In the narrative of Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the chaotic times of the late Eastern Han Dynasty, “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” is often regarded as the core key to Cao Cao’s dominance over northern China.
Zhuge Liang explicitly stated in the “Longzhong Plan” that “Now Cao Cao has assembled an army of one million and holds the Emperor to command the warlords; truly, we cannot compete with him.” Later generations also largely revered this strategy as Cao Cao’s “stroke of genius.”
However, when we look back at the details of history, we find that the value of this strategy is not inherently established. Dong Zhuo attempted it before Cao Cao but ended up dead and disgraced; Yuan Shao had a far better opportunity to implement it but gave it up voluntarily; and behind Cao Cao’s decision to welcome and support the Emperor lay deeper considerations beyond “commanding the warlords.” From Dong Zhuo’s failure, Yuan Shao’s choice, to Cao Cao’s practice, the essence of “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” is actually a complex game of “strength and morality, tactics and popular support” in turbulent times.
I. Appearance and Essence: Why is “Holding the Emperor” not an inherent winning strategy?
The core logic of “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” is to transform Emperor Xian of the Han Dynasty, a symbol of imperial power, into a lever of actual power. However, against the backdrop of warlord strife in the late Han Dynasty, the appeal of the Emperor had already declined with the collapse of the Eastern Han imperial power. Whether one could achieve success by relying on this strategy depended not on whether to control the Emperor, but on how to utilize the symbolic significance of the Emperor. Dong Zhuo’s failure precisely demonstrates the fatal flaw of “only adopting the form while ignoring the essence.”
Dong Zhuo was the first warlord in the late Han Dynasty to practice “holding the Emperor.” In 189 AD, he entered the capital (Luoyang) at He Jin’s invitation, quickly seized military control of Luoyang, deposed Emperor Shao of the Han (Liu Bian), installed Emperor Xian of the Han (Liu Xie), and appointed himself Prime Minister. Seemingly, he had completed the layout of “holding the Emperor.” He even attempted to imitate Cao Cao’s later tactics: he rehabilitated scholars persecuted during the Partisan Prohibitions, win over renowned scholars like Cai Yong, and tried to cover up his autocratic nature with the pretense of respecting the Han Dynasty. However, Dong Zhuo’s fatal mistake was that he only learned the violent means of “controlling the Emperor” but completely destroyed the moral foundation and bottom line of order required to “command the world.”
He indulged the Liangzhou army in looting and killing, reducing Luoyang to ruins; he arbitrarily deposed and installed emperors and poisoned the Empress Dowager, treating imperial ethics with contempt; even when he held Emperor Xian hostage and moved the capital to Chang’an, he still maintained his rule through “swords” rather than “morality.” This model of relying solely on violence and disregarding popular support not only failed to make the warlords submit but also aroused the collective anger of the whole country. Eastern warlords such as Yuan Shao and Cao Cao quickly formed an alliance against Dong Zhuo. Although Dong Zhuo held the Emperor, he became a traitor to the state denounced by all warlords under heaven. In the end, he was killed by Lü Bu, and his forces collapsed accordingly.
Dong Zhuo’s failure reveals a crucial fact: in turbulent times, the “Emperor” is merely a symbol that requires supporting measures. Without sincerity in maintaining order, strategies to win popular support, and strength matching the symbol, simply “holding the Emperor” cannot “command the warlords”; instead, it will only make one the target of everyone’s attacks. This also laid the groundwork for Yuan Shao’s subsequent decision and Cao Cao’s practice.
II. Opportunity and Choice: Why did Yuan Shao give up “Holding the emperor”? It was not short-sightedness but a trade-off
Before Cao Cao welcomed Emperor Xian, Yuan Shao had the best opportunity to “hold the Emperor to command the warlords.” In 195 AD, Ju Shou proposed to Yuan Shao the suggestion of welcoming the Emperor from Chang’an, restoring the imperial ancestral temple in Luoyang, commanding the world, and suppressing those who do not submit. At that time, Yuan Shao, in terms of both reputation and strength, was far superior to Cao Cao: the Yuan family was a prominent aristocratic clan with “four generations of senior ministers,” and its disciples and former officials were scattered all over the country, making it the core representative of the scholar-official group; Yuan Shao had already occupied Jizhou and extended his influence to Bingzhou, Youzhou, and Qingzhou, becoming the most powerful warlord among the eastern warlords. In contrast, Cao Cao had almost lost Yanzhou the previous year due to Chen Gong’s rebellion and had a weak foundation. However, Yuan Shao eventually rejected Ju Shou’s proposal. This choice is often criticized as “short-sighted and incompetent,” but considering the situation at that time and Yuan Shao’s circumstances, it was actually a rational trade-off between advantages and disadvantages.
