Following the pivotal Battle of Red Cliffs (208 CE), the alliance between Sun Quan and Liu Bei had successfully repelled Cao Cao’s southern advance. However, victory left a complex territorial puzzle. While Cao Cao retained control of northern Jing Province, the southern portion – especially the critical commandery of Nan Commandery (Nanjun) centered on Jiangling – was captured by Zhou Yu after a grueling year-long campaign.
By 209–210 CE, Liu Bei, though victorious in name, held only a narrow foothold at Gong’an, with no substantial base for expansion. Recognizing his precarious position, he formally requested that Sun Quan “lend” him Nan Commandery – a move that would grant him direct access to the middle Yangtze and a platform to push westward into Yi Province (modern Sichuan).
This request ignited fierce debate within the Eastern Wu court.
Eastern Wu’s Internal Divide: Opposition vs. Pragmatism
The majority of Sun Quan’s advisors, led by Zhou Yu, vehemently opposed the loan. As recorded in the Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi), Zhou Yu warned:
“Liu Bei is a heroic figure, and Guan Yu and Zhang Fei are like bears and tigers. If we grant him territory, it will be like ‘feeding a tiger that will one day devour us.’”
Zhou Yu saw Liu Bei not as an ally, but as a future rival whose rise would threaten Wu’s security. Moreover, Nan Commandery was his hard-won conquest – he served as its Governor and held fiefdoms there. Lending it away was not just strategic folly; it was a personal affront.
Yet Lu Su, Sun Quan’s chief strategist, argued the opposite. He contended that Cao Cao remained the paramount threat, and that Liu Bei, though ambitious, could not be controlled or eliminated. Better, Lu Su reasoned, to turn him into a buffer against the north.
Sun Quan ultimately sided with Lu Su – a decision that reshaped the balance of power in the Three Kingdoms.
Strategic Benefits: A win-win against Cao Cao
From a geopolitical standpoint, the loan made compelling sense:
- Shared Frontline: With Liu Bei stationed in Nan Commandery, Wu no longer bore the full brunt of Cao Cao’s pressure along the entire Yangtze. Now, Liu Bei absorbed the western flank, while Wu defended the east.
- Mutual Deterrence: The Sun-Liu alliance, though fragile, presented a united southern front that forced Cao Cao into defensive postures in Jing province.
- Psychological Impact: Historical sources note that when Cao Cao heard of the loan, he was so stunned that “his writing brush fell from his hand” – a testament to how deeply this move disrupted his strategic calculus.
Thus, the arrangement served both Liu Bei’s need for expansion and Sun Quan’s need for strategic depth.
The Hidden Cost: Undermining Zhou Yu and court politics
Beyond military strategy, Sun Quan’s decision likely carried internal political motives. After Red Cliffs, Zhou Yu’s prestige and influence had soared. As commander of Wu’s western armies and governor of Nan Commandery, he wielded near-autonomous power.
By lending Nan Commandery to Liu Bei – over Zhou Yu’s explicit objections – Sun Quan may have sought to:
- Clip Zhou Yu’s wings by stripping him of his territorial base.
- Assert royal authority over a potentially overmighty general.
- Prevent the rise of a rival power center within his own regime.
Tragically, Zhou Yu died in 210 CE, shortly after proposing a bold plan to seize Yi Province before Liu Bei could act. Had he lived, tensions between him and Sun Quan might have escalated further. In this light, the “loan” of Nan Commandery appears not only as a foreign policy choice, but as an act of domestic consolidation.
A calculated risk with lasting consequences
Was Lu Su right? In the short term, yes. The loan stabilized the Sun-Liu alliance, checked Cao Cao’s resurgence, and bought Wu crucial time to fortify its core territories.
But in the long run, it sowed the seeds of future conflict. Once Liu Bei seized Yi Province (214 CE), Sun Quan demanded the return of Jing Province (Nan Commandery to be more specific). In 215, Liu Bei and Sun Quou reached a boundary demarcation agreement to resolve the issue of Jing Province’s ownership, historically known as the Xiang River Demarcation, also called the Xiang River Alliance. They divided Jing Province along the Xiang River: Sun Quan obtained Jiangxia, Changsha, and Guiyang, while Liu Bei secured Nan Commandery, Lingling, and Wuling. Although this agreement failed to resolve the underlying conflicts between the two sides, and Eastern Wu remained dissatisfied, it is crucial to clarify that there was no situation where Liu Bei borrowed Jing Province and refused to return it.
- First, it was actually Eastern Wu that proactively lent Nan Commandery to Liu Bei to form an alliance against Cao Cao.
- Second, Liu Bei also participated in Zhou Yu’s campaign to capture Nan Commandery and Jiangxia, jointly reclaiming territory from Cao Cao, even though the majority of the credit should belong to Eastern Wu.
- Third, Liu Bei returned two commanderies to Eastern Wu, effectively returning two for the one borrowed.
As mentioned above, it turned out Sun Quan was dissatisfied and he wanted more. The resulting dispute culminated in Lü Meng’s surprise invasion of Jing Province (219 CE) and the execution of Guan Yu – irreparably shattering the alliance.
Thus, while Lu Su’s policy was strategically sound in 210 CE, it rested on the fragile assumption of lasting trust in an era defined by betrayal. When the two sides decided to jointly oppose Cao Cao, this compromise and cooperation were highly effective. Unfortunately, after Lu Su’s death, his successor Lü Meng focused more on his own interests, prioritizing the conflicts between allies over the contradiction between enemies, and thus betrayed the former alliance.
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