultimate cautionary tale against unchecked militarism.

Zhao Xiangzi:

The head of the Zhao clan who was besieged by Zhi Bo at Jinyang. His survival and subsequent alliance with Han and Wei led to the partition of Jin, marking the beginning of the Warring States period.

Utilitarian Cost-Benefit Analysis of War:

Unlike moralists who condemn war purely on ethical grounds, Mozi uses a stark economic and demographic calculus. He argues that land is abundant but human life is scarce; therefore, sacrificing human lives to conquer empty cities is fundamentally irrational and bad statecraft.

The “Medicine” Analogy for Statecraft:

Mozi compares offensive war to a medicine that cures only 4 or 5 out of 10,000 patients. Even if a few states (like Chu, Wu, Qi, Jin) temporarily benefited from war, the overall “mortality rate” of states makes it a disastrous policy. This is a brilliant early formulation of statistical probability applied to political ethics.

Epistemological Mirroring (镜于人):

Mozi advocates for historical empiricism. Instead of relying on abstract ideals, leaders should use history as a mirror to predict outcomes. This reflects the Mohist school’s strong emphasis on logic, empirical evidence, and historical precedent.

“When the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold” (唇亡齿寒):

A famous Chinese idiom originating from the Zuo Zhuan, meaning that the loss of a close ally or buffer state will directly endanger one’s own security. Mozi uses it to explain the geopolitical logic behind the Han and Wei clans’ decision to betray Zhi Bo.

“If the fish does not strive in the water, how will it survive on land?” (鱼水不务，陆将何及乎):

Quoted from the Book of Songs (Shijing). Mozi uses this poetic metaphor to emphasize the urgency of mutual survival and the catastrophic consequences of failing to act in concert against a common threat.

子墨子言曰：“古者王公大人为政于国家者，情欲誉之审，赏罚之当，刑政之不过失……。”是故子墨子曰：“古者有语：谋而不得，则以往知来，以见知隐。谋若此可得而知矣。”

　　今师徒唯毋兴起，冬行恐寒，夏行恐暑，此不可以冬夏为者也。春则废民耕稼树艺，秋则废民获敛。今唯毋废一时，则百姓饥寒冻馁而死者，不可胜数。今尝计军上：竹箭、羽旄、幄幕、甲盾、拨劫，往而靡弊腑冷不反者，不可胜数。又与矛、戟、戈、剑、乘车，其列住碎拆靡弊而不反者，不可胜数。与其牛马，肥而往，瘠而反，往死亡而不反者，不可胜数。与其涂道之修远，粮食辍绝而不继，百姓死者，不可胜数也。与其居处之不安，食饭之不时，肌饱之不节，百姓之道疾病而死者，不可胜数。丧师多不可胜数，丧师尽不可胜计，则是鬼神之丧其主后，亦不可胜数。

　　国家发政，夺民之用，废民之利，若此甚众，然而何为为之？曰：“我贪伐胜之名，及得之利，故为之。”子墨子言曰：“计其所自胜，无所可用也；计其所得，反不如所丧者之多。”今攻三里之城，七里之郭，攻此不用锐，且无杀，而徒得此然也？杀人多必数于万，寡必数于千，然后三里之城，七里之郭且可得也。今万乘之国，虚数于千，不胜而入；广衍数于万，不胜而辟。然则土地者，所有余也；王民者，所不足也。今尽王民之死，严下上之患，以争虚城，则是弃所不足，而重所有余也。为政若此，非国之务者也。

　　饰攻战者言曰：“南则荆、吴之王，北则齐、晋之君，始封于天下之时，其土地之方，未至有数百里也；人徒之众，未至有数十万人也。以攻战之故，土地之博，至有数千里也；人徒之众，至有数百万人。故当攻战而不可为也。”子墨子言曰：“虽四五国则得利焉，犹谓之非行道也。譬若医之药人之有病者然，今有医于此，和合其祝药之于天下之有病者而药之。万人食此，若医四五人得利焉，犹谓之非行药也。故孝子不以食其亲，忠臣不以食其君。古者封国于天下，尚者以耳之所闻，近者以目之所见，以攻战亡者，不可胜数。”何以知其然也？东方有莒之国者，其为国甚小，闲于大国之闲，不敬事于大，大国亦弗之从而爱利，是以东者越人夹削其壤地，西者齐人兼而有之。计莒之所以亡于齐、越之间者，以是攻战也。虽南者陈、蔡，其所以亡于吴、越之间者，亦以攻战。虽北者且不一著何，其所以亡于燕代、胡貊之闲者，亦以攻战也。是故子墨子言曰：“古者王公大人，情欲得而恶失，欲安而恶危，故当攻战，而不可不非。”

　　饰攻战者之言曰：“彼不能收用彼众，是故亡；我能收用我众，以此攻战于天下，谁敢不宾服哉！”子墨子言曰：“子虽能收用子之众，子岂若古者吴阖闾哉？”古者吴阖闾教七年，奉甲执兵，奔三百里而舍焉。次注林，出于冥隘之径，战于柏举，中楚国而朝宋与及鲁。至夫差之身，北而攻齐，舍于汶上，战于艾陵，大败齐人，而葆之大山；东而攻越，济三江五湖，而葆之会稽。九夷之国莫不宾服。于是退不能赏孤，施舍群萌，自恃其力，伐其功，誉其志，怠于教遂。筑姑苏之台，七年不成。及若此，则吴有离罢之心。越王勾践视吴上下不相得，收其众以复其雠，入北郭，徙大内，围王宫，而吴国以亡。昔者晋有六将军，而智伯莫为强焉。计其土地之博，人徒之众，欲以抗诸侯，以为英名，攻战之速，故差论其爪牙之士，皆列其舟车之众，以攻中行氏而有之。以其谋为既已足矣，又攻兹范氏而大败之，并三家以为一家而不止，又围赵襄子于晋阳。及若此，则韩、魏亦相从而谋曰：“古者有语：唇亡则齿寒。赵氏朝亡，我夕从之，赵氏夕亡，我朝从之。诗曰：鱼水不务，陆将何及乎！是以三主之君，一心戮力，辟门除道，奉甲兴士，韩、魏自外，赵氏自内，击智伯大败之。”

　　是故子墨子言曰：“古者有语曰：君子不镜于水，而镜于人。镜于水，见面之容；镜于人，则知吉与凶。今以攻战为利，则盖尝鉴之于智伯之事乎？此其为不吉而凶，既可得而知矣。”