Those who form cliques to deceive the ruler and twist words for private gain are invariably trusted by powerful magnates.
Those who can claim military merit are elevated through official ranks and titles; those who cannot win false reputations are strengthened by external state influence.
Thus those who delude the ruler and serve private factions gain status either through official nobility or foreign backing.
Now rulers inflict punishment without verification and grant ranks and salaries before merits are proven. How then can law‑wise statesmen risk death to present their proposals? How would treacherous ministers abandon profit and withdraw voluntarily?
Consequently, the ruler grows weaker while private ministerial factions grow more powerful.
Though Yue was rich and militarily strong, rulers of Central Plains states knew it brought them no benefit, saying: “We cannot control it.”
Some present‑day states possess vast land and large populations, yet their rulers are deluded and ministers monopolize power. Such states become as uncontrollable as Yue.
Rulers recognize they cannot control Yue, yet fail to see they no longer control their own states – this is a failure of analogy.
People say Qi perished not through loss of land or cities, but because the Lü clan lost control and the Tian clan seized power.
Jin fell not through territorial loss, but because the Ji clan lost authority and the Six Ministers monopolized governance.
Today ministers hold power and make arbitrary decisions while rulers fail to reclaim authority – this is ignorance on the ruler’s part.
One sharing the fatal illness of a dying man cannot live; one repeating the actions of fallen states cannot survive.
Following the ruinous paths of Qi and Jin while hoping for national stability is impossible.
Note
This passage delivers a severe warning: unverified reward‑punishment systems enable ministerial cliques to seize power. Rulers who fail to check powerful ministers repeat the fall of Qi and Jin, losing their state despite retaining territory and population.
Han Fei
The leading late‑Warring‑States Legalist political thinker. This excerpt comes from Lonely Indignation (Gu Fen), warning rulers against ministerial usurpation by citing two famous state‑usurpation precedents.
Clique Politics (Peng‑dang Bi‑zhou)
A major political evil in ancient China: ministers collude, cover up each other’s crimes, and isolate the ruler from true information.
Tian Clan Usurps Qi
In 379 BCE, the Tian clan overthrew the original Lü royal house of Qi after long‑term power accumulation, a classic example of ministerial usurpation.
Six Ministers Partition Jin
The six powerful aristocratic clans of Jin gradually seized power, eventually dividing Jin into three states (Han, Zhao, Wei), ending the Ji royal house’s rule.
Yue State Analogy
Han Fei uses Yue as a metaphor: a state under ministerial control becomes alien to its nominal ruler, just like a foreign land.
Verification of Merit
A core Legalist principle: rewards and punishments must be based on proven achievements and factual checks, not favoritism.
朋黨比周以弊主,言曲以便私者,必信於重人矣。故其可以功伐借者,以官爵貴之;其不可借以美名者,以外權重之。是以弊主上而趨於私門者,不顯於官爵,必重於外權矣。今人主不合參驗而行誅,不待見功而爵祿,故法術之士安能蒙死亡而進其說,姦邪之臣安肯乘利而退其身?故主上愈卑,私門益尊。夫越雖國富兵彊,中國之主皆知無益於己也,曰:「非吾所得制也。」今有國者雖地廣人眾,然而人主壅蔽,大臣專權,是國為越也。智不類越,而不智不類其國,不察其類者也。人主所以謂齊亡者,非地與城亡也,呂氏弗制,而田氏用之。所以謂晉亡者,亦非地與城亡也,姬氏不制,而六卿專之也。今大臣執柄獨斷,而上弗知收,是人主不明也。與死人同病者,不可生也;與亡國同事者,不可存也。今襲跡於齊、晉,欲國安存,不可得也。
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