The peril of great states of ten‑thousand chariots lies in overly powerful ministers; the peril of medium‑sized states of one‑thousand chariots lies in excessive trust in personal attendants. These are universal troubles for all rulers.
Moreover, ministers commit grave crimes while rulers make fatal blunders, because the interests of ministers and rulers are fundamentally opposed.
How can we prove this?
The ruler benefits from appointing capable men to office; ministers benefit from gaining posts despite incompetence.
The ruler benefits from granting ranks and salaries to meritorious men; ministers benefit from gaining wealth and nobility without merit.
The ruler benefits from employing outstanding and able heroes; ministers benefit from forming cliques to serve private interests.
Consequently, state territory shrinks while ministerial clans grow rich; the ruler declines in status while powerful ministers rise.
Eventually the ruler loses authority and ministers seize state power. The ruler becomes merely a vassal, while chief ministers divide territory and exercise sovereign rights. This is how ministers deceive their ruler for private gain.
Among powerful ministers of the present age, fewer than two or three out of ten retain their favor when the ruler’s power shifts. Why? Because ministers commit enormous crimes. Those guilty of great offenses deceive their ruler and deserve death.
Wise men are far‑sighted and fear execution, so they never side with powerful magnates. Virtuous men are upright and incorruptible, ashamed to deceive the ruler alongside treacherous ministers, so they also refuse to follow magnates.
Thus the followers of powerful magnates are either fools unaware of disaster, or corrupt men unafraid of treachery.
Powerful ministers collude with such foolish and corrupt men, deceiving the ruler above and extorting profit from the people below. Forming cliques and speaking with one voice, they mislead the ruler, ruin laws, disrupt scholars and commoners, endanger and weaken the state, and bring hardship and humiliation to the ruler. These are grave crimes.
If ministers commit great crimes yet the ruler fails to restrain them, this is a fatal blunder. With fatal errors above and enormous crimes below, a state cannot avoid ruin.
Note
This passage establishes a vital Legalist principle: ruler and ministerial interests are inherently contradictory. Powerful ministerial cliques composed of foolish and corrupt followers will deceive the ruler and ruin the state unless strictly restrained by the sovereign.
The core Legalist political thinker of the late Warring‑States Period. This passage is from Lonely Indignation (Gu Fen) of Han Feizi, his key essay analyzing the inherent conflict between ruler and ministerial interests.
Inherent Conflict of Ruler‑Minister Interests
A foundational Legalist theory: the ruler pursues national stability and impartial governance, while ministers seek personal wealth and factional power; their interests are naturally opposed.
Ten‑Thousand / One‑Thousand Chariot States
Standard Warring‑States classification: great states with 10000 war chariots, medium‑sized states with 1000 chariots, facing different political risks.
Cliques and Collusion (Peng‑dang Bi‑zhou)
Ministerial factionalism that unites corrupt officials to monopolize power, a primary threat to monarchical rule in ancient China.
Sovereign Power Usurpation
Ministers may reduce the ruler to a nominal vassal and divide state territory, as seen in historical cases such as the Six Ministers partitioning Jin and the Tian clan seizing Qi.
萬乘之患，大臣太重；千乘之患，左右太信；此人主之所公患也。且人臣有大罪，人主有大失，臣主之利與相異者也。何以明之哉？曰：主利在有能而任官，臣利在無能而得事；主利在有勞而爵祿，臣利在無功而富貴；主利在豪傑使能，臣利在朋黨用私。是以國地削而私家富，主上卑而大臣重。故主失勢而臣得國，主更稱蕃臣，而相室剖符，此人臣之所以譎主便私也。故當世之重臣，主變勢而得固寵者，十無二三。是其故何也？人臣之罪大也。臣有大罪者，其行欺主也，其罪當死亡也。智士者遠見，而畏於死亡，必不從重人矣。賢士者修廉，而羞與姦臣欺其主，必不從重人矣。是當塗者之徒屬，非愚而不知患者，必污而不避姦者也。大臣挾愚污之人，上與之欺主，下與之收利侵漁，朋黨比周，相與一口，惑主敗法，以亂士民，使國家危削，主上勞辱，此大罪也。臣有大罪而主弗禁，此大失也。使其主有大失於上，臣有大罪於下，索國之不亡者，不可得也。
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