ministerial cliques

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 14.1

    All treacherous ministers seek to comply with the ruler’s will to gain the power of close favor. Therefore, whatever the ruler approves, ministers praise; whatever the ruler detests, ministers condemn. Generally among human nature, those with identical choices affirm one another, while those with differing choices oppose one another. What ministers praise is what…

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 11.5

    The peril of great states of ten‑thousand chariots lies in overly powerful ministers; the peril of medium‑sized states of one‑thousand chariots lies in excessive trust in personal attendants. These are universal troubles for all rulers.

  • Han Feizi – Chapter 11.2

    When powerful magnates control key state affairs, both inner‑palace attendants and outer officials become their tools. Hence neighboring states will not cooperate unless relying on them, so enemy states speak for them. Government officials cannot advance unless submitting to them, so ministers serve them. Palace attendants cannot approach the ruler unless clinging to them,…