Chapter 45: Minor Selections (Xiao Qu)
The purpose of disputation is to clarify the distinction between right and wrong, examine the principles of order and chaos, understand the locus of sameness and difference, investigate the logic of names and realities, handle benefits and harms, and resolve doubts. It is to summarize the true state of all things and explore the analogies among various arguments. Names are used to denote realities, phrases to express intentions, and reasoning to explain causes. One selects based on categories and gives judgments based on categories. What one has in oneself, one should not criticize in others; what one lacks in oneself, one should not demand of others.
“Or” means not exhaustive. “Hypothesis” means it is not so now. “Model” means establishing a standard; what is modeled is the basis for the standard. Therefore, if it fits the model, it is right; if it does not fit, it is wrong. This is “modeling.”
“Illustration” (Pi) means citing another thing to clarify this one. “Parallel” (Mou) means comparing phrases to see if they both hold. “Adduction” (Yuan) means saying, “You accept this, why can I not accept it alone?” “Induction” (Tui) means attributing to the other what they reject, based on its similarity to what they accept. “This is like saying” means sameness; “How could I mean” means difference.
Things may be similar but not entirely the same. Parallel phrases have a limit where they are correct. That things are so has a reason why they are so; their being so may be the same, but the reason why may not be the same. When one selects, there is a reason for selecting; the act of selecting may be the same, but the reason may not be the same. Therefore, the phrases of Illustration, Parallel, Adduction, and Induction may change in application, become dangerous in transition, lose meaning when extended far, and depart from the root when flowing loosely. Thus, they must be examined carefully and not used indiscriminately. Since words have multiple aspects, different categories, and different causes, they must not be observed partially.
Things may be “affirmed and so” (shi er ran), “affirmed but not so” (shi er bu ran), “universal in one but not the other” (一周而不一周), or “one is and one is not” (一是而一不是). They cannot be used indiscriminately. Thus, since words have multiple aspects, different categories, and different causes, partial observation is wrong.
A white horse is a horse; riding a white horse is riding a horse. A black horse is a horse; riding a black horse is riding a horse. Huo (a slave) is a person; loving Huo is loving a person. Zang (a slave) is a person; loving Zang is loving a person. This is “affirmed and so.”
Huo’s parents are persons; Huo serving his parents is not serving persons in general. His younger brother is a handsome man; loving his brother is not loving handsome men in general. A cart is wood; riding a cart is not riding wood. A boat is wood; riding a boat is not riding wood. A robber is a person; many robbers are not many persons; no robbers is not no persons. How is this clear? Hating many robbers is not hating many persons; desiring no robbers is not desiring no persons. The world agrees on this. If so, although a robber is a person, loving robbers is not loving persons; not loving robbers is not not loving persons; killing robbers is not killing persons. There is no difficulty. This is of the same category as the former. The world has the former without self-criticism, yet the Mohists have the latter and are criticized. This is without reason. Is this not being inwardly stubborn, outwardly closed, and empty-minded? Stubborn inwardly and unresolved. This is “affirmed but not so.”
Moreover, reading books is not loving books. Cockfighting is not a chicken; loving cockfighting is loving chickens. About to fall into a well is not falling into a well; stopping one about to fall into a well is stopping falling into a well. About to go out the door is not going out the door; stopping one about to go out is stopping going out. If so, about to die young is not dying young; longevity is the opposite of dying young. Having fate is not fate; not insisting on having fate is not fate. There is no difficulty. This is of the same category. The world has the former without self-criticism, yet the Mohists have the latter and are blamed. This is without reason. Is this not being inwardly stubborn, outwardly closed, and empty-minded? Stubborn inwardly and unresolved. This is “affirmed but not so.”
Loving people requires universally loving all people before one can be said to love people. Not loving people does not require universally not loving people; not universally loving means one does not love people. Riding a horse does not require universally riding all horses before one can be said to ride a horse; riding one horse means one rides horses. As for not riding a horse, one must universally not ride any horse before one can be said not to ride a horse. This is “universal in one but not the other.”
Residing in a state is residing in a state; having one house in a state is not possessing the state. The fruit of a peach tree is a peach; the fruit of a thorn bush is not a thorn. Asking about a person’s illness is asking about a person; hating a person’s illness is not hating a person. A person’s ghost is not a person; an elder brother’s ghost is an elder brother. Sacrificing to a person’s ghost is not sacrificing to a person; sacrificing to an elder brother’s ghost is sacrificing to an elder brother. A horse’s eye being blind means the horse is blind; a horse’s eye being large does not mean the horse is large. A cow’s hair being yellow means the cow is yellow; a cow’s hair being numerous does not mean the cow is numerous. One horse is a horse; two horses are horses. A horse having four feet means one horse has four feet, not two horses have four feet. One horse is a horse. A horse being white means among two horses, some are white, not that one horse is some white. This is “one is and one is not.”
Note
This core Mohist logic text defines four reasoning modes and semantic rules. It categorizes four proposition forms and resolves the “killing robbers is not killing people” paradox to justify its universal love doctrine.
Master Mo:
The founder of the Mohist school. The chapter defends the Mohist doctrine of “Universal Love” against critics by using rigorous logical distinctions.