Firstly, Yuan Shao was skeptical about the actual effect of “holding the Emperor.” The examples of Dong Zhuo, Li Jue, and Guo Si were right in front of him—Dong Zhuo held the Emperor but was attacked by the whole country; Li Jue and Guo Si held the Emperor but fell into internal strife, and neither ended well. In Yuan Shao’s view, the appeal of the “Emperor” had long been in name only: the essence of warlord separatism was “strength speaks.” If one’s own strength was insufficient, even holding the Emperor would not make the warlords submit; if one’s own strength was sufficient, there seemed to be no essential difference between having the “name” of the Emperor or not. Later facts also partially confirmed his judgment: after Cao Cao welcomed the Emperor, not only did no warlords submit because of the “Emperor’s order,” but within half a year, Yuan Shu even declared himself Emperor. In 199 AD (the fourth year of Jian’an), Yuan Shao made plans to attack Xudu (Cao Cao’s base), and the Battle of Guandu followed. In 200 AD (the fifth year of Jian’an), Liu Bei, who had submitted to Cao Cao, assassinated the Inspector of Xuzhou and took control of Xuzhou again.
Secondly, Yuan Shao’s own advantages made “holding the Emperor” an unnecessary option. Yuan Shao’s core competitive strength was the reputation of the Yuan family as an aristocratic clan. Relying on the accumulation of “four generations of senior ministers,” he had already attracted a large number of scholar-official talents to submit to him without resorting to the symbol of the Emperor. For him, welcoming the Emperor might even become a restraint: with the Emperor by his side, he would have to consider imperial ethics in his actions and could not expand his territory or appoint officials freely as before. More importantly, Emperor Xian was installed by Dong Zhuo, and Yuan Shao had previously advocated installing Liu Yu, the Governor of Youzhou, as the Emperor (though the plan was abandoned because Liu Yu refused). If he welcomed Emperor Xian at this time, it would be equivalent to denying his previous stance, which might even trigger internal disputes. In contrast, “not holding the Emperor” allowed him to maintain freedom of action and continue to absorb scholar-officials with his own reputation, making it a more cost-effective choice for Yuan Shao.
The reason why later generations believe that Yuan Shao missed a golden opportunity is largely due to judging heroes by their success or failure—Cao Cao eventually rose to power by relying on “holding the Emperor” and his own tactics, while Yuan Shao was defeated in the Battle of Guandu, which made “not holding the Emperor” a crime of his. However, returning to the historical scene in 195 AD, Yuan Shao’s choice was not incompetent but a rational judgment based on his own strength and the situation.
III. Chance and Necessity: Why did Cao Cao welcome the emperor? The deep-seated demand beyond “Commanding the Warlords”
Cao Cao’s decision to welcome and support Emperor Xian was driven by both chance factors and inevitable needs. The so-called “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” was more like a tool to win over the scholar-official group for Cao Cao, rather than a weapon to command the warlords.
Cao Cao’s opportunity to welcome the Emperor was full of chance. In 196 AD (the first year of Jian’an), Emperor Xian and his entourage escaped from Chang’an after going through hardships and arrived in Luoyang, which had been reduced to ruins. At that time, the Emperor was in a desperate situation: there were pursuers led by Li Jue and Guo Si outside, while the military strength of his own side was insufficient. Inside, the generals like Yang Feng who escorted Emperor Xian were former members of the Yellow Turban Rebellion; their soldiers had poor military discipline and often harassed the nobles and ministers. Moreover, Luoyang was hit by a famine after Dong Zhuo’s destruction, and food was scarce. Many ministers even had to go out to gather wild food, and many died of starvation. Coupled with the unruly soldiers, Emperor Xian was indeed in an extremely difficult position.
At first, Emperor Xian wanted to summon Lü Bu to come to his aid. Why? Because when Dong Zhuo held Emperor Xian hostage and took him to Chang’an, it was Lü Bu and Wang Yun who joined forces to kill Dong Zhuo and support the Emperor. However, later, when Li Jue and Guo Si attacked Chang’an, Lü Bu was defeated and fled. This should have been good news for Lü Bu, but unfortunately, he was unable to go to the Emperor’s aid at that time due to a lack of military provisions.
Later, when the Emperor finally returned to Luoyang, he faced an even worse situation. Thanks to Dong Zhuo’s arson, Luoyang had become a wasteland. To make matters worse, a famine broke out, leading to a poor harvest. Many ministers had to go out to pick wild fruits for food, and many starved to death. In addition, the soldiers were undisciplined and ran amok. At this point, the Emperor was indeed in an extremely desperate situation.
