Duke Wen of Teng asked Mencius:
“Teng is a small state, squeezed between the great powers of Qi and Chu. Should we submit to Qi, or align ourselves with Chu?”
Mencius replied:
“This kind of strategic calculation is beyond my capacity. But if you insist on an answer, I can offer only this: deepen your moats, strengthen your walls, and stand together with your people to defend the state. If, even in the face of death, the people refuse to abandon you – then there is still hope for Teng.”
滕文公問曰：「滕，小國也，間於齊楚。事齊乎？事楚乎？」
孟子對曰：「是謀非吾所能及也。無已，則有一焉：鑿斯池也，築斯城也，與民守之，效死而民弗去，則是可為也。」
Note
This brief dialogue from Mencius: King Hui of Liang II cuts through the realpolitik of the Warring States era. While other advisors urged small states to pick powerful patrons, Mencius rejected dependence entirely. True security, he argued, does not come from clever alliances but from moral governance that binds ruler and people as one. When citizens willingly stay and fight – not out of fear, but loyalty – the smallest state becomes unconquerable in spirit, if not in size.
When small states like Teng (in present-day Tengzhou, Shandong) struggled desperately for survival. As the great powers Qi and Chu expanded aggressively, smaller states were often forced into a precarious balancing act – shifting allegiances between stronger neighbors to buy temporary security.
Duke Wen of Teng’s question reflects the widespread anxiety among rulers of minor states in the Warring States’ period.
Self-reliance over Subservience
Rather than advising whether to “serve Qi” or “serve Chu,” Mencius responded, “This kind of strategy is beyond my capacity.” Though phrased modestly, this was in fact a firm rejection of the “pick-a-patron” approach. In his view, dependence on a hegemon might seem safe but ultimately meant loss of sovereignty – and eventual annexation, as happened later to states like Lu and Song. The real solution lay not in diplomatic opportunism, but in internal strengthening through virtuous governance.
Popular support as the foundation of national defense
Mencius’s core proposal was not merely about military tactics or alliances, but more about winning the people’s hearts.
This echoes Mencius’s famous line in Gongsun Chou II:
“Favorable weather (heaven’s time) is less important than terrain (earth’s advantage), and terrain less important than popular unity (human harmony).”
No matter how high the walls or deep the moats, without public support, national defenses crumble from within. But if ruler and people are united, even a small state can resist mighty foes.
The Confucian “people-centered” view of national security
Mencius’s advice reveals a distinct Confucian vision of defense:
- National security is not merely a military matter, but an extension of moral governance;
- Only if rulers practice benevolent policies in peacetime – light taxes, moral education – will the people willingly protect the state in crisis;
- True strength lies in ethical cohesion, not territory or troop numbers.
This stands in sharp contrast to Legalist “enrich the state, strengthen the army” doctrines or the Diplomatists’ (“Vertical and Horizontal”) alliance games. Mencius believed: a small state practicing the Way of the True King may survive despite weakness; a large state losing the people’s trust will fall despite power.
Historical validation and limitations
Teng was eventually conquered – likely by Song or Qi – in the late Warring States period, showing that moral idealism alone could not guarantee survival in an age of ruthless realpolitik.
Yet Mencius’s influence endured:
- Liu Bei’s “crossing the river with the people” during the late Eastern Han;
- Wen Tianxiang’s “let my loyal heart shine in history” in the Southern Song;
- Gu Yanwu’s Ming-era maxim “The rise and fall of the world concerns every commoner” all embody the spirit of “standing with the people” – a direct inheritance of Mencius’s ideal that “the people will not abandon their ruler.”
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