Huo and Zang (获与臧):
Generic names for male and female slaves/servants in ancient China. They are used here as logical variables to test the boundaries of semantic categories and moral obligations.
Mohist Logic:
This chapter is one of the most important texts in the history of Chinese logic. It systematically defines the methods of argumentation, including “Model” (效), “Illustration” (辟), “Parallel” (侔), “Adduction” (援), and “Induction” (推). It anticipates modern formal logic by distinguishing between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
The “White Horse” Paradox and Semantic Distinctions:
The text engages with the famous paradoxes of the School of Names (名家), particularly Gongsun Long’s “A white horse is not a horse.” The Mohists resolve this by distinguishing between extension (a white horse falls under the category of horse) and intension (the concept of “white horse” is not identical to “horse”). They apply this to ethics: “A robber is a person, but killing a robber is not killing a person,” defending their stance on justified punishment within a framework of universal love.
Intension vs. Extension (内涵与外延):
The Mohists clearly distinguish between terms that distribute universally and those that do not. For example, “loving people” requires universal quantification (loving all people), whereas “riding a horse” only requires existential quantification (riding at least one horse). This is a sophisticated grasp of quantifier logic.
Critique of Dogmatism:
The text criticizes opponents for being “inwardly stubborn and outwardly closed” (内胶外闭), highlighting the Mohist emphasis on intellectual openness and the willingness to revise beliefs based on logical consistency rather than emotional attachment to traditional categories.
Killing Robbers is Not Killing People (杀盗非杀人):
This is the central ethical-logical thesis of the chapter. It defends the Mohist position that their doctrine of universal love does not preclude the execution of criminals, as the moral category of “person” in the context of love is distinct from the legal/moral category of “robber” in the context of punishment.
Reading Books vs. Loving Books (读书非好书):
A semantic distinction used to illustrate that the object of an action (reading) does not necessarily imply affection for the physical object (the book), just as “killing a robber” does not imply a violation of the principle of “loving people.”
夫辩者，将以明是非之分，审治乱之纪，明同异之处，察名实之理，处利害，决嫌疑。焉摹略万物之然，论求群言之比。以名举实，以辞抒意，以说出故。以类取，以类予。有诸己不非诸人，无诸己不求诸人。
或也者，不尽也。假者，今不然也。效者，为之法也，所效者，所以为之法也。故中效，则是也；不中效，则非也。此效也。辟也者，举也物而以明之也。侔也者，比辞而俱行也。援也者，曰：“子然，我奚独不可以然也？”推也者，以其所不取之同于其所取者，予之也。“是犹谓”也者，同也。“吾岂谓”也者，异也。
夫物有以同而不率遂同。辞之侔也，有所至而正。其然也，有所以然也；其然也同，其所以然不必同。其取之也，有所以取之；其取之也同，其所以取之不必同。是故辟、侔、援、推之辞，行而异，转而危，远而失，流而离本，则不可不审也，不可常用也。故言多方，殊类，异故，则不可偏观也。
夫物或乃是而然，或是而不然，或一周而不一周，或一是而一不是也。不可常用也，故言多方殊类异故，则不可偏观也，非也。
白马，马也；乘白马，乘马也。骊马，马也；乘骊马，乘马也。获，人也；爱获，爱人也。臧，人也；爱臧，爱人也。此乃是而然者也。
获之亲，人也；获事其亲，非事人也。其弟，美人也；爱弟，非爱美人也。车，木也；乘车，非乘木也。船，木也；人船，非人木也。盗人人也；多盗，非多人也；无盗，非无人也。奚以明之？恶多盗，非恶多人也；欲无盗，非欲无人也。世相与共是之。若若是，则虽盗人人也；爱盗非爱人也；不爱盗，非不爱人也；杀盗人非杀人也，无难盗无难矣。此与彼同类，世有彼而不自非也，墨者有此而非之，无也故焉，所谓内胶外闭与心毋空乎？内胶而不解也。此乃是而不然者也。
且夫读书，非好书也。且斗鸡，非鸡也；好斗鸡，好鸡也。且入井，非入井也；止且入井，止入井也。且出门，非出门也；止且出门，止出门也。若若是，且夭，非夭也；寿夭也。有命，非命也；非执有命，非命也，无难矣。此与彼同类。世有彼而不自非也，墨者有此而罪非之，无也故焉，所谓内胶外闭与心毋空乎？内胶而不解也。此乃是而不然者也。
爱人，待周爱人而后为爱人。不爱人，不待周不爱人；不周爱，因为不爱人矣。乘马，不待周乘马然后为乘马也；有乘于马，因为乘马矣。逮至不乘马，待周不乘马而后不乘马。此一周而一不周者也。
居于国，则为居国；有一宅于国，而不为有国。桃之实，桃也；棘之实，非棘也。问人之病，问人也；恶人之病，非恶人也。人之鬼，非人也；兄之鬼，兄也。祭人之鬼，非祭人也；祭兄之鬼，乃祭兄也。之马之目盼则为之马盼；之马之目大，而不谓之马大。之牛之毛黄，则谓之中黄；之牛之毛众，而不谓之牛众。一马，马也；二马，马也。马四足者，一马而四足也，非两马而四足也。一马，马也。马或白者，二马而或白也，非一马而或白。此乃一是而一非者也。
Leave a Reply