Under such circumstances, it was imperative to summon warlords to come to the court’s rescue. At this time, Dong Zhao, who was in Luoyang and had always been on bad terms with Yuan Shao, secretly sent someone to contact Cao Cao, urging him to come to the Emperor’s aid as soon as possible. Meanwhile, he pretended to be acting on Cao Cao’s behalf to appease Yang Feng, promising him benefits. It was with his help that Cao Cao was able to arrive in Luoyang smoothly and escort Emperor Xian back to Xuchang.
The core motivation behind Cao Cao’s decision to welcome the Emperor was not to command the warlords, but to make up for his family background shortcomings and win over the scholar-official group. Cao Cao’s father, Cao Song, was the adopted son of a eunuch. This family background was regarded as “the ugly legacy of a eunuch’s adopted son” by the scholar-officials. Even though Cao Cao rose to power with his military talents, he was still looked down upon by many scholar-officials. Since the Eastern Han Dynasty, the scholar-officials had become a core force with human, material, and intellectual resources. To succeed in the warlord melee, it was crucial to gain the support of the scholar-official group.
Previously, although Cao Cao had implemented the policy of appointing people based on their talents and recruited talents from humble backgrounds such as Guo Jia and Xu Chu, the support he received from the scholar-officials was always limited. The “welcoming of the Emperor” happened to provide him with an opportunity to get close to the scholar-officials.
As Xun Yu (who came from the prominent Yingchuan scholar-official family) advised: welcoming the Emperor could, in the name of respecting the Han Dynasty, send a signal to the scholar-officials that he was upholding the traditional order, thereby breaking the prejudice against his family background as the ugly legacy of a eunuch’s adopted son. Cao Cao followed this advice. After welcoming the Emperor, he ostensibly renovated the imperial ancestral temple, maintained rituals, and respected Emperor Xian as the common lord of the world. In essence, he used the Emperor’s name to provide official career paths for the scholar-officials, gradually gaining the support of scholar-official talents such as Xun Yu and Cheng Yu. For Cao Cao, the primary value of “holding the Emperor” was to resolve the legitimacy crisis caused by his family background, rather than to command the warlords. The later advantage of using the Emperor’s name to condemn Yuan Shao and gain the public opinion upper hand of attacking traitors under the imperial edict was merely an additional benefit of this strategy.
IV. The nature of power in turbulent times: “Holding the Emperor” is only a superficial phenomenon; Strength and popular support are the fundamentals
From Dong Zhuo’s failure, Yuan Shao’s choice, to Cao Cao’s practice, the narrative of “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” ultimately points to a core conclusion: in the turbulent times of the late Han Dynasty, the symbolic value of the Emperor always depended on strength and popular support. Without these two elements, no matter how brilliant the strategy of “holding the Emperor” was, it could not achieve success.
Dong Zhuo had the form of “holding the Emperor” but lacked the “matching strength and popular support.” His Liangzhou army was powerful but lost all popular support; although he controlled the Emperor, he destroyed all moral foundations and eventually met his demise. Yuan Shao had the “matching strength and popular support” (support from scholar-officials) but believed that “holding the Emperor” would bring more disadvantages than benefits. He could expand without resorting to the Emperor’s symbol, so he gave it up voluntarily. This choice was not obviously wrong at that time and was only labeled as a “mistake” later because of his defeat in the Battle of Guandu. Cao Cao accurately combined “holding the Emperor” with his “own needs”: he needed the Emperor’s symbol to make up for his family background shortcomings and win over the scholar-officials, and his military talents and pragmatic strategies (such as the tuntian system to solve the problem of military provisions) provided the strength support for “holding the Emperor,” ultimately maximizing the value of this strategy.
The excessive admiration for “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” in later generations often overlooks a crucial fact: the core reasons for Cao Cao’s dominance over northern China were his military talents (such as defeating a stronger enemy with a smaller force in the Battle of Guandu), his talent appointment strategy (combining the policy of “appointing people based on their talents” with winning over scholar-officials), and his economic measures (the tuntian system to stabilize the rear). “Holding the Emperor” was only one part of this, not the whole story. Just as Yuan Shao could still become the most powerful warlord in the east even without holding the Emperor; Cao Cao, even after holding the Emperor, still needed to defeat Yuan Shao in the Battle of Guandu to truly consolidate his hegemony over northern China. The ultimate rule in turbulent times is always strength determines everything. The symbol of the “Emperor” is merely an amplifier of strength, not strength itself.
From Romance of the Three Kingdoms to real history, the story of “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” is not only a strategic game between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao but also a profound interpretation of the nature of power in turbulent times: violence can seize power but cannot maintain it for a long time; symbols can add luster to something but cannot create something out of nothing. Only by combining “strength” with “popular support” and “tactics” with “order” can one truly gain a firm foothold in turbulent times. This is perhaps the most precious insight left by “holding the Emperor to command the warlords” for later generations.
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