The anti-Dong Zhuo coalition of 190 AD is often remembered as a noble but fractured alliance of warlords united to restore the Han dynasty. Among them, Cao Cao stands out in both historical records and Romance of the Three Kingdoms as the leader who fought with relentless determination, launching a near-suicidal attack at Xingyang despite being outnumbered and underprepared. This act has traditionally been interpreted as a sign of Cao Cao’s exceptional vision, courage, and loyalty to the Han cause—especially in contrast to the passive, self-serving warlords who feasted while he bled.
However, a closer examination of the historical context, reveals a more nuanced truth: Cao Cao’s aggression was not driven by idealism, but by stark self-interest. Unlike the established warlords, Cao Cao had nothing to lose and everything to gain. This article dismantles the myth of Cao Cao’s early heroism and exposes the realpolitik behind his actions: in a world where power came from land, armies, and legitimacy, Cao Cao fought hard because he was the only one who could truly win by doing so.
The Myth of Cao Cao the Visionary
Popular history, influenced by Romance of the Three Kingdoms, paints Cao Cao as a far-sighted patriot—a man who, even in his early years, understood that defeating Dong Zhuo was the first step toward unifying China. His bold attack at Xingyang, though a tactical failure, is celebrated as a moral victory, proving his willingness to “strike the rock with an egg”, as a chinese idiom goes, for the greater good.
Later, when Cao Cao seized control of Emperor Xian and laid the foundation for the Cao Wei state, this early act was retroactively glorified. Historians and readers alike praised his foresight, contrasting him with the “shortsighted” warlords who “only cared about their petty gains.”
But this narrative is anachronistic—it judges 190 AD through the lens of events in the 210s. At the time, no one could have predicted Cao Cao’s rise. His actions must be understood not as prophecy, but as rational calculation based on his unique position.
All warlords acted in self-interest
Every warlord in the coalition—Yuan Shao, Yuan Shu, Liu Dai, Gongsun Zan, Han Fu, and others—made decisions based on personal survival and advancement, not abstract loyalty.
For these regional governors and de facto rulers, joining the coalition was a high-risk, low-reward gamble. They already held real power in their territories. Their choices boiled down to two possible outcomes:
- Defeat by Dong Zhuo
Loss of troops and resources,
Possible death or capture,
Weakened position at home, inviting rebellion or annexation by rivals. - Victory over Dong Zhuo
Even if successful, victory offered little benefit to most warlords, as explored below.
Three futures after Dong Zhuo: Why most warlords had nothing to gain
If Dong Zhuo were defeated, the warlords faced three possible paths—none of which promised greater power or freedom than they already enjoyed.
Option One: Become another “Dong Zhuo”
Only a warlord with overwhelming military and political strength could seize control of the central government. In 190 AD, that role belonged to Yuan Shao, the coalition’s nominal leader and scion of the powerful Yuan clan. For lesser warlords, this path was impossible.
Option Two: Serve in the central government
They could accept court appointments under a reformed Han administration. But this meant:
- Subordination to whoever controlled the emperor (likely Yuan Shao or Han Fu),
- Loss of autonomy,
- And political infighting with established court officials.
As the text notes: “It’s better to be a local tyrant than a frustrated official in the capital.” In their own domains, they were kings without crowns—why trade that for bureaucratic servitude?
Option Three: Return to their territories
Most warlords would simply go back home after the campaign. But here’s the key: they were already local rulers. Whether they won or lost, their best outcome was to return to the status quo.
So why risk everything to achieve what they already had? As the article argues, fighting hard only benefited others—it was like “making clothes for someone else to wear”, as the Chinese proverb goes.
Cao Cao’s unique position: The man with nothing to lose
This is where Cao Cao was fundamentally different.
- In 190 AD, Cao Cao was not a warlord—he was a fugitive with no territory.
- He had raised a private army using his family’s wealth and influence,
- He was wanted by Dong Zhuo’s regime for opposing the tyrant,
- And he had no official base of power.
For Cao Cao, the stakes were reversed:
- Defeat meant death or obscurity,
- Victory meant redemption, legitimacy, and opportunity.
By defeating Dong Zhuo, Cao Cao could:
- Remove his status as a wanted man,
- Regain official recognition from the Han court,
- Earn titles, rank, and political capital,
- And use that legitimacy to build his own power base.
Unlike the other warlords, Cao Cao had no “home” to return to—so the central government was his only path to power.
Cao Cao’s “Heroism” was calculated ambition
Cao Cao’s relentless fight against Dong Zhuo was not an act of foresight or patriotism, but a survival strategy. He was the only one who stood to gain significantly from victory.
While others fought to preserve what they had, Cao Cao fought to acquire what he lacked: legitimacy, status, and a foundation for future power.
His later success—controlling the emperor, defeating rivals, and founding the Wei state—was not the fulfillment of a grand plan from 190 AD, but the result of seizing opportunities created by his early, high-risk actions.
The lesson is clear: in the Three Kingdoms era, power was not won by the most loyal, but by those with the most to gain—and the least to lose.
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