All treacherous ministers seek to comply with the ruler’s will to gain the power of close favor. Therefore, whatever the ruler approves, ministers praise; whatever the ruler detests, ministers condemn.
Generally among human nature, those with identical choices affirm one another, while those with differing choices oppose one another. What ministers praise is what the ruler approves – this is called shared preference. What ministers condemn is what the ruler rejects – this is called shared rejection.
No case exists where people with identical choices oppose each other. This is how ministers win the ruler’s trust and favor.
Treacherous ministers leverage trusted influence to promote or demote other officials through praise and slander. If the ruler lacks statecraft to control them and factual verification to examine them, he will surely trust their present words merely because they once agreed with him. This is how favored ministers deceive the ruler and seek private gain.
Thus the ruler is deceived above, while ministers grow powerful below – such are ministers who dominate the ruler.
When a state has ruler‑dominating ministers, subordinates cannot exert all their wisdom and loyalty, nor can officials uphold law to achieve merits. Why? People naturally pursue safety and benefit, and avoid danger and harm.
Ministers who strive for merit and loyalty end in hardship and poverty, bringing misfortune to their families. Those who deceive the ruler through treachery and bribe powerful ministers gain nobility and wealth, blessing their kin. Who would abandon safety and benefit for danger and harm?
With such flawed governance, it is impossible for the ruler to expect loyal subordinates and law‑abiding officials.
Palace attendants know integrity brings no safety or benefit. They reason: “To serve loyally and earn security is like a blind man trying to distinguish black from white – hopeless. To uphold justice without chasing wealth for security is like a deaf man judging sound quality – even more hopeless. Since both paths fail, how can we avoid colluding to deceive the ruler and serve powerful ministers?” Thus they disregard the ruler’s morality.
Civil officials also know uprightness brings no security. They reason: “To serve with purity is like drawing squares and circles without compasses – impossible. To govern legally without cliques for security is like scratching one’s head with feet – absurd. Since both paths fail, how can we avoid abandoning law to serve powerful ministers privately?” Thus they disregard royal decrees.
Consequently, many serve powerful ministers for private gain, while few serve the ruler by law. The ruler stands isolated above while ministers form cliques below. This is why Tian Chengzi assassinated Duke Jian of Qi.
Note
This passage delivers a strict Legalist warning: corruption spreads when loyalty brings no reward and treachery brings wealth. Without strict statecraft and verification, rulers are isolated, ministers form cliques, and regicide/state‑usurpation follows.
Late Warring‑States Legalist thinker. This passage is from Traitors, Usurpers, and Assassins (Jian Jie Shi Chen), analyzing how corrupt ministerial cliques bring down rulers.
Tian Chengzi (Tian Heng, Tian Chang)
Minister of Qi who killed Duke Jian of Qi, seized power, and paved the way for the Tian clan to usurp the Qi throne – a classic example of ministerial usurpation.
Duke Jian of Qi
The Qi ruler overthrown by Tian Chengzi, used by Han Fei as a warning case for weak rulers.
Shared Preference & Rejection (Tong‑qu, Tong‑she)
Han Fei’s psychological observation: ministers manipulate the ruler by echoing his likes and dislikes, forming an unbreakable bond of compliance.
Ruler‑Dominating Ministers
Powerful cliques that control the ruler’s decisions, the core political evil Han Fei aims to eliminate.
Natural Human Self‑Interest
Legalist core premise: people prioritize self‑benefit; if loyalty brings suffering and treachery brings wealth, all will turn corrupt.
Tian Clan Usurpation of Qi
A landmark historical event: ministerial power overthrew the legitimate royal house, used repeatedly by Han Fei to warn against unchecked ministerial cliques.
凡姦臣皆欲順人主之心以取親幸之勢者也。是以主有所善，臣從而譽之；主有所憎，臣因而毀之。凡人之大體，取舍同者則相是也，取舍異者則相非也。今人臣之所譽者，人主之所是也，此之謂同取。人臣之所毀者，人主之所非也，此之謂同舍。夫取舍合而相與逆者，未嘗聞也，此人臣之所以取信幸之道也。夫姦臣得乘信幸之勢以毀譽進退群臣者，人主非有術數以御之也，非參驗以審之也，必將以曩之合己信今之言，此幸臣之所以得欺主成私者也。故主必欺於上，而臣必重於下矣，此之謂擅主之臣。國有擅主之臣，則群下不得盡其智力以陳其忠，百官之吏不得奉法以致其功矣。何以明之？夫安利者就之，危害者去之，此人之情也。今為臣盡力以致功，竭智以陳忠者，其身困而家貧，父子罹其害；為姦利以弊人主，行財貨以事貴重之臣者，身尊家富，父子被其澤；人焉能去安利之道而就危害之處哉？治國若此其過也，而上欲下之無姦，吏之奉法，其不可得亦明矣。故左右知貞信之不可以得安利也，必曰：「我以忠信事上積功勞而求安，是猶盲而欲知黑白之情，必不幾矣。若以道化行正理不趨富貴事上而求安，是猶聾而欲審清濁之聲也，愈不幾矣。二者不可以得安，我安能無相比周、蔽主上、為姦私以適重人哉？」此必不顧人主之義矣。其百官之吏，亦知方正之不可以得安也，必曰：「我以清廉事上而求安，若無規矩而欲為方圓也，必不幾矣。若以守法不朋黨治官而求安，是猶以足搔頂也，愈不幾也。二者不可以得安，能無廢法行私以適重人哉？」此必不顧君上之法矣。故以私為重人者眾，而以法事君者少矣。是以主孤於上而臣成黨於下，此田成之所以弒簡公者也。